DECISIONS ABOUT WORKPLACE FAVOR REQUESTS

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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Organizational Behavior and Theory

Tepper School of Business
Carnegie Mellon University
April 2017

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Laurie Weingart, Linda Babcock, Taya Cohen, and Denise Rousseau for inspiring ideas and thoughtful comments on my dissertation research. I had the privilege to be trained by this truly exceptional group of women, and I am forever grateful for their wonderful advice and unfailing support. I am grateful to Paul Goodman for his friendship and support. I think about him often because without his encouragement and inspiration, I would not have had the courage to begin this journey in the first place. I thank Lise Versterlund for her guidance on some of the nascent ideas that shaped this work. I appreciate the openness and availability of all faculty members in the Organizational Behavior & Theory group, I learned a lot from working with them.

This research was funded by generous support from the National Science Foundation (SES-1330470), the Carnegie Bosch Institute, the Center for Behavioral and Decision Research, and the Graduate Student Assembly and the Provost's Office at Carnegie Mellon University.

I wish to thank my family and friends for all their love and support. Several faithful friends and colleagues were always available to offer encouragement including Julia Laurin, Jonathan Woon, Jonathan Kush, and Lily Morse. My daughter, Madeline, was (almost) always understanding when “Mommy had to work on her research.” My mother, Linda, and my sister, Lynn Ann, have never wavered in their love and support. Thank you all for helping me fulfil my dream. Above all, I appreciate the unwavering love, patience, and support of my husband and best friend, Christopher Weirup, who agreed to uproot our young family and move with me to Pittsburgh. “Thank you / For being there / Because you and me are gonna be alright.”
ABSTRACT

Today most organizations define job responsibilities less clearly than they did in the past. Additionally, increasing emphasis on personal initiative, empowerment, and self-management places a higher burden on workers to control their own activities. As such, decisions about whether to perform discretionary helping tasks, such as requested favors, is an important issue that faces all working professionals as they try to balance the many divergent demands on their time. This dissertation focuses on how individuals make decisions regarding whether to agree to favor requests, defined as “discretionary, prosocial behavior that is performed in response to a specific, explicit request from one person to another,” in the workplace. I show favors—because they are externally requested—are phenomenologically distinct from in-role behaviors and voluntary helping behaviors. I examine favor requests from the perspective of the performer to identify the motivations that influence responses to favor requests. I consider how favor decision-making—both the factors that people consider as well as the decision outcome—changes across individuals and situations. The dissertation contains three papers that contribute to this goal. Paper 1 defines favors and favor requests, distinguishes them from other workplace helping behaviors, and proposes a framework of the motivational processes of favor request decisions. Paper 2 provides an empirical test of the motivational framework proposed in Paper 1. Paper 3 examines the relationship among helping context, comparing favors versus volunteerism, gender, and guilt proneness. Overall, this stream of research is intended to develop an understanding of how people behave when confronted with favor requests.

Keywords: favors; helping behavior; decision making; gender; guilt
INTRODUCTION

Job descriptions are often broadly defined, and companies place considerable emphasis on personal initiative, empowerment, and self-management. In this complex and ambiguous environment, employees are forced to make decisions about how to balance the many divergent demands on their time. One such demand comes in the form of favors, tasks that are outside of one’s official responsibilities and help others rather than oneself. How do we respond to requests for favors? My research searches for answers to these questions by examining how people think, feel, and act when confronted with favor requests. This dissertation is comprised of three papers that provide theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature on favor decision making processes and outcomes in the workplace.

Work-related favors are an important form of helping behavior with consequences at the individual and organizational level. With a more complete understanding of favor decision making process and outcomes, both researchers and managers can identify the antecedents and consequences that influence responses to favor requests leading to higher individual and organizational performance. Favors may be discretionary, but they are critical for the success of organizations as a whole as well as the employees who benefit from them.

This dissertation develops a cognitive perspective on how individuals make decisions regarding whether to agree to favor requests in the workplace – that is, explicit requests to perform discretionary, prosocial behavior. The goals of this stream of research are three fold: 1) to define favors and distinguish them from other workplace behaviors, 2) to understand the motivational factors that influence people’s decisions to agree to or decline favor requests, and 3) to examine the role of gender and guilt in favor decision making outcomes.
Overview of the Dissertation

The most foundational proposition from my research, and one that is critical for organizations and managers to understand, is that favors are phenomenologically distinct from other workplace behaviors. In the first paper (co-authored with Laurie Weingart and Taya Cohen), we identify and define favors, and position them vis-à-vis related phenomenon, such as prosocial behavior, compliance, social exchange, and volunteerism. We propose a theoretical definition of a favor, “a *discretionary, prosocial behavior that is performed in response to a specific, explicit request from one person to another.*” We propose that individuals are more likely to agree to perform behaviors when they are presented as favors rather than volunteer opportunities. One important cause of this variance is the increased importance of the interpersonal relationship between the requestor and the performer in the favor decision-making process. We provide a theoretical framework that outlines how responses to favor requests are driven by the favor’s potential impact on three targets: the potential performer (“self”), requestor or other beneficiary (“other”), and the interpersonal relationship between the performer and the requestor (“relationship”) and meet three types of goals: economic gains or losses (“instrumental”), emotional gains or losses (“hedonic”), and response rules for the environment in which the request is made (“normative”). In the second paper, I perform an empirical test of the three motivational goals (instrumental, hedonic, and normative) for the self target of the proposed theoretical framework Using confirmatory factor analysis on an existing dataset, I provide evidence that the items are an acceptable fit for three-factor hypothesized model.

In the third paper (co-authored with Linda Babcock and Taya Cohen), we examine the role of helping context, gender, and guilt proneness on discretionary interpersonal helping rates in five studies. We hypothesize that helping context (favor requests versus volunteer
opportunities), gender, and guilt proneness will all have direct positive effects on helping rates.

We hypothesize that gender plays a role in favor decision making because gender stereotypes prescribe that women perform interpersonal helping behavior. Similarly, we propose that guilt—because of its tendency to draw attention to consequences for others and social norms—will influence the likelihood to agree to favors because it causes people to think about the costs of declining the favor. Next, we hypothesize that helping context and gender will interact such that the positive effects of gender will be amplified in the favor context versus the volunteer context. Finally, we propose a moderated mediation model whereby guilt proneness partially explains the relationship between the gender and helping rates, but that the relationship between gender and guilt proneness is moderated by helping context. The results from these five studies provide inconsistent support for the positive effect of favor context, female gender, and high levels of guilt proneness on helping rates, but the moderated mediation model was not supported as the favor context did not differentially affect the relationship between gender and guilt proneness.

**Boundary Conditions**

It is important to establish the boundary conditions for this research stream during this initial stage. First, I focus on favors encountered in the workplace; favors that are personal in nature, unless they occur within the work context, are excluded from this analysis. Second, I will limit the current investigation to the perspective of the performer, explaining how people make decisions about whether to agree to or decline favor requests. A performer-focused perspective remains agnostic regarding the motivation of requestors as they decide who to ask. Adding the decision making process perspective of the requestor will be an important next step for future studies, but is currently outside the scope of this initial research. Third, this research is limited to North American participants. It is not clear that the same results would hold for participants in
other countries as it has been shown that culturally-driven collectivism strengthens discretionary helping behavior (Moorman & Blakely, 1995). Although an assessment of cross-cultural differences in favor decision making is an interesting research direction, it is currently out of scope for this stream of research.

**Why Does it Matter How People Respond to Favor Requests?**

Theoretically, the literature does not differentiate external requests for discretionary interpersonal helping behavior, favors, from other helping behaviors. Defining favors and distinguishing favor requests from other workplace helping behavior, both theoretically and empirically, is important because, given their external stimulus, they are likely to different antecedents and consequences.

From a practical perspective, work-related favors are an important form of helping behavior with consequences at the individual and organizational level. For individuals, discretionary work requests can create role ambiguity, role conflict, and role overload, which have well-documented negative influences on job performance and subjective well-being (Rizzo, House, & Lirtzman, 1970; Siegall, 2000). Furthermore, some people agree to perform a large amount of discretionary work while others do very little. These differences may create a sense of inequity in the work place especially since this work may be under-emphasized in promotions and evaluations (Ely, Ibarra, & Kolb, 2011). For organizations, the work represented by the discretionary, additional effort of favors is critical to its functioning (Borman & Motowidlo, 1997). Thus, under-allocation of discretionary work, when considered collectively, reduces organizational productivity. On the other hand, over-allocating discretionary work can also reduce organizational productivity if performers have high opportunity costs. Additionally, equitable distribution of such tasks are important to promote fairness and organizational justice.
(Greenberg, 2011).
Decisions about whether to perform favors for colleagues, supervisors, and subordinates is an important issue that faces all working professionals as they try to balance the many divergent demands on their time. This article focuses on how individuals make decisions regarding whether to agree to favor requests, defined as “explicit requests to perform discretionary, prosocial behavior” in the workplace. We explore how favors—because they are directly requested by one individual to another and invoke an interpersonal relationship—are phenomenologically distinct from in-role behaviors, social exchange, and voluntary helping behaviors. We consider favor requests from the perspective of the performer (as opposed to the requestor) to identify the motivations and emotions that influence responses to favor requests and consider how favor decision making differs across individuals and situations. We provide a framework that outlines how responses to favor requests are influenced by concerns about helping and harming one’s self, the requestor, the relationship between one’s self and the requestor, and others whom the favor might affect. We conclude with a discussion of how separating favors from other workplace helping behavior can inform both research and practice.

Keywords: favors; decision making; interpersonal relations; prosocial behavior; dyadic exchange; organizational citizenship; employee motivation
Will You Do Me a Favor? Responding to Favor Requests in the Workplace

“Will you do me a favor and proofread this document before I submit it?” Favor requests like this are ubiquitous in today’s organizations where voluntary helping behavior (Organ, 1988; Van Dyne, Cummings, Parks, & McLean Parks, 1995), personal initiative (Frese & Fay, 2001), and self-management (Liden, Wayne, & Sparrowe, 2000; Uhl-Bien & Graen, 1992) are highly valued but not always clearly and directly rewarded. The allocation of discretionary work is further confounded by changing workplaces that complicate interpersonal relationships and job roles through non-standard work arrangements (Ashford, George, & Blatt, 2007; Connelly & Gallagher, 2004; George, Levenson, Finegold, & Chattopadhyay, 2010), job insecurity (Kalleberg, 2009), technological changes (Olson & Olson, 2000), and coordination across organizational and geographic boundaries (Adler, Kwon, & Hecksher, 2008; Gittell & Douglass, 2012; Grant & Parker, 2009). In this environment of uncertainty, change, and discretion, interpersonal relationships inform decisions about which discretionary tasks to perform, including requested favors. As a result, all working professionals must find a way to balance the many divergent demands on their time.

The resulting role conflict, role overload, citizenship pressure, job creep, and inequity of balancing discretionary work with job requirements have a well-documented negative influence on job performance and subjective well-being (Bolino & Turnley, 2005; Bolino, Turnley, Gilstrap, & Suazo, 2010; Ford & Randolph, 1992; Rizzo et al., 1970; Siegall, 2000; Van Dyne & Ellis, 2004). Furthermore, some people agree to perform a large amount of discretionary work while others do very little. These differences may create a sense of inequity in the workplace especially because this type of work may be under-emphasized in promotions and evaluations.
At the same time, favors can provide considerable individual benefits for those who perform them, such as career advancement or positive emotion.

From an organizational perspective, however, there is less conflict: the work represented by the discretionary, additional effort associated with doing favors is critical to the functioning of the organization (Borman & Motowidlo, 1997). It can enhance coworker and managerial productivity (Organ, 1988; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Hui, 1993), free resources for more productive activities (Borman & Motowidlo, 1993; Organ, 1988; Podsakoff et al., 1993), and improve the stability of organizational performance (Karambayya, 1990; Organ, 1988; Smith, Organ, & Near, 1983). Favors benefit others and thus contribute to the well-being of people within the organization and the organizations themselves (Helliwell & Putnam, 2004) even though they create additional work for the selected performer. Since the effectiveness of organizations rests on people being willing to help each other when asked and offering to help when not asked, it is important to understand how employees make decisions about performing favors. On the other hand, over-allocating discretionary work can also reduce organizational productivity if performers have high opportunity costs. Additionally, equitable distribution of such tasks is important to promote fairness and organizational justice (Greenberg, 2011).

Favors are pervasive in the modern workplace. Over the past several years, we have surveyed over two thousand individuals from diverse populations including human resources professionals, MBA alumni, current MBA and master’s students with professional experience, and working adults, and nearly all of the survey respondents could readily provide us with an example of a favor they had been asked to perform within the last month. In fact, many were able to list multiple favors, and most participants indicated that favor requests were recurring or frequent occurrences. For example, working professionals reported being asked to “give up a
“set up for a trade show”, “perform administrative tasks for a new employee (e.g., email address, phone, and computer)”, “be the point person for my group for a companywide project,” and “prepare a customer presentation.” In all of the examples we collected, there was a specific request from one person to another to do a task that was outside the performer’s job responsibilities. These characteristics make favors distinguishable from other prosocial and workplace helping behaviors.

The concept of favors has been a prominent topic for decades in other fields, particularly anthropology (Malinowski, 1922; Mauss, 1990), sociology (Blau, 1964; Burt, 1992; Homans, 1958; Scott, 2008), and economics (North, 1990; Polanyi, 1957). Most of this literature has focused on favors at the organizational level of analysis where favors are viewed as a network of exchanges that are used to fill institutional voids (Blau, 1964; Puffer, McCarthy, Jaeger, & Dunlap, 2013; Teagarden & Schotter, 2013; Verbeke & Kano, 2013). These networks of favors are built upon expectations of delayed reciprocity such that motivations are considered in terms of the overall give and take among participants (Berkowitz & Daniels, 1963; De Waal & Luttrell, 1988; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 1979). Recent discussion of favors in the management literature has examined favors at the individual level of analysis. For individuals, favors can be viewed as interpersonal interactions characterized by discretionary and prosocial action (Belmi & Pfeffer, 2015; Flynn, 2003a, 2003b; Flynn & Brockner, 2003).

In this paper, we also focus on the individual level of analysis, building on both exchange-based and interpersonal conceptualizations of favors while focusing on the favor decision-making process itself. We examine the complexity of the process people go through when responding to favor requests and offer a conceptual framework that provides a new lens for understanding why responses to favor requests are difficult. We propose that favors are an
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An identifiable type of workplace behavior that sits at the intersection of interpersonal helping, social exchange, and discretionary behavior. Viewing favors through the intersection of these three literatures advances theory by enabling us to make predictions about the cognitive, affective, and behavioral reactions to favor requests.

In developing our conceptual framework, we first define favors by elaborating upon their prosocial, exchange, and discretionary features, identifying how favors are different from other types of voluntary behavior and how favor requests are different from implicit requests and institutional expectations. In the next section, we describe the characteristics of favors and demonstrate the breadth of workplace favors considering them in terms of the dyadic relationship and the scope of the task. In the third section, we propose a decision model of motivational factors that people consider during the favor deliberation process. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of this new definition and conceptual framework for research and practice as well as directions for future investigation.

DEFINING FAVORS IN THE WORKPLACE

We define a favor as a discretionary, prosocial behavior that is performed in response to a specific, explicit request from one person to another. When a favor is desired, the requestor (sender) communicates the favor request (the specifics about the task to be done) to the intended performer (receiver) as shown in Figure 1. Thus, a favor request is the explicit ask for help communicated between a requestor and a potential performer. In response, the performer assesses the request and the requestor, interpreting the embedded social and situational information (Goffman, 1956; Kohler, 1964; Shannon & Weaver, 1948; Warnock, 1966). After interpreting the favor request, the performer must make a favor decision, determining whether to perform the favor, and then communicate that decision via a favor request response. If the
performer agrees to the favor request, it is at this point the favor, the act of providing the requested help, occurs.

As we will elaborate below, favors are: 1) prosocial, 2) interpersonal, and 3) discretionary. This definition situates favors at the intersection of the prosocial behavior, interpersonal social exchange, and discretionary behavior literatures acknowledging that favors feature these three attributes simultaneously. These three characteristics of favors can be used to compare and contrast them to other workplace helping and extra-role behaviors.

Although favors are by no means limited to the workplace, in our research, we focus on work-related favors. Work-related favors include favors requested by a colleague within one’s workplace or between individuals in a professional working relationship. Favors requested by people outside one’s workplace or profession are also included if the favor taps into a person’s professional expertise or identity, such as a physician who is asked to provide free medical advice at a social event.

Favors are Prosocial

At their core, favors are prosocial, as they are completed to help other people. Prosocial behaviors are “defined by society as generally beneficial to other people and to the ongoing political system,” (Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaertner, & Clark, 1981: 4). Workplace favors are requested with the expectation that the resultant action will help the requestor, a third party, a group of others, and/or an institution. Interestingly, favor requests motivate much helping behavior in the workplace. Previous research suggests that between 75 and 90 percent of workplace helping is in response to a specific request for help (Anderson & Williams, 1996; Burke, Weir, & Duncan, 1976; Kaplan & Cowen, 1981). While some incidents of helping occur after someone volunteers without being asked to help, many helping interactions at work are
initiated by someone seeking help as a potential recipient or as a facilitator for a needy third party (Anderson & Williams, 1996). However, extant theories of prosocial behavior do little to focus on the request dynamic and attendant decision-making process.

Given their prosocial nature, workplace favors are closely related to other types of organizational helping behavior. The preponderance of research in this area has focused on prosocial organizational behavior (POB) and organizational citizenship behavior (OCB), which are similar to favors in that they too involve workplace helping behavior. POBs are acts performed with the intention of promoting the welfare of others (Brief & Motowidlo, 1986) and OCBs are discretionary behaviors that help the organization or people within the organization (Kovovsky & Organ, 1996; Organ, 1988, 1997; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine, & Bachrach, 2000; Smith et al., 1983; Van Dyne & LePine, 1998; Williams & Anderson, 1991). POBs and OCBs differ from one another in how they treat the performer’s intention to help (Cropanzano, 2015); POB is motivated by the intention to help others (Brief & Motowidlo, 1986) whereas OCB requires only prosocial consequences (Organ, 1988). Favors are more similar to OCBs than POBs because people often do favors for egoistic rather than purely prosocial reasons (Bolino, 1999; Bolino, Varela, Bande, & Turnley, 2006; De Dreu & Nauta, 2009; Grant & Mayer, 2009). Thus, like OCB, our definition of favors emphasizes the behavioral outcome—providing help to others—without requiring prosocial intent. Prosocial intentions are just one among many motivating factors for why people perform favors.

Favors differ from POB and OCB in that they are driven by a direct ask between two people. One might ask a coworker to “move some boxes into a car,” “help prepare someone else’s presentation,” or “give feedback to his child for an upcoming job interview.” This direct ask means that the scope of a favor request is determined by the needs and desires of the
requestor and often includes details about the task, timing, and recipient. In response to a direct ask, the performer is compelled to accept or reject the specific request. Even if the performer is willing to do something different from the specific request to help, the initial request must first be rejected. In contrast, most conceptualizations of POB and OCB assume that, because the behavior is extra-role, it is not prescribed or determined in advance (Bateman & Organ, 1983; Katz & Kahn, 1978), leaving performers to determine the scope of the help that best meets their own goals (Bolino, Harvey, & Bachrach, 2012) – goals such as improving their skills or stimulating a social interaction (Sharp, 1978; Stinson & Stam, 1976). For example, a POB or OCB occurs when an employee offers to help a coworker (regardless of being asked), and that help that can take the form of just looking over a nearly polished presentation slide deck to writing the entire slide deck for them. In summary, a favor is a specific type of organizational helping behavior, one that is triggered by an explicit request.

**Favors are Interpersonal (Social) Exchange**

Because favors are driven by a direct request for help, they can be classified as a type of interpersonal or social exchange. This differentiates favors from OCBs and other types of workplace helping behavior where employees may face “pressure to engage” in helping (Bolino et al., 2010; Cain, Dana, & Newman, 2014), but the pressure is diffuse rather than direct. Noticing and cleaning a dirty microwave in the breakroom because one is personally motivated to do so is phenomenologically and experientially distinct from being asked to go clean the microwave in the breakroom even when, in both cases, it is not your job to do so. The former is self-directed, whereas the latter is more about compliance with the specific request.

Social exchange is the exchange of activity, tangible or intangible, between at least two persons (Homans, 1958, 1961). Workplace helping behavior has been examined as social
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exchange between employees and employers (Bateman & Organ, 1983; Organ, 1988; Robinson & Morrison, 1995; Van Dyne & LePine, 1998), supervisors and subordinates (Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975; Dienesch & Liden, 1986), and between coworkers (Flynn, 2003b; Flynn & Brockner, 2003). Favors can occur across any of these boundaries.

Positioning favors as a social exchange allows us to explore two important aspects of the dynamic. First, a favor involves a stimulus (a request for help) that requires a response (“yes” or “no”) and an expectation (or at least hope) of action. In this way, we can think of favor requests as influence attempts that trigger expectations of compliance (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Second, conceptualizing favors as social exchange emphasizes the relationship between the requestor and the performer (Ferris et al., 2009; Gittell & Douglass, 2012). In making and responding to a favor request, the relationship between the actors is front and center.

**Expectation of a response.** Because favor requests are explicit and direct asks that clearly identify the task and the performer, they evoke expectations of a response and of compliance (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). A direct ask triggers a process in which the performer is obligated to provide the requestor with a “yes” or “no” answer. Even though doing the favor is, by definition, a choice, responding to the request one way or the other is expected. If the performer says “no,” the response is complete. However, if the performer agrees to perform the favor, a two-part response is required: the “yes” response and the performance of the requested behavior. (Note the two paths from the performer to the requestor in Figure 1.) The favor performer can only remove the pressure of the favor request by responding to it one way or the other.

As with other requests for compliance, favor requests pull on our desires to behave effectively, build and maintain our relationships, and manage our self-concepts (Cialdini, 1995,
2001). In deciding how to respond, performers must evaluate their goals (e.g., to exact benefit from the exchange relationship or to avoid being taking advantage of) and determine how to act appropriately within the overt social situation presented by the favor request (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Wood, 2000). If a potential performer rejects a favor request, he or she runs the risk of violating the norm of benevolence, and frustrating concerns with being liked and seeing oneself as a helpful person (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Goffman, 1971; Gouldner, 1960).

Explicit favor requests differ from implicit requests and institutional expectations. With implicit requests or expectations, the target recognizes that he or she is being urged to respond in a specific way but is not directly asked to do something. For example, a coworker might note that the break room is a mess without directly asking someone to clean it. In contrast, if the coworker asks you to do them a favor and clean the break room, the direct and explicit ask for specific action would evoke a high expectation for compliance. Performers acknowledge the social costs of refusing a direct request for help (Flynn & Lake, 2008). The pressure of the social situation alone is often enough to result in a “yes” to a favor request (Cialdini, 2001).

Explicit favor requests are also different from diffuse requests for volunteers where a request is directed to multiple people. When a potential help provider believes that others may take action instead, it relieves personal responsibility (Darley & Latané, 1968; Otten, Penner, & Waugh, 1988). This effect is even more pronounced when other potential performers are perceived as better able to help or when norms or rewards minimize support for providing help (Dovidio, Piliavin, Gaertner, Schroeder, & Clark, 1991; Piliavin et al., 1981). For example, multiple employees might be sent an email requesting someone to serve on the building safety committee. In these situations, potential performers may feel some pressure from the requestor to
respond, but that pressure is distributed such that each recipient can make an individual choice about whether to volunteer to perform the task, and any one person can do it. In the case of diffuse volunteer requests, although there is a specific requestor (the email sender), the requestor is not tapping into the one-to-one relationship between the requestor and any given performer. The strength of a volunteer request is thus weaker than a favor request because of the distributed interpersonal connection and the diffusion of responsibility across the potential performers (Darley & Latané, 1968).

**The role of the relationship.** Favors are a social exchange between individuals, and as such, involve the formation or reinforcement of a relationship (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Ferris et al., 2009; Gittell & Douglass, 2012; Organ, 1988). Depending on the features of that relationship (e.g., authority, power, status, interdependence), individuals will be more or less willing to exert effort on behalf of the other party (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Ferris et al., 2009). While we discuss how power, status, and interdependence affect responses to favor requests later in the article, it is important to note here that the relationship between the two parties is integral to a favor request, because one person is asking another. Requestors can invoke the relationship when making a request, for example, “I’m asking you as a friend” (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Even if not explicitly mentioned by the requestor, a performer will consider the relationship when deciding how to respond, for example, “How will my response affect our relationship? Will saying no put distance between us? Will saying yes pull us closer together?”

Relationships can be conceptualized as an interaction between two people in terms of their thoughts, needs, and motivations (Kelley et al., 1983; Kelley & Holmes, 2003). Many of these needs, such as giving and receiving help from others, can only be fulfilled within dyads or groups (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Drigotas & Rusbult, 1992; Ferris et al., 2009; Hazan &
Reciprocity is fundamental to forming and maintaining the mutuality of these helping exchanges (Gittell & Douglass, 2012; Gouldner, 1960). Just as reciprocity is fundamental to relationship building and social exchange, reciprocity is a key component to the asking and doing of favors. Favor requests evoke reciprocity (Bartlett & DeSteno, 2006; Belmi & Pfeffer, 2015; Blau, 1964; Flynn & Brockner, 2003; Goei & Boster, 2007; Gray, Ward, & Norton, 2014; Homans, 1958; Simpson, & Willer, 2008). When a performer agrees to do a favor for a requestor, there is an expectation that the requestor is indebted and can be called upon in the future (Blau, 1964; Coleman, 1988; Greenberg, 1980; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978), and that indebtedness increases the power and influence of the performer relative to the requestor (Greenberg & Westcott, 1983). Even imposing the obligation to reply to the favor request (provide the requestor with a “yes” or “no” answer) is a form of dominance that evokes power and status.

Although favors are a form of social exchange, viewing them solely in these terms is likely to underpredict their incidence, and the social exchange perspective does not fully explain the favor decision-making process. Social exchange models focus on cost-benefit calculations individuals make to determine whether helping will be “worth it” to themselves (Piliavin et al., 1981). However, not all employees are primarily driven by the give and take (or cost-benefit assessment) associated with favor exchange (Ames, Flynn, & Weber, 2004). Our model broadens the conceptualization of favors by considering more affective motives for doing favors (such as the benefit provided to the requestor – “how can I help another person”) and normative motives (such as the morality of help giving – “it’s the right thing to do”). Situating favors at the intersection of social exchange and prosocial behavior provides a more comprehensive view of the favor dynamic.
Favors are Discretionary

The third and final feature of favors is that they are *discretionary*, that is, they are outside of a person’s job responsibilities (i.e., extra-role, Katz & Kahn, 1978) and the potential performer has volition and discretion over his or her decision to agree or disagree with the request. The extra-role aspect differentiates favors from job requirements and in-role job requests (Organ, 1990; Smith et al., 1983; Van Dyne, Graham, & Dienesch, 1994) making them similar to OCBs (Organ, 1988, 1997; Van Dyne & LePine, 1998). Favors, like OCBs, are not formally rewarded by the organizational reward system (Marinova, Moon, & Van Dyne, 2010). And while OCBs have been shown to positively relate to job performance ratings (Podsakoff, Whiting, Podsakoff, & Blume, 2009; Podsakoff et al., 1993), it remains to be seen whether doing favors has the same positive effect. Nonetheless, when responding to favor requests, potential performers must believe they can say no and that the decision is truly theirs. If they believe they must say “yes,” then the request is no longer a favor from the perspective of the receiver, even though it may have been presented as such. Thus, perception that the favor response is a discretionary choice for the receiver is key.

The role of perception. Perceptions of the request are particularly relevant for favors because feelings of discretion are subjective. Employees in the same job differ in the extent to which they view specific OCBs as part of their role (Morrison, 1994; Van Dyne, Kamdar, & Joireman, 2008), and we expect favor perceptions are similar. Individual and contextual differences influence employee perceptions of the extent to which specific OCBs are viewed as in-role (Kamdar, McAllister, & Turban, 2006). Differences in role perceptions appear across nations, supervisors, and subordinates, supporting the notion that the distinction between a discretionary behavior and a required one is often hazy (Lam, Hui, & Law, 1999). While a
requester might intend a favor request to be discretionary, the recipient may not view it as such, and vice versa. If the performer feels obligated to acquiesce, the request fails to meet the “discretionary” aspect of our definition.

At issue is a potential mismatch between the formal, organizationally determined job characteristics and those that are perceived and enacted by employees in situ (Daniels, 2006). Employees in the same job may differ in their role perceptions, and these differences influence perceptions of discretionary behaviors as in-role or extra-role (Kamdar et al., 2006; Morrison, 1994; Van Dyne et al., 2008). As with OCBs, the performer’s determination of whether a requested favor is discretionary is likely to be a primary influence on that performer’s response.

One type of mismatch can occur when the requestor intends a request to be a requirement, but the performer perceives it as discretionary. If the performer perceives discretion, he or she will interpret the request as a favor and engage in a favor decision-making process. For example, a colleague might ask a colleague to give his or her “opinion” about a decision not directly related to the job, and the performer might interpret that providing the opinion is optional. If the performer says “yes,” he or she would expect the effort to be acknowledged as a favor and thus rewarded by reciprocity or gratitude. Given that the requestor believed the request to be a job requirement, the requestor is unlikely to respond in this way leading to a confused, frustrated, or angry performer. If the performer says “no,” the requestor might interpret the response as insubordination causing a negative response for the requestor. These consequences assume that the mismatch in perception is not recognized. If the performer is aware of the perceptual differences, he or she may question the request, demand remuneration, or be angry about being forced to comply.
A mismatch can also result when a requestor intends the response to be at the performer’s discretion, but the performer does not believe that to be the case. This might occur when the requestor is of much higher status or power than the performer, or when there are strong social norms to say yes (e.g., in situations where no one ever says no when asked). In this situation, the requestor’s intent of performer discretion is of low relevance to the performer’s decision-making process. As an example, a manager might try to recruit an employee for a standing committee that clearly has a need for additional help. When a favor request is coded as a requirement, the performer will not enter into a decision-making process; he or she will just perform the task. However, this response assumes that the performer is not aware of the difference in perception. If the performer does recognize a perceptual disparity, he or she may take that into account and either reframe the request as discretionary or feel frustrated because the requestor does not recognize the constraints.

FAVOR DECISION MAKING: MOTIVATIONS TO AGREE OR DECLINE

When people receive favor requests, they must decide whether to agree or decline to perform a specific behavior for a specific person. Depending on the motivations evoked by the request and requestor, potential performers may feel pushed into agreeing or declining, pulled by the appeal of the request or the appeal of declining, or a mixture of push and pull motivations that require the potential performer to weigh multiple potentially conflicting considerations simultaneously. Within the context of a specific favor request, these motivations may be additive, strengthening the desire to agree to or decline the request, or incompatible, creating internal conflict that leads to difficult, and potentially sub-optimal decisions. Prior literatures have recognized many of these motivational forces, but have not considered them in tandem and
in concert with consideration of whether to do a favor (Batson, Ahmad, Powell, & Stocks, 2008; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Locke & Latham, 2002; Rioux & Penner, 2001).

People are motivated to perform favors because they believe they will get something in return, because they will feel better afterwards, and because they believe it to be an organizational norm. Each of these motives is predicated on the desire to satisfy an underlying respective goal: instrumental, hedonic, or normative. A performer’s goals will govern what information he or she is sensitive to and what alternatives he or she considers (Kruglanski & Kopetz, 2009). We consider each of these motives in presenting our framework of potential favor performers’ decision making (see Table 1). We describe how instrumental, hedonic, and normative goals for the self (i.e., performers), others (i.e., requestors, recipients, and/or organizations), and the relationship between the requestor and performer motivate potential performers to agree or decline favor requests.

**Self-Focused Motivations**

Even though all favors are intended to help others, some favors have the potential to help the performer as well. When faced with a favor request, people consider how performing the requested behavior will affect them and their own needs and interests. While not the only concern for most people, self-interest is a powerful motivator of behavior (Holmes, Miller, & Lerner, 2002; Schwartz, 1986). Thus, a major but not exclusive consideration in favor decision making is how agreeing to the request will affect one’s self. Some individuals are particularly in tune with self-interest, such as those that see themselves as independent and autonomous (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) or have dispositional achievement motivation and performance orientation (Moon, Kamdar, Mayer, & Takeuchi, 2008). However, research has also shown that self-concern is often moderated by situational contexts, such as a justice climate (De Dreu &
Therefore, organizational factors as well as individual attributes can direct individuals’ decision making to focus on outcomes for the self. Self-focused considerations can be divided into three categories of goals: instrumental, hedonic, and normative.

**Instrumental benefits.** The decision of whether to fulfill a favor request is influenced, in part, by the performer’s assessment of the potential benefits that can be gained and the potential costs that can be avoided from agreeing to or declining to perform the requested behavior (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). As noted earlier, favor behavior, like citizenship behavior, may provide instrumental benefits to the performer by improving or maintaining the performer’s resources, such as career, income, or status (Podsakoff et al., 2000). The indirect, non-relationship career benefits from performing a favor has been termed the *promotability* of the favor (Vesterlund, Babcock, Recalde, & Weingart, 2016). Promotability represents the projected or perceived effect performing the favor will have on career promotions and rewards. Doing promotable favors may improve a person’s projected work-related competence, expertise, and effectiveness, as well as their reputation and standing within the organization. For example, a performer might view a favor favorably if it has “a lot of visibility to help me get ahead in the long run.” As one survey respondent noted, she performed favors at her workplace because she hoped it would result in a strong performance evaluation and “make an easy case for being ranked in top 5%.”

Some favors provide instrumental benefits for the performer by virtue of their relative scarcity or uniqueness, such as being asked to serve on a powerful or prestigious committee or attend an elite conference (Biss & Hasher, 2011; Brehm & Cole, 1966; Brehm, 1981; Burger & Caldwell, 2011; Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Lynn, 1991, 1992). People will be more likely to agree
to perform these “special” favors to avoid a potential lost opportunity. Of course, the benefits of agreeing to perform a favor must be balanced against the potential benefits of declining it.

Favors can also improve or maintain others’ positive perceptions of the favor performer, thus providing reputational benefits for the performer (Grant & Mayer, 2009; Rioux & Penner, 2001; Takeuchi, Bolino, & Lin, 2015). For example, favors may provide reputation benefits by giving performers the opportunity to look powerful, helpful, or friendly, and these positive reputations can increase instrumental rewards.

**Instrumental costs.** On the other side of the equation, favors can be measured based on how costly they are for the performer to do—including both direct costs and opportunity costs. By declining to perform a favor, performers can avoid the additional workload and detraction from their own individual productivity. At one end of the spectrum, one might be asked for a low cost favor, such as to “bring printed copies of the presentation to the meeting,” a task which requires a few clicks and a trip to the printer with no expectation of future effort. At the other end of the spectrum, one might be asked, like a survey respondent of ours was, to “lead the beginning of a process-focused organizational change project… this request took me outside of my role and outside of my domain. It required almost 100% focus for several months.” This favor would require an initial investment of extensive hours, resources, and coordination and necessitate an on-going commitment. These absolute costs could be measured in terms of time and effort as well as corresponding decreases in other scarce resources.

Favors can be considered in terms of opportunity costs as well as direct costs. Relative comparisons fall into two categories. First, performers may compare favor requests against their own workload to determine the favor’s relative importance and value. Second, performers might compare favor requests against others’ (e.g., coworkers’) workloads considering both balance
and equitable distribution (Adams, 1965) as well as skill and expertise matching. For example, consider these explanations for agreeing to favor requests: “I agreed to help because it was my turn”; “…because I was available”; “…because everyone else was busier than I was.” All of these explanations suggest that people actively consider equity and fairness for themselves and others in weighing the costs and benefits of acquiescing to the favor request. Such consideration takes into account instrumental costs for the self and others, as well as hedonic and normative concerns.

Some favors are high cost because they are inherently undesirable or even illegitimate, so called “non-promotable tasks” (Vesterlund et al., 2016). Tasks are perceived as illegitimate to the extent that employees think the requested behaviors are inappropriate to be asked of them (Semmer et al., 2015). If a task is deemed illegitimate, it is highly unlikely that individuals will volunteer for it, and they may avoid it even if it is a job requirement. Individuals are likely to be particularly upset about favor requests that involve these illegitimate tasks, such as “moving boxes into my supervisor’s trunk” or “cleaning out a storage room.” In addition to being unpleasant to complete, agreeing to these types of favors could have reputational costs for performers. Consider what could happen if one consistently agrees to perform low-valued or socially undesirable tasks—they might develop a reputation of being a “lackey” or “flunkey.” As with the more tangible instrumental costs and benefits, potential performers must balance potential reputational costs and benefits in deciding whether to agree, and make a holistic judgment of whether saying yes is overall beneficial for achieving their goals.

**Hedonic goals.** Individuals may be motivated to perform favors through a desire to feel good and to avoid feeling bad. Gaining or maintaining positive affect is recognized as a fundamental driver of behavior across the social influence, prosocial behavior, and task
motivation literatures (Batson, 1998; Batson et al., 1991; Cialdini, Darby, & Vincent, 1973; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Davis, 1994; Dovidio & Penner, 2003; Penner et al., 2005a; Pilivin, Dovidio, Gaertner, & Clark, 1981; Pizarro, 2000; Reykowski, 1982). One might be motivated to perform favors to improve or maintain one’s mood (Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978) and/or by inherent enjoyment derived from helping or completing the favor task (Locke & Latham, 2002). Likewise, one might agree to perform a favor to avoid negative affect, such as guilt or remorse that could result from declining a request. Individuals who are sensitive to guilt avoid situations in which they are apt to let others down (Wiltermuth & Cohen, 2014). In the realm of favors, sensitivity to guilt could lead individuals to acquiesce to requests so as not to disappoint or harm others.

Hedonic goals might also motivate individuals to decline favor requests. The time and effort required to perform a favor can evoke negative affect, such as anger, anxiety, or fatigue resulting from an increased workload. Guilt or shame can arise if performing a favor leads to insufficient time and effort spent elsewhere, such as one’s own work projects or with loved ones outside of work. In these cases, an individual may choose to decline the favor to avoid potential negative emotions.

Performing favors is likely to provide not only direct affective consequences (feeling good) but also positive self-evaluations (feeling good about the self). For example, people for whom helpfulness and cooperativeness are important aspects of their identity will agree to favors that allow them to provide observable help to others (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Dovidio & Penner, 2003; Grusec, 1991; Swinyard & Ray, 1979). When these individuals perform favors, they feel good about themselves and satisfy hedonic goals. Similarly, people for whom being “efficient” or “discerning” are important aspects of their identity may feel good when they decline favors
that they believe to be distracting them from their assigned work, such as favors that require participating in lengthy, unproductive meetings.

**Normative goals.** Agreeing to do favors can satisfy normative goals when those favors allow individuals to demonstrate compliance with appropriate behavior as defined by moral codes and the social context in which they are acting. Performers are likely to feel the pressure from universal norms that prescribe behavior related to fairness (reciprocity and equity) and aiding others (social responsibility) as well as from personal or organizational norms and standards of helping behavior (Batson et al., 2008; Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Penner et al., 2005; Schwartz & Howard, 1982). For example, within organizations that socialize, model, or reward helping values, agreeing to favors is seen as the appropriate and expected behavior. Furthermore, organizations or societies characterized by cultural tightness exhibit an increased sensitivity to social norms (Gelfand et al., 2011). In organizations that emphasize individual effort and individualized achievement, however, performing favors that detract from individual productivity may be seen as counter-normative, and therefore inappropriate.

Although there is considerable variation in norms across organizational settings (Cooke & Rousseau, 1988), three generalized norms are particularly relevant within the context of favor decision making: reciprocity, equity, and social responsibility. First, most of the existing literature on favors has focused on the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960) to suggest that people are motivated to reciprocate favors as a form social exchange (Belmi & Pfeffer, 2015; Blau, 1964; Cialdini, 2001). Reciprocity can motivate people to help when they want a non-specific future reward—not necessarily from the same person from which they provided the help but in equal measure (Burger, Sanchez, Imberi, & Grande, 2009; Lerner, 1980; Zuckerman, 1975). Simply put, the norm of reciprocity establishes an expectation to reciprocate favors, and
this norm has been shown to be stronger within the organizational context (Belmi & Pfeffer, 2015). Previous research has found that people’s attributions of favor-doer motives and liking for help providers accounted for much of their willingness to reciprocate (Ames et al., 2004; Greenberg & Frisch, 1972; Schopler & Thompson, 1968). Willingness to reciprocate is also much higher when helping was seen as deliberate rather than accidental (Greenberg & Frisch, 1972).

Second, individuals may respond to favors in terms of equity (Adams, 1965; Ambrose & Kulik, 1999), whereby they consider a favor in terms of how much overall work they have done relative to the rest of their workgroup or how favors are allocated to them versus capable others. Equity motives are at play when performers agree because “it’s their turn” to do the favor. Third, social responsibility norms encourage people to help others who are dependent upon them (Berkowitz & Daniels, 1963). Social responsibilities norms may compel bosses, for example, to do favors for their subordinates or employees to do favors for struggling coworkers.

In addition to generalized norms related to equity, reciprocity, and social responsibility, individuals may respond to norms activated by a particular context, such as norms governing compliance with authority. Authority will motivate individuals to comply with favor requests when the requestor has some power or status advantage, such as an advantage in position, influence, or expertise (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Smith et al., 1983; Tyler, 2006; Van Dyne et al., 1994; Wright, Baxter, & Birkelund, 1995). If the boss asks for the favor, it is normative to agree to do it or find someone who will. Of course, when the boss asks for a favor, there are a number of instrumental considerations that performers must consider in conjunction with the normative considerations about complying with authority.
Finally, individuals’ moral codes, their standards of what is right and wrong, are important in favor decision making. Moral codes exert normative pressure to do what is right, which often involves helping others in some way, and to avoid doing harm. From a moral standpoint, some people agree to favors because they believe that it is the right thing to do or decline favors because they violate standards (e.g., if one were requested to lie to a customer or steal from the company). Normative goals related to morality and ethics function in conjunction with hedonic goals related to the avoidance of guilt and shame, as guilt and shame arise when one behaves in unethical and counter-normative ways (Tangney & Dearing, 2002).

**Other-focused Motivations**

Favors are prosocial in nature so they benefit someone other than the self. Although self-focused motivations provide a compelling reason to agree to or decline favor requests, performers are aware that their responses to favor requests also affect requestors, recipients (i.e., the beneficiaries of the favor), and/or the organization as a whole. The amount of that benefit is highly variable and often subjective (Ames et al., 2004; McNeely & Meglino, 1994; Piliavin et al., 1981). When helpers believe that they will provide value to the recipient, they are more motivated to help (Batson, 1998).

Other-focused motivations refer to the goals to provide instrumental or hedonic benefits to these other parties, or to follow norms regarding the treatment of others. Favors performed for prosocial reasons related to helping others are not necessarily completely selfless behaviors, as favor behaviors are multiply determined. Nonetheless, the altruistic desire to help other people can lead targets to perform behaviors requested of them. When focusing on the needs of others, performers may consider the potential of the favor to improve the material or emotional condition of the requestor, recipients, and/or organizations and institutions more generally.
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(Batson, 1998; Batson et al., 2008; Macintyre, 1967). Of course, in some cases, too much altruistic behavior might be a bad thing. If someone is consistently allowed to delegate a particular task to others, they may never learn how to do it themselves. In such cases, potential performers might decline to perform the requested favor in order to provide the opportunity for the requestor to learn new skills or receive the recognition for performing a valued task.

When assessing the ability of a favor to benefit others, performers consider how their act will benefit the ultimate recipient, who may or may not be the requestor (McNeely & Meglino, 1994). Williams and Anderson (Williams & Anderson, 1991) categorized helping behaviors based on the beneficiary or target by separating help directed at an individual from help directed at the organization. As such, the beneficiary of the help may not be the same as the target of the request who does the helping. For example, if a manager asks an employee to “manage a contractor while another employee is out on maternity leave,” the manager is a beneficiary, and the absent employee, the contractor, and the organization also benefit. Any or all of these beneficiaries could factor into the performer’s computation of benefit. Familiarity and distinctiveness of the ultimate recipient may influence favor decisions as shown in Table 2.

Performers are more likely to agree to favors that benefit familiar recipients (Table 2, cells A and C) versus favors for non-familiar recipients (Table 2, cells B and D) because they believe that their contributions can make a real difference in the life of the beneficiary (Penner, 2002; Simon, Stürmer, & Steffens, 2000). Both geographical and psychological distance can decrease willingness to donate one’s time or money (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2010; Wiepking, 2008). Just as performers are more likely to do favors for requestors that they know and like, they are also more likely to do favors for beneficiaries that they know and like (Cialdini, 2001; Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Favors for familiar beneficiaries are more likely to provide self and
relationship benefits to the performer. The chances that you will be able to be repaid for doing a favor for the person in the office next to yours are significantly higher than for the person you met once at an office party.

Similarly, people are also more likely to perform favors that benefit distinct (individual) targets versus collective entities (Murnighan, Kim, & Metzger, 1993). In the case of a distinct beneficiary, there is a more direct mapping between the performance of the favor and the benefit to others. When the favor recipient is a specific individual, the payback is more direct so the relationship benefits are clearer (Kinsbergen, Tolsma, & Ruiter, 2011; Kogut & Ritov, 2005; Loewenstein & Small, 2003).

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**Relationship-focused Motivations**

Relationship motivations, which drive individuals to act in a specific manner with a specific partner, are salient in the favor context (Holmes, 1981). Favors, unlike other behaviors, are defined by a one-to-one relationship between the performer and the requestor. As such, building, maintaining, or even reducing the relationship between the specific performer and requestor can motivate individuals to agree to or decline favor requests. Prior research shows that helping decisions may be driven by the relationship (Ames et al., 2004). Unlike other helping behaviors, not only do decision makers consider how the favor will help the other person, but also they consider how doing the favor will improve their relationship with the requestor. Close relationships cause individuals to focus on hedonic decision making while distant relationships are more likely to prompt instrumental or normative processes (Ames et al., 2004).
**Personality and values.** People who are more in tune with their relationships with others, such as those high in need for affiliation or relational self-construal, are more likely to emphasize the relationship outcomes of favors (Cross, Bacon, & Morris, 2000). Differences in requestor-performer relationships should influence favor performance as individuals assess the relative importance of the relationship against gains and losses for the self and the other. In some cases, even when the harm to the self is high and the gain to the other is low, individuals will still agree to perform favors because of the importance of the relationship between themselves and the requestor (Rusbult, Agnew, & Arriaga, 2012; Van Lange et al., 1997).

Given the fundamental need to form and maintain strong, stable interpersonal relationships (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Reis, Collins, & Berscheid, 2000), people consider their relationships with the requestor of the favor when determining whether to agree. Thus, individuals are more likely to perform favors within close and strong relationships to improve or maintain that closeness and strength (Berscheid, Snyder, & Omoto, 1989; Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997; Kelley et al., 1983; Reis et al., 2000). For example, the degree of liking for and similarity with the requestor, which breed closeness, are likely to affect favor performance (Goei, Lindsey, Boster, Skalski, & Bowman, 2003). Individuals in high-quality relationships are aware and attuned to the needs of others, so favor exchanges are more likely in these relationships as compared to low-quality relationships (Dutton & Heaphy, 2003; Dutton & Ragins, 2007).

Individuals may comply with favor requests within weak or unstable relationships in order to build a more positive relationship with the requestor (Cialdini & Trost, 1998) or to avoid harming the relationship. Agreeing to do favors can allow the performer to demonstrate the importance of their relationship with the requestor, and this demonstration has the potential to
improve both parties’ feelings about the strength or closeness of the relationship (Ferris et al., 2009; Grant & Dutton, 2012). Regardless of closeness, strength, or stability, performing favors for relationship-focused goals can satisfy the need for affiliation (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Reis et al., 2000). On the other hand, constant favor demands might create a burden on a relationship that is too costly to maintain. In these cases, individuals might decline favor requests to rebalance the give and take of the relationship, reduce its impact, or end it completely. Moreover, personality and situational constructs that foster heightened concern for interpersonal relationship consequences, such as guilt-proneness (Cohen, Wolf, Panter, & Insko, 2011) or contextual factors that increase perceived harm from a decline outcome (Berndsen, van der Pligt, Doosje, & Manstead, 2004; Grant & Gino, 2010; Wiltermuth & Cohen, 2014; Zeelenberg & Breugelmans, 2008) are likely to increase agreement with favor requests.

**Power and status differences.** Perhaps the most salient aspect of a relationship within the workplace is the relative position of the individuals within the formal and informal organizational hierarchies. More than 80 percent of the favors recalled in our surveys of working professionals across diverse career levels and occupations were requested by a supervisor or other superior. Even if these base rates are biased by retrospection (such that people are more likely to remember the favors they performed that their superiors asked them to do), the high percentage suggests that a striking proportion of favors are requested by those with higher power, status, or rank than the target. Such individuals are more likely to ask for favors because they can take advantage of increased rates of compliance afforded by their position (Emans, Munduate, Klaver, & Van de Vliert, 2003; Koslowsky, Schwarzwald, & Ashuri, 2001; Tyler, 1997). Power and dominance-based status can lead to increased compliance with favor requests out of fear of saying no, whereas prestige-based status can lead to increased compliance with
favor requests out of respect and deference for the requester (Cheng, Tracy, Fousham, Kingstone, & Henrich, 2012). Individuals are frequently rewarded for behaving in accordance with authority figures (and penalized for not); thus compliance with their demands becomes a powerful factor in the favor decision-making process (Cialdini & Trost, 1998).

The helping literature suggests that help seeking can create or emphasize power and status inequalities such that the help seeker is acknowledging a higher level of competence on the part of the helper (Flynn, Reagans, Amanatullah, & Ames, 2006; Lee, 1997). This suggests that helping a requestor can bestow status on the helper. Favors, however, may present a slightly different dynamic because they do not necessarily imply a lack of competence on the part of the help seeker. Instead, favor requests may signal insufficient resources unrelated to competency, such as time conflicts or workload. Still, the request may nonetheless confer perceptions of competence to the helper if the request conveys the belief that the recipient can indeed perform the favor successfully. For example, if your colleague asks you to give a guest lecture to her class while she is on vacation, you are unlikely to devalue her skills as an instructor. Still, by virtue of her asking you to teach her class, you are likely to believe that she thinks you are a competent enough instructor not to harm her students or teaching evaluations.

Favors simultaneously acknowledge a current need (the favor to be completed) with a future benefit in response (e.g., reciprocity or gratitude). Benefits from future interactions might include a repayment of the favor or relationship benefits from providing the favor. Instead of denigrating your colleague’s power, status, ability, or agency, her request to cover her lecture will likely trigger thoughts of ways that she can repay you, such as covering one of your classes or other responsibilities.
Relationship quality. Separate from the relative position of the requester vis-à-vis the performer, the quality of the relationship will influence whether a performer will comply with a requestor’s favor request. People often note that their responses to favor requests depend on how they feel about the requestor, as highlighted in this example: “Honestly it would depend on my relationship with the colleague… I wouldn’t go out of my way to [do the favor] unless I was close with that person”. Performing favors for close, trusted colleagues with whom one shares an interdependent relationship is likely to be associated with positive emotions and a desire to help the other person or to strengthen the relationship. Specifically, there are four particularly important attributes of relationship quality that should influence the favor decision-making process: relationship commitment, subjective closeness, interdependence, and trust (Bui, Peplau, & Hill, 1996; Ferris et al., 2009).

First, relationship commitment, attachment to or involvement with another person, is likely to increase positive responses to favor requests because it provides a motivation to engage in behaviors that benefit the relationship even when these behaviors may undermine self-interest (Meyer & Allen, 1984, 1991, 1997; Rusbult & Buunk, 1993). Second, more positive subjective feelings about the relationship with the requestor (e.g., satisfaction, commitment, closeness) should lead the individuals to be more willing to agree to favors just as these feelings have been shown to drive helping behavior in other contexts (Clark, Ouellette, Powell, & Milberg, 1987; Williamson & Clark, 1989). This occurs because people in close relationships feel responsible for each other and derive emotional benefits from helping people with whom they have strong relationships. Conversely, favor requests from distant acquaintances, such as workers in disconnected departments or friends of friends, might be viewed as upsetting, burdensome, or even inappropriate. Third, higher levels of interdependence within a relationship drives favor
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compliance because the requestor and the performer feel more joint responsibility for each other’s outcomes (Anderson & Williams, 1996; Bui et al., 1996; Drigotas & Rusbult, 1992; Kelley et al., 1983), such that agreeing to perform the favor is seen as beneficial to the dyad not just the requestor. Fourth, because trust involves a willingness to rely on and be vulnerable to another person (Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007; Dirks & Ferrin, Donald, 2001; Homans, 1958; Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998; Lewicki, Tomlinson, & Gillespie, 2006; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Mellinger, 1956), individuals who trust one another are more likely to perform favors because they are less likely to worry about negative consequences, such as a lack of reciprocation or gratitude.

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Distinguishing favors from other workplace behavior and understanding favor request motivations will provide theoretical direction for the field of organizational behavior and practical advice for individuals and organizations. Treating favors as a subset of other existing behaviors, such as social exchange or prosocial behavior, as is currently done in the management literature, fails to capture the entirety of the phenomenon and neglects that the critical importance of interdependent work relationships in modern-day organizations. By building a definition and conceptual framework of workplace favors that acknowledges the dyadic connection between favor requestors and performers, the current work helps us to better understand the favor decision-making process and its consequences.

Theoretical Implications

We take the perspective that the decision of how to respond to a favor request is a complex one, influenced by considerations about the performer (“self”), the requestor and other beneficiaries (“other”), and the performer’s relationship to the requestor (“relationship”). Using a
framework of favor requests that integrates a broad set of motivations allows us to more accurately predict when people will say “yes” or “no” to favor requests and why they make these choices. Better prediction of responses is the result of a more complete picture of favor requests and decision making by receivers of these requests. Furthermore, using a broad range of motivations to model favor responses enables us to understand the complexity of the decision-making process. Often, potential favor performers consider multiple motivations simultaneous and bringing them together is not always additive. Sometimes a favor will place self-focused and other-focused motivations in opposition, such as when favors are highly valued to the requestor but extremely time consuming and difficult for the performer. In these cases, the performer must choose whether to prioritize his or her own interests over that of the requestor and beneficiary. Other times, a favor can meet both self-focused and other-focused motivations simultaneously, such as in the case of a favor that provides relationship or career benefits for performers as well as benefits for the requestor.

Finally, having a more complete picture of the complexities of the favor deliberation process enables us to examine the antecedents and consequences of the resulting decisions. The motivations that are triggered by a favor request will differ based on characteristics of the self, other, and the relationship, and different motivations may be associated with different decision-making consequences. Our conceptual framework enables exploration of the antecedents and consequences of work-related favors from the perspective of individuals and organizations.

**Antecedents.** Considerable research has been done to identify demographic (Cameron & Nadler, 2013; Farrell & Finkelstein, 2007; Jones & Schaubroeck, 2004; Kidder, 2002) and dispositional (Bourdage, Lee, Lee, & Shin, 2012; Chiaburu, Oh, Berry, Li, & Gardner, 2011; Ilies, Fulmer, Spitzmuller, & Johnson, 2009; Li, Barrick, Zimmerman, & Chiaburu, 2014)
differences in discretionary helping behaviors. Empirical studies and meta-analyses have shown that numerous personality constructs can help explain prosocial behavior, including conscientiousness, agreeableness, openness to experience, positive and negative affect, locus of control, honest-humility, empathy, and guilt proneness (Borman, Penner, Allen, & Motowidlo, 2001; Bourdage et al., 2012; Chiaburu et al., 2011; Cohen, Panter, Turan, Morse, & Kim, 2014; LePine, Erez, & Johnson, 2002; McNeely & Meglino, 1994; Organ & Ryan, 1995). Because favors are driven by specific requests not individual initiatives, these findings may or may not apply to favors. Future research should investigate the role of demographic and personality differences in predicting favor performance to test whether the same characteristics that predict helping behavior more broadly also predict favor performance.

One demographic variable that is likely to be particularly important in predicting favor responses is gender. Gender differences in helping behavior have been shown across many contexts (Andreoni & Vesterlund, 2001; Cameron & Nadler, 2013; Eagly & Crowley, 1986; Farrell & Finkelstein, 2007; Kidder, 2002; Salminen & Glad, 1992; Sprecher, Fehr, & Zimmerman, 2007). These gender differences are believed to be related to gender-role norms and stereotypes (Eagly, 2009; Eagly & Crowley, 1986; Eagly, Makhijani, & Klonsky, 1995) that stipulate interpersonal helping to be more normative for women than men. Favors are defined as interpersonal helping, so favors are likely to be more of an expectation for women than for men. In fact, given a fear of backlash, women may not even perceive many favor requests as discretionary because of these gender norms (Cameron & Nadler, 2013; Farrell & Finkelstein, 2007; Heilman, 2001; Heilman & Chen, 2005). Making the choice to follow gender norms and do discretionary work may cause women to fall behind on their job-related work, leading to decreased performance or career progression. Additionally, positive feedback from others and
harmonious relationships have been shown to be more important for women's self-esteem than for men's (Gabriel & Gardner, 1999; Roberts & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1989; Schwalbe & Staples, 1991). Because women are generally more relationally-oriented than men (Clark et al., 1987; Cross & Madson, 1997), favor acquiescence may be even more gendered than other forms of helping behavior.

Guilt proneness (Cohen et al., 2011; Tangney & Dearing, 2002) is likely to be a particularly important personality variable for predicting favor decision making. People who are high in this personality trait anticipate they would feel guilty about harming others and are averse to letting others down (Wiltermuth & Cohen, 2014). They have a heightened sense of responsibility to colleagues and exhibit strong affective organizational commitment and work intensity (Flynn & Rebecca L. Schaumberg, 2012; Schaumberg & Flynn, 2012), all of which suggests that individuals with high levels of this trait are apt to be the ones most likely to say “yes” to workplace favor requests.

**Consequences.** Agreeing to favors can have both positive and negative consequences for individuals and organizations. For example, doing a favor may enable the performer to meet new people or demonstrate new skills, and may factor into salary and promotion decisions. With regard to organizations, favor performance by employees can enhance the overall productivity of the firm and free up resources for employees to focus on tasks that best match their interests and skill sets. Favors stabilize organizational performance by filling in gaps that are not covered by formal organizational roles. Because favors often represent work that is ambiguously defined or assigned and not rewarded or recognized within the formal organizational structure, cultural support (e.g., norms, rewards, or recognition) of such behaviors is likely to increase the likelihood that they are performed.
While there are potential instrumental, hedonic, and relationship benefits of favor performance for individuals and organizations, there are also potential costs that can undermine these benefits. Before the performer even responds, he or she may feel negatively toward the requestor as a result of just being asked. If the performer says “yes” and performing the favor negatively affects the performer’s mood or work performance, he or she might blame the requestor. If the performer says “no,” he or she must deal with the potential relationship consequences of denying the requestor. Intrapersonally, favor requests may cause employees to experience negative emotions, role conflict, role overload, and job creep, all of which can lead to burnout, decreased job satisfaction, and reduced well-being. Performing favors that take the form of non-promotable tasks in particular can negatively affect employees’ well-being, status and power, and tarnish their reputations. Yet, it is often the case that non-promotable tasks need to be completed by someone, and while undesirable, these tasks can be just as important to a firm’s success as other more favorable tasks, making the question of who will perform discretionary non-promotable tasks in organizations a particularly difficult social dilemma. There are large potential costs to firms if all employees eschew the performance of discretionary tasks that help the organization and people within it.

If a particular person is expected to say “yes,” that person is more likely than others to get asked to do favors, and over time this can become a problem, both for that individual and the organization more broadly. If these expectations are widely shared, such individuals may also be more likely to acquiesce and be particularly disadvantaged when the favors they are requested to perform are not the sorts of tasks that will lead to promotions and positive performance appraisals. Low status employees may be targeted to perform favors that are least beneficial to career progression, “getting coffee” or “running errands,” thus perpetuating their position in the
hierarchy. At the organizational level, this can lead to problems of bias and inequality of treatment. If, for example, in a particular organization, women are always expected to be the note-takers and party planners and are requested to perform various discretionary behaviors of this sort, it could lead to systematic gender bias in the organization, with women taking on additional work that is not beneficial for their advancement. Determining who will perform a favor is likely a decision made at the interpersonal level. However, collectively these interpersonal decisions affect the organization as a whole.

**Practical Implications**

We believe that research on work-related favors is inherently practical in that it involves everyday decisions that all of us experience. In this paper, we have suggested factors that may lead individuals to agree or disagree to perform favors in organizations. Firms that wish to facilitate effective and efficient distribution of favors need to concentrate on how these factors influence favor decisions.

**For individuals.** When individuals are faced with favor requests, they should consciously engage in a favor decision-making process, asking themselves a series of questions. First, they should verify that the request is actually discretionary to avoid mismatches between requestor expectations and their own. Surfaced disagreements regarding job requirements provide a useful opportunity for negotiating role expectations. It is important for the performer and the requestor to find a way to get on the same page.

Second, if the individual is indeed faced with a favor request, he or she should consider, “Who is asking for this favor?” The characteristics of the relationship between the two individuals affect motivations. For example, the high status of the requestor might cause the individual to agree to a favor they might not do for someone of lower status. Because favors are,
by definition, discretionary, individuals are free to agree or decline them, but there are still consequences of these decisions.

The third question, then, is, “What will really happen if I say ‘yes’ or ‘no’?” It is important to do a realistic assessment of the ramifications of acquiescence or rejection of a favor request, in terms of benefits and costs to oneself, others, and the organization. People are likely to be biased in these assessments, perhaps overplaying the negative ramifications (“I’ll never get asked again” or “[the requestor] will think less of me if I say no”) or underestimating the time it will take to complete the task in the future (Finkenauer, Gallucci, van Dijk, & Pollmann, 2007).

Part of this deliberation is a thorough consideration of the costs to oneself of performing the favor in terms of time and workload. Perhaps a person will need to give up some other activity or take time out of his/her non-work life, such as giving up family or vacation time, if he or she chooses to do the favor. A person should also consider why he or she was asked and if he or she is the right person to do the favor. Sometimes there is a unique skill match; other times there is no one else available.

If there are others who could perform the task, and if the costs are too high and/or the benefits too low for oneself, the individual should suggest someone else to ask, ideally someone who would benefit from performing the favor. For example, if an individual is asked to present at a conference, he or she might not benefit from his or her 15th conference presentation. However, a newcomer who has never presented might be excited to take advantage of an opportunity to gain exposure and experience. Providing a viable alternative for the requestor that also provides an opportunity for an alternative performer limits the harm of saying “no” and can have a net benefit to the organization.
For organizations. A critical concern for organizations is to ensure that favors are allocated fairly across organizational members. First, organizations should ensure that all employees are asked to do an equivalent share of non-promotable and promotable discretionary work. If equality in requests for non-promotable discretionary tasks is not possible, then such tasks could become part of the job requirements for new or existing roles in the organization so that people in those roles can be rewarded or evaluated positively for performing the work. Credit could be provided by reducing other work demands or acknowledging the effort. Because favors are critical for the organization, they could be considered as part of the evaluation criteria for career progression, but this, of course, blurs the line between discretionary and required work. Most importantly, organizations need to ensure that the same individuals are not chronically asked to do favors, and efforts should be made to spread discretionary work across the entire group. Organizations may need to track this extra effort and encourage certain individuals to perform more or less favors than others to change behavior in the organization.

Second, as discussed in this paper, people say yes to favor requests for a variety of reasons. If organizations want this work completed in an efficient and timely manner, managers and supervisors should design and tailor incentives that motivate people to say yes. These incentives are necessarily different for different individuals. Some favors are inherently more appealing to certain people or can be made more appealing by tailoring the request or framing it in a specific way. For example, if an employee is motivated by status, he or she would be more likely to agree to favor requests that highlight how there is an opportunity to interact with high-status individuals or gain respect from peers. Favor requests that highlight opportunities to gain status will be particularly effective for the status-motivated employee but may not be effective for other employees in the organization who care little about status.
Need for Future Theoretical Development

Our framework does not address the demand side of favors (that is, who is asked to do favors) and situations where people make poor decisions when faced with favor requests. We suggest that both of these areas are important opportunities for future development.

Demand side of favors (who is asked). Our framework focuses on how people respond to favor requests. It does not consider the other side of the dynamic regarding who is asked. Nevertheless, the two are inherently interdependent. People ask others to do favors at least partly because of their expectation of who will say yes. If we imagine an “economy of favors,” we can think of the demand side as the people who request favors and the supply side as the people who agree to perform them. The process of determining whether to agree to a favor begins after a performer is asked. However, our discussion of the motivation to agree to favors assumes uniformity in the asking process. As we know from related research (Vesterlund et al., 2016), “who gets asked” to do favors is anything but uniform. Instead, there are systematic differences in base rates, for example, with women being more likely to be asked than men.

If certain individuals are asked more often or are expected to say yes, they will respond differently to requests than those individuals who are not asked frequently or not expected to comply. If favor requests are rare, each one can be considered a unique opportunity to agree to or decline. On the other hand, if they are frequent, they may become embedded into an individual’s job and lose their discretionary nature. If, for example, as a result of behavioral norms or stereotypes, a person is consistently asked and expected to say yes to favor requests, he or she will likely acquiesce to most of these requests to avoid the backlash of saying no. With frequent favor requests versus occasional helping, issues of work distribution, equality, and fairness become even more salient.
When favor decision making goes wrong. In this paper, we presented a framework of favors with underlying assumptions of honesty and transparency on the parts of the requestors and performers. That is, we (implicitly) assumed that favor requestors asked for favors out of genuine need and selected the most appropriate performer, and that both requestors and performers could understand and accurately predict the immediate and downstream consequences of their actions. When these assumptions fail, which, we acknowledge, they often do, they jeopardize the integrity of the favor decision-making process.

First, just as compliance techniques can be used to manipulate people into doing things they would not otherwise choose to do, this framework of favor decision making can also be used to influence response behavior in nefarious ways. For example, a requestor might promise an exchange-oriented performer career benefits when the requestor knows that the favor will not provide those benefits but just wants to get out of doing it. Future research can explore how and when requestors use motivation-related cues to convince people to perform legitimate and illegitimate favors.

Second, difficulties associated with predicting future consequences of favor decisions and performance are important issues for future research. When a performer does a favor, he or she expects an immediate response as well as downstream consequences, and these expected results influence favor decisions. Performers may expect to feel good about helping, receive gratitude from the requestor, or receive a promotion. However, these results might not occur. Instead, performers might feel overwhelmed or annoyed, and their effort could be completely ignored by the requestor or the organization. Similarly, organizations can fail to accurately predict the consequences of favors. A requestor might tell a performer that he or she will be able to receive a promotion for completing more discretionary work, but when promotion time comes, the
decision makers may have forgotten or discounted the favors and other discretionary helping behaviors performed and withhold the promotion. Because the actual consequences of favor performance are unknown at the time of the request, performers must make favor decisions based on incomplete information.

CONCLUSION

We have emphasized throughout this paper how favors are a combination of prosocial behavior, social exchange, and discretionary work. Conceptualizing favors in this way allows us to address the increasing complexity of the changing nature of work, where roles and tasks are less clearly defined and work is more flexible. Favors are an interpersonal exchange, and as employees are faced with workplace changes that threaten work relationships, such as shorter tenures, less job security, boundary-spanning coordination efforts, and technological innovations, favor decision making becomes increasingly complicated. Because relationships are a primary means by which people become attached to organizations (Kahn, 2007), other-oriented and relationship-oriented motivations and emotions are likely to have a strong influence on decision making in organizations. Favor decision making hinges on other-oriented and relational considerations, making the study of favors in organizations particularly timely.

In closing, we suggest that further research on work-related favors is important not only for building theory on this particular construct but also for increasing our field’s attention to the nuances of decision making in organizations. We have emphasized how the favor decision making process can cause both positive and negative consequences for individuals and organizations, making responses to favor requests less clear and obvious. For this reason, we believe that our treatment of favors will help to further discussions about how ambiguous and discretionary work is allocated in organizations.
PAPER 2: MEASURING THE MOTIVATIONS TO AGREE TO FAVOR REQUESTS

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the theoretical framework of favor decision making proposed by Weirup, Weingart, and Cohen (2016), which proposed that individuals making decisions about whether to agree to perform favor requests based on their affect upon three types of targets (self, other, and relationship) in support of three types of goals (instrumental, hedonic, and normative). Using items from an archival dataset that represent the three types of goals for the self-focused target, I use confirmatory factor analysis to assess whether the goals in the framework separate into three factors. The results show acceptable fit and provide preliminary support for the hypothesized 3-factor solution. Directions for refinement and future work are suggested.

Keywords: favors; decision making; confirmatory factor analysis
Measuring the Motivations to Agree to Favor Requests

This paper examines the motivations considered in the favor decision making process through a confirmation of the theoretical framework proposed by Weirup, Weingart, and Cohen (2016). When people receive favor requests, they must determine whether to agree to perform a specific behavior for a specific person. As they consider these requests, individuals weigh the motivations, or reasons, they might have for agreeing to perform the favor. Weirup et al.’s theoretical framework proposes that the motivation to agree to favor requests come from the favor’s potential impact on three targets: the potential performer (“self”), requestor or other beneficiary (“other”), and the interpersonal relationship between the performer and the requestor (“relationship”). Within each of those targets, individuals consider three sources of benefits and costs: economic gains or losses (“instrumental”), emotional gains or losses (“hedonic”), and response rules for the environment in which the request is made (“normative”). Instrumental goals seek to improve one’s own financial, social, or reputational benefits. An example of an instrumental benefit to the self would be a desire to agree to the favor as a means of improving one’s performance evaluations or social status. A hedonic goal for the self would be the positive feeling resulting from the act of agreeing to and/or performing the favor. A self-oriented normative goal would be a decision consistent with one’s personal norms for behavior, such as one’s moral code or sense of right and wrong. Prior literatures, including compliance, prosocial behavior, organizational citizenship behavior, task motivation, and social exchange, have recognized these motivational forces but have not considered them in tandem and while considering whether to do a favor.

This framework proposes that these motivations are not considered independently when deciding whether to perform favor requests. Instead, they are likely to combine and interact.
Depending on the motivations evoked, people may feel “pushed” or forced into agreeing, “pulled” by the appeal of the request, or a conflict-ridden combination of both. The framework enables researchers to understand the push and pull of favor requests. People can feel forced or pushed into doing favors when they feel like they don’t have a choice, such as when the relationship or the context compels their decision; people can feel pulled when they feel the attractiveness or benefits of doing the favor, such as when positive consequences or positive affect are imminent. Within the context of a specific favor request, these motivations may be additive, strengthening the desire to agree to or decline the request, or incompatible, creating internal conflict and leading to difficult, and potentially sub-optimal decisions. Consistent with the scope of the framework, this paper focuses on the perspective of the person who receives the favor request (the person who will perform the favor).

The purpose of this paper is to provide a first step toward an empirical validation of the categorization of motivations proposed in Weirup et al.’s theoretical framework (2016). Validating a portion of the framework provides an initial step towards creating a tool to measure the motivational and cognitive processes invoked while making decisions about favor requests. Measuring these processes paves the way for future work that could examine the antecedents and consequences of these favor decisions.

To validate a subset of the motivations proposed in the framework, this study utilizes an archival dataset from a large survey of working adults that explored the favor decision-making process using qualitative and quantitative measures. This survey was administered as part of exploratory work on favor decisions between April and December 2013, before the theoretical framework was developed. Although designed for different purposes, the survey nonetheless contains relevant data for testing portions of the theoretical framework proposed by Weirup,
Weingart, and Cohen (2016). Specifically, one section of the survey asked individuals to think about the factors that influenced how they responded to favors. Although the items in the survey do not allow for a test of all nine possible combinations of targets and goals, they do allow for a test of the three goals for the “self” target. Thus, the focus of this paper is to investigate the factor structure of the goals relevant to the self portion of the favors framework. Accordingly, I selected the 14 relevant items from the extant data for testing this portion of the framework. Future studies with an expanded set of items will be needed to verify the remaining portions of the framework.

I hypothesized an oblique three-factor structure. According to goal theory, there are three types distinct types of goal-frames for prosocial behavior: instrumental (or gain), hedonic, and normative. These goal-frames rely on different needs to drive behavior. The instrumental frame is concerned with resources; the hedonic frame is concerned with feeling good; and the normative frame is concerned with appropriate action. However, these three types of goals are not mutually exclusive and can be simultaneously activated (Lindenberg, 2006, 2013; Lindenberg & Steg, 2007). Furthermore, research on goals has shown that motivational and cognitive processes are entwined because goals direct what information one pays attention to and what alternatives one considers (Kruglanski & Kopetz, 2009). For example, instrumental and hedonic goals are likely to be correlated due to their focus on self-interest without regards to others (Tamir, Mitchell, & Gross, 2008). Similarly, hedonic and normative goals might be correlated due to the emotional response one derives from behaving (in)appropriately. For example, guilt may be defined in terms of the emotional response to a norm violation (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994). Empirically, I expected all three scales to be distinct yet correlated because individuals often have a difficult time parsing out and communicating
cognitive processes in a retrospective self-reports, which are limited by autobiographical memory (see Schwarz & Sudman, 1994; Sudman, Bradburn, & Schwarz, 1996; Tourangeau, Rips, & Rasinski, 2000). Given the interrelationships among the three goal types, I compare the proposed three-factor solution to alternative models, such as a single-factor solution.

The analyses also explore gender differences in the factor structure. There is considerable research to demonstrate that women and men help in different ways (Andreoni & Vesterlund, 2001; Babcock, Recalde, Vesterlund, & Weingart, 2017; Cameron & Nadler, 2013; Eagly & Crowley, 1986; Farrell & Finkelstein, 2007; Kidder, 2002; Salminen & Glad, 1992; Sprecher et al., 2007). For example, women are more likely to engage in communal, interpersonal type helping behaviors (Farrell & Finkelstein, 2007; Heilman & Chen, 2005; Kidder, 2002) while men are more likely to engage in chivalrous and “heroic” ways (Eagly & Crowley, 1986). Likewise, the motivations for helping may differ between women and men. Because of prescriptive gender stereotypes, women are faced with considerable backlash for not helping so normative motivations may be stronger for women than men (Eagly, 2009; Eagly & Crowley, 1986; Eagly et al., 1995). Similarly, women expect a greater emotional benefit from helping than men (Sprecher et al., 2007). As a result, women may have greater hedonic motivations to help than men. The purpose of this additional analysis was to determine whether gender would have an effect on the factor structures for men versus women. If present, gender differences in models might offer some insight for future research.
METHOD

Sample

The analyses used a dataset of 640 participants\(^1\) with a minimum of one year of full-time work experience. These participants were recruited from three populations who all completed the same survey\(^2\): a) 443 working adults who were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk and paid for their time, b) 115 MBA and public policy graduate students who were entered into a lottery as compensation for their participation, and c) 42 working adults from a university-administered online subject pool who were entered into a lottery as compensation for their participation. All participants had at least one year of full-time work experience. All participants were recruited to participate in a 10-minute research survey about “your thoughts and feelings while you are deciding whether to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to requests you receive at work.”

The sample was diverse in terms of gender (47% female), age (\(M_{\text{age}} = 32.7\) years), and work experience (\(M_{\text{workexperience}} = 10.7\) years). Ninety percent were US citizens. The sample had a mix of ethnicity and race: <1 percent American Indian or Alaska Native; 16 percent Asian or Pacific Islander; 7 percent Black or African-American; 12 percent Hispanic; 62 percent White, non-Hispanic; and 4 percent Other or Prefer not to Say. Fifty percent had a 4-year college degree or greater, 52 percent had never been married, and 69 percent had no children.

Measures

The survey required participants to first describe three to five (depending on the sample) examples of recent favor requests and then answer questions about the examples of they provided.

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\(^1\) The original data collection contained 771 participants. 59 participants were removed for failing to pass a basic attention check, 69 participants were removed for reporting less than 1 year of full-time work experience, and 3 participants were removed for failing to describe favors in the open-ended questions.

\(^2\) Data source did not significantly influence the results.
Favor Request Examples. In the first section, I first asked participants to concentrate on work-related situations and provided a definition of a request, “We are interested in learning more about the types of work-related requests that you receive. We define a request as something you are asked to do to help someone else that you perceive as voluntary or discretionary.” Next, I presented a list of ten sample requests, such as “give a presentation at a very important conference,” and “prepare coffee for a client,” that I had collected during pre-testing. I used the term request because I did not want to bias the participant with colloquial connotations of the word “favor.” Finally, I asked participants to provide examples of three to five “requests” they had received in the last six months and report their responses to those requests. These favor requests served two purposes: one, the request examples represented the content of the favors that would be referenced in the questions that followed; and two, the recollection of specific instances of past favor performance served as a memory induction to improve the reliability of the answers on the main survey questions. For this paper, I did not analyze the content of these favor request examples in this study except to verify that the participant understood the question and focused on work-based examples.

Motivation Items. Section 2, the main survey block, included favor response motivation items. Participants responded to the following question: “In general, how much did each of the following factors influence how you responded to work-related requests over the last six months?” For this question, participants rated items with an influence scale (1 = not at all influential, 2 = slightly influential, 3 = moderately influential, 4 = very influential, 5 = extremely influential). The full instrument included 36 items. However, because the items were created for a different purpose, they were not all relevant to this study. This study used the 14 items that represented the three constructs in the “self” column: instrumental, hedonic, and normative. An
example instrumental item was “It will improve my performance evaluations.” A hedonic item was “Helping makes me feel good.” A normative item was “It supports my moral code.” Figure 1 shows the hypothesized measurement model and associated items.

Data Analysis

All tests for the factorial validity of the hypothesized three-factor model were conducted using analysis of covariance structures within the framework of a confirmatory factor analytic (CFA) model. I selected CFA because I am testing a proposed theoretical model of the underlying latent variable structure. Using an a priori specification of the model, I allow the measures to load on the predicted factors but restrict loading on other factors to zero. The purpose of this measurement model was to describe how well the observed indicators (items) serve as a measurement instrument for the latent constructs. The hypothesized model will be evaluated by statistical measures to determine goodness-of-fit to the data. Analyses were based on maximum likelihood parameter estimate using the MPlus program version 7.2 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012). The following criteria were used in testing for goodness of fit between the hypothesized model and the data (see Figure 1): the $X^2$ likelihood ratio, the comparative fit index (CFI; Bentler, 1990), the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA; Steiger & Lind, 1980), and the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR; Bentler, 1995). After reviewing the model for the data as a whole, I conducted a multiple group analysis to compare the factor structure for men versus women.

RESULTS

Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations for the items. Item means ranged from 3.07, representing “moderately influential” to 3.72, approaching “very influential.” Five participants failed to answer one item, see items marked in Table 1 for details.
The cases with a missing value was different for each item so these missing values were treated as missing at random.

**CFA for Hypothesized Model**

A first-order three-factor confirmatory factor analysis was performed on the favor request motivation items, allowing the factors to be correlated. The items were modeled to load on their respective theoretical factors: instrumental, hedonic, and normative. The Chi-squared value of model fit showed a difference between the observed and modeled covariance matrix, $\chi^2 (74, N = 640) = 511.053, p < .001$. However, because the Chi-squared test is sensitive to sample size, it nearly always rejects the model when large samples are used (Bentler & Bonett, 1980). Therefore, additional fit indices were examined, which are the most insensitive to sample size, model misspecification, and parameter estimates. Previous research supports the use of Chi-Square test with degrees of freedom and $p$-value, the RMSEA and its associated confidence interval, the SRMR, and the CFI (Kline, 2005). Although there have been some variation in cutoff value recommendations over time (Bentler, 1990; Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Hu & Bentler, 1999; Joreskog & Sorbom, 1984; Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004; Marsh & Hocevar, 1985; Steiger, 2007), I have used the following values to indicate acceptable fit: CFI > .90; RMSEA < .08; and SRMR < .08; and good fit: CFI > .95; RMSEA < .06; and SRMR < .05. Factor loadings are considered to be acceptable if their standardized regression weight was greater than .6 (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006).

The goodness of fit statistics for the hypothesized model (Table 2, Model 1) were mixed. Two indices indicated acceptable fit: CFI = .914 and SRMR = .070, but the third indicated poor fit: RMSEA 90% CI = {.088, .104}. Table 3 and Figure 2 show the factor loadings for this model. All of the items in each of the three factors exhibited high inter-item reliability:
instrumental, $\alpha = .82$, hedonic, $\alpha = .90$, normative $\alpha = .84$, and the factor loadings of all items were significant. Standardized factor loadings$^3$ of the instrumental items ranged from .624 to .868.

**Models Comparisons**

I considered three alternative models. I performed Chi-squared difference tests comparing the alternative models with the hypothesized model (Table 2, Model 1) to determine whether the alternatives might provide better model fit. Goodness of fit and model comparison statistics are shown in Table 2. First, I tested and rejected a first-order one-factor model (Table 2, Model 2), $\Delta \chi^2 (3, N = 640) = 770.055, p < .001$. Next, I tested a first-order two-factor model with an instrumental factor and a combined hedonic-normative factor (Table 2, Model 3), $\Delta \chi^2 (2, N = 640) = 122.224, p < .001$. The correlation between the hedonic and normative factors in the hypothesized model (Model 1) was .873 providing evidence for combining these two factors. However, model comparison indicated that this model was a slightly poorer fit than the 3-factor model. Third, I tested and rejected a first-order two-factor model with a normative factor and a combined instrumental-hedonic factor (Table 2, Model 4), $\Delta \chi^2 (2, N = 640) = 637.934, p < .001$. Chi-squared difference tests and goodness of fit statistics showed better fit for the hypothesized model (Model 1) than the alternative models (Models 2 through 4).

In addition to these alternative models, given the correlations among the factors, a second-order model is possible. However, a single second-order factor with three first-order factors is just identified so chi-squared tests and fit statistics are identical to a first-order, three-factor model with correlated factors (Model 1). To perform model fit testing, a single second-order factor model must be over-identified with at least four first-order factors or two second-

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$^3$ Items were standardized using STDYX in MPlus.
order factors. Thus, additional research that includes the other and relationship items will need to assess whether a model with a higher-order factor to represent all self-oriented goals will improve fit.

**Model Modification**

To avoid capitalizing on chance, I did not make model modifications based on the empirical results. However, I did examine modification indices (MIs) and standardized expected parameter charges (EPCs) to identify potential sources of misspecification that might contribute to model fit. An MI gives the expected drop in chi-square if the parameter in question is freely estimated. The standardized EPC index provides the standardized expected value of the parameter if it is freely estimated. Several MIs were greater than 40 with standardized EPCs greater than .4.

Examination of modification indices related to these data indicated two sets of items that suggest correlated error terms: “speed my career progression” with “improve my performance evaluations,” MI = 46.409, EPC = .507, “right thing to do” with “fair thing to do,” MI = 74.875, EPC = .408. Additionally, three items had MIs that indicated possible cross-loadings: “part of who I am” on hedonic, MI = 47.984, EPC = .672, “enjoy helping” on normative, MI = 50.667, EPC = .565, and “right thing to do” on hedonic, MI = 48.288, EPC = -.669. When each of these cross-loadings were each independently added to the model, fit improved. “Part of who I am” loaded on both factors but loaded higher hedonic, B = .483, than normative, B = .339. “Right thing to do” became a Hayward case whereby it’s factor loadings exceeded 1 on normative, B = 1.935, and -1 on hedonic, B = -1.195; and “enjoy helping” loaded on both factors and higher on normative, B = .823, than hedonic, B = .422. These cross-loadings indicated possible poor items that need to be evaluated for removal or revision in future analysis. Future research may address
these potential misspecifications by taking advantage of new items generated specifically for testing the hypothesized model rather than the existing data being used in this study.

**Exploratory Analysis**

**Reliability and Bad Item Analysis.** Without a second dataset to use for reliability and bad item analysis, I used a split halves approach. I used SPSS\(^4\) to randomly divide the data into two sets. The descriptive statistics for each half are listed in Table 5. First, I estimated the fit of the hypothesized model for Sample 1 (Table 2, Model 8). Factor loading were strong, ranging from B = .651, SE = .036 to B = .877, SE = .016. Fit statistics for Sample 1 were similar but slightly better than the statistics for the full dataset (Table 2, Model 1): \(\chi^2 = 298.126, \text{df} = 74, \Delta\text{CFI} = .006, \Delta\text{RMSEA} = .001, \Delta\text{SRMR} = -.002\). As with the full dataset, based on CFI and SRMR, this model had acceptable fit; RMSEA would suggest poor fit. Next, I estimated the fit of the hypothesized model for Sample 2 (Table 2, Model 9). Factor loading were strong, ranging from B = .588, SE = .042 to B = .854, SE = .019. Only “fair thing to do” had a loading below .6. Fit statistics for Sample 2 were similar to but slightly poorer than the full dataset, \(\chi^2 = 322.865, \text{df} = 74, \Delta\text{CFI} = -.020, \Delta\text{RMSEA} = .007, \Delta\text{SRMR} = .006\). For this model both the CFI and the RMSEA were below acceptable levels although the SRMR indicated acceptable fit. Even with these small differences, this analysis shows consistent levels of fit across both halves of the data.

To perform the bad item analysis, I dropped the three items that cross-loaded on two factors (“part of who I am,” “enjoy helping,” and “right thing to do”) from the Sample 2 and compared it to Sample 1 with the original items. Factor loadings for this model were strong, ranging from B = .583, SE = .048 to B = .858, SE = .020. Again, only “fair thing to do” had a loading below .6. Fit statistics indicated improved fit between Sample 1 with the bad items

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\(^4\) The halves were created using the RANDOM SAMPLE OF CASES option for the SELECT CASES command.
(Table 2, Model 8) compared to Sample 2 without the bad items (Table 2, Model 10), $\Delta \chi^2 = 146.445$, $\Delta df = 33$, $\Delta CFI = -.009$, $\Delta RMSEA = -.005$, $\Delta SRMR = -.009$. However, even though it was improved, the revised model without the bad items still showed only acceptable fit based on the CFI and SRMR and poor fit based on the RMSEA.

**CFA for Gender-specific Models.** I conducted exploratory analysis of the factor structure by separating the data by gender. As shown in Table 2, although the chi-squared value increased, $\Delta \chi^2 = 27.981$, $\Delta df = 11$, $p = .003$, increased degrees of freedom and two improved fit statistics (RMSEA and SRMR) suggest that a model with gender as a covariate (Table 2, Model 5) may fit slightly better than the hypothesized model without the covariate (Table 2, Model 1). Next, I split the data by gender into two subsets and fit single-gender models. Based solely on chi-squared changes, both models fit better than the full dataset (Table 2, Model 1): model for the male data (Table 2, Model 6), $\Delta \chi^2 = 158.455$, $\Delta df = 0$, and model for the female data (Table 2, Model 7), $\Delta \chi^2 = 243.274$, $\Delta df = 0$. Factor loading were strong for both genders, ranging from $B = .628$, SE = .039 to $B = .889$, SE = .016 for females and $B = .590$, SE = .040 to $B = .857$, SE = .024 for males. No factor loadings were below .6 for females; only “part of who I am” had a loading below .6 for the males. However, when comparing fit indices, the male data fit slightly worse than the full dataset, $\Delta CFI = -.019$, $\Delta RMSEA = .009$, $\Delta SRMR = .020$, while the female data fit slightly better than the full dataset, $\Delta CFI = .009$, $\Delta RMSEA = -.003$, $\Delta SRMR = -.009$. As shown in Table 4, the factor loadings were similar for both genders with no single item explaining the fit differences. The correlations between instrumental and the other two factors were slightly strong for females, $r = .503$ for hedonic and $r = .445$ for normative, than males, $r = .355$ for hedonic and $r = .318$ for normative.
DISCUSSION

The purpose of this study was to provide empirical validation for one part of the theoretical framework of favor motivations posited by Weirup, Weingart, and Cohen (2016). The framework proposes that people are motivated to perform favors to meet three types of goals (instrumental, hedonic, normative) for three potential targets (self, other, relationship). These goals and targets are not mutually exclusive. In fact, this framework highlights the potential complexity of the decision making process and the possibility of incompatible motivations. The present study examined the portion of the model representing self-focused goals. Using survey data from diverse samples, I have illustrated the extent to which the item measurements represent the hypothesized theoretical structure. The findings of this study provided some support for the hypothesis of a three-factor model to measure the self-focused motivations of favor performance. The hypothesized model of “self column” of Weirup et al.’s theoretical framework (2016) was an acceptable fit for these data but could use some refinement.

The fit of the model confirms that the items served as acceptable proxies for this first study, but an important step toward a valid and reliable scale to measure the favor decision making process is new item development and existing item clarification. Going forward, new items need to be developed and tested or existing items need to be modified to more precisely represent the underlying constructs theorized in the framework. In the exploratory reliability and item analysis, I found, using split halves reliability, that the fit for the hypothesized was reliable across the two random samples. Using the second sample to explore the items identified through model modification that had cross-loadings (“part of who I am,” “enjoy helping,” and “right thing to do”), model fit was marginally improved. The first two of these items relate to self-concept and identity items. “Part of who I am” and “enjoy helping” may have loaded on both
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factors because they are not clearly Hedonic or Normative concepts but instead imply an internalization of the value of helping. This internalization could lead to both a personal norm related to helping or a hedonic benefit resulting from helping, but the item is not written in a way that directly corresponds to either of these factors. Not surprisingly, these items were shown to cross-load on both the Hedonic and Normative factors. The cross-loadings seem to indicate that liking or valuing helping drives personal norms about helping or vice versa. Indeed, the literature shows that when comparing people who internally motivated rather than externally motivated, they have more interest, excitement, and confidence for a task (Deci et al., 2001; Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Nix, Ryan, Manly, & Deci, 1999). When allowed to load on both the hedonic and normative factors, “right thing to do” was a Heywood case with negative error variance, signally that it is a candidate for deletion.

For the Instrumental factor, items needs to be written that tap into a broader range of instrumental costs and benefits and are more narrowly focused on those benefits. Items that tap into high and low levels of promotability, the extent to which a favor provides indirect, non-relationship career benefits, such as demonstrated competence, expertise, or effectiveness, are missing from this set of items (Vesterlund et al., 2016). Additionally, items that tap into the instrumental cost side of the equation are also absent. For example, sometimes favor decisions are based on the amount of time and effort that would need be expended to complete them or the opportunity costs of doing favors instead of other tasks.

The Hedonic factor might be improved by removing implications about or references to identity, self-esteem, morality, norms, or values as discussed above and being more present focused. Hedonic motivations are often framed as present-focused, task-driven current emotions (Kruglanski & Kopetz, 2009). The survey used in this study, which is retrospective and does not
focus on a specific favor, may be an ineffective mechanism for tapping into these motivations. Instead, methods that provide for measurement at the time of the decision, such as experience sampling, might better capture these motivations. For example, when viewed immediately, juggling multiple roles has been shown to have a negative effect on mood, but when examined over time, habituation to role juggling occurred (Williams, Suls, Alliger, Learner, & Wan, 1991). Similarly, the emotional benefits and consequences of favors might only be visible when viewed at their occurrence rather than in aggregate and across time.

The Normative factor may prove to contain multiple factors due to the level of analysis for norms and morality, whether they are at the personal level or higher, as well as the complex relationship between norms and identity. When selecting the items for the “self” column, I used the definition provided in the framework, which focused on fulfilling one’s expectation for one’s own behavior as driven by the individual’s personal norms and morality. However, disentangling personal norms and morality from relationship, group, organization, and societal norms proved difficult. For example, the “right thing to do” item does not state who is determining right from wrong so it is unclear to the participant which referent to apply. Even though an individual might personally believe that helping others is always the “right” choice, the incentives in his or her work environment might make that choice less clear. Additionally, norms and identity overlap but are distinct. The self-concept is partially driven by social comparisons, which are often normatively based (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Rosenberg, 1979). Two of the items used here “does his/her part” and “part of who I am” focus on the concept of self but may tap into identity more than norms or morality so these items may need to be revised.

In addition to concerns with the items, the Hedonic and Normative factors were very highly correlated, $B = .873$, $SE = .017$ in the full dataset, $B = .873$ $SE = .023$ for females, and $B
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= .872, SE = .024 for males. Although the fit statistics did not support combining these factors for this data set, new items will need to consider the theoretical and empirical implications of this high correlation. Namely, items need to be written in a way that focuses on one but not the other.

Finally, not only do items need to be written or revised for the self-focused motives, the remaining parts of the model, the other- and relationship-focused motives, must still be tested. When creating new items for these other columns, care must be taken to focus on their desired target. For example, an item from the existing data set read, “Helping is expected in our group/organization”. This item is clear that the target norms are those of the group and the organization not the individual or the favor requestor. Future work needs to bring all three targets together to determine whether the self-focused motivations examined here can be distinguished from the other-focused and relationship-focused motives as hypothesized by the framework.

Limitations

This study was limited by several factors related to the archival dataset: a) imperfect item fit, b) lack of a specific favor to assess, c) retrospective evaluation, d) a focus on favors that people agreed to perform. Although these findings provide initial evidence to support a portion of the theoretical framework that captures the self-focused motives for favors, additional work is needed to address these limitations. First, the data used in this study are archival, and thus, the items used were not written specifically to represent the theorized framework being tested. As discussed above, items need to be written or revised to better represent the theory to be tested.

Second, the theoretical model being tested is built upon Weirup et al.’s definition of a favor: “discretionary, prosocial behavior that is performed in response to a specific, explicit request from one person to another” (2016). Since participants supplied their own version of a favor request, the data collected may not reflect decisions about tasks that meet that definition.
Future research could focus participants on a particular request that epitomizes these characteristics to normalize responses.

Third, a major challenge survey research is bias, especially resulting from retrospective reporting. Since these data measured the motivations in retrospect, the data may suffer from bias (Schwarz, 2007; Schwarz & Sudman, 1994). The next step in exploring the cognitive experience of favor decision making should involve measuring these motivations in situ rather than retrospectively. One option would be to explore these motivational processes in a laboratory or field experiment so that participants could report their cognitive and affective processes at the time of the event. On the other hand, although prospective and retrospective self-reports may not precisely reflect the episodic experience, e.g., the exact motivations considered and behaviors performed in response to a favor request, prospective and retrospective reports do relate to how people understand and conceptualize their experience. Whether that understanding is accurate or not, it does influence future decisions. Although the current results are informative, an investigation that provides the opportunity to monitor cognitive influences on favor decisions closer to the time of the decision would be optimal. Finally, in this data, participants were asked to think only about favors they agreed to perform. While these favors are important for initial understanding, favors that people agreed to perform are likely to have different motivational processes than favors that are declined. Future research should examine the deliberation process without respect to the decision outcome (not focusing on favors that people agreed to perform).
PAPER 3: THE EFFECT OF FAVOR FRAMING AND GENDER OF HELP GIVING

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we examine the relationships among discretionary interpersonal helping rates, helping context, gender, and guilt proneness. Previous research indicates that women are more likely than men to perform interpersonal and relationship-based helping behaviors, but this research has not considered the initiating trigger of the helping behavior. In this work, we examine helping context, comparing helping framed as a favor request, which is initiated by an interpersonal ask, versus helping framed as a volunteer opportunity, which is initiated by personal volition, to understand how this framing influences helping rates. We propose that the interpersonal situation prompted by a favor request leads to different cognitive decision making processes and increased helping rates compared to other types of helping behavior across both genders. Furthermore, given previous research demonstrating that women are more likely to perform interpersonal-type helping behaviors than men, we propose that when the situation is framed as a favor versus a volunteer opportunity, these gender differences will be even more pronounced. Finally, we propose and test guilt proneness as the mediating mechanism to explain differences in helping rates by favor context and gender. We find mixed support for these proposed relationships across five studies. In Studies 1A and 1B, we tested the relationship between gender and favor performance using vignette studies, and in Studies 2, 3, and 4, we test the relationships using behavioral experiments. Across all studies, helping context makes a significant difference in discretionary interpersonal helping rates, but gender differences are less consistent. We discuss the implications of these findings for the decisions that people and organizations face when determining whether to perform discretionary interpersonal helping behaviors at work.
Keywords: favors; prosocial behavior; gender; decision making
The Effect of Favor Framing and Gender on Discretionary Interpersonal Help Giving

“Would you do me a favor? Can you please help me proofread this manuscript?”

Decisions about whether to perform favors for colleagues, supervisors, and subordinates is an important issue that faces all working professionals as they try to balance the many divergent demands on their time. Favors are discretionary helping behaviors that are triggered by a direct request from one person to another. Discretionary helping is ubiquitous in today’s organizations, and the extra effort produced by such behaviors is critical to the functioning of organizations (Borman & Motowidlo, 1997; Katz, 1964; Organ, 1988; Organ, Podsakoff, & MacKenzie, 2006; Van Dyne, Cummings, & Parks, 1995). Between 75 and 90 percent of workplace helping is in response to a direct request for help (Burke, Weir, & Duncan, 1976; Kaplan & Cowen, 1981; Anderson & Williams, 1996), yet we know surprisingly little about the antecedents of favor performance. While existing research has examined discretionary helping behaviors in general, especially in the context of organizational citizenship behavior, favors, helping driven by a direct request, are rarely investigated separately.

Some people engage in a large amount of helping behavior while others do very little, and considerable research has been done to identify the attitudinal (Konovsky & Pugh, 1994; Moorman, 1991; Organ, 1988), demographic (Cameron & Nadler, 2013; Farrell & Finkelstein, 2007; Jones & Schaubroeck, 2004; Kidder, 2002), dispositional (Bourdage et al., 2012; Chiaburu et al., 2011; Ilies et al., 2009; Konovsky & Organ, 1996) and motivational differences (Bolino, 1999; Bolino et al., 2012; Eastman, 1994; Takeuchi et al., 2015) that give rise to helping behaviors. This paper attempts to distinguish a certain type of discretionary helping—favors—from other non-favor types of helping and asks whether helping behavior differs based on the type of helping.
This paper takes a piecemeal approach to a moderated mediation model (Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005) of the influence of helping context, gender, and guilt proneness on discretionary interpersonal helping rates, as shown in Figure 1. We build the theory for each hypothesized link and then present the corresponding hypothesis. First, we propose direct effects of helping context (Hypothesis 1) and gender (Hypothesis 2) on helping rates, our outcome of interest. Second, we propose an interaction effect where gender will moderate the direct effect of helping context on helping rates (Hypothesis 3). Finally, we propose that guilt proneness will mediate the conditional direct effect (by helping context) of gender on helping rates (Hypothesis 4).

We define favors as discretionary, prosocial behaviors that are performed in response to specific, explicit requests from one person to another. The important characteristics of favors are that they are prosocial (intended to help others), interpersonal (a direct ask between the requestor and the intended performer), and discretionary (not required by the formal organization). We propose that favors—because they are performed in response to a direct ask from a specific person—trigger a social and moral decision-making process whereby the intended performer must decide whether or not to agree to perform the requested task. In this work, we seek to distinguish favor requests from volunteer opportunities, where individuals help without being directly asked or in response to a diffuse ask with multiple potential performers. Volunteers typically seek out opportunities to help (Omoto & Snyder, 1995) while favor performers respond to a specific help request.

Favor are prosocial in that they provide benefit to individuals and organizations. Given that favors are requested, the performance of the favor is clearly a desired outcome for the requestor. Additionally, there are likely to be other parties that benefit from favors including the organization as a whole. Prosocial organizational behavior is critical to the functioning of the
organization (Borman & Motowidlo, 1997) as organizational effectiveness hinges on people’s willingness to provide help when asked (Borman & Motowidlo, 1993; Karambayya, 1990; Organ, 1988; Podsakoff et al., 1993; Smith et al., 1983). The positive outcomes associated of helping are even more evident when such help is made salient through a specific request, a favor. In contrast to volunteer opportunities, where help is provided without being asked, with favor requests, the need for help has been acknowledged so the help provided will be more clearly recognized.

Favors are a form of interpersonal social exchange. Given the interpersonal relationship between a favor requestor and favor performer created when the request is made, favors are a dyadic social decision in which the potential performer must assess his or her decision within the social context, not only evaluating the task requested but also his or her relationship with the requestor, as well as the organizational environment and others who might be affected by the decision (Rilling & Sanfey, 2011; Sanfey, 2007). Because favors are a form of social exchange, there is an expectation of a response to favor request. While a volunteer opportunity can be ignored, a direct ask must be addressed. This expectation of a response increases the pressure to agree by triggering compliances norms (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Additionally, like other forms of social exchanges, favors invoke the interpersonal relationship between the requestor and the performer (Ferris et al., 2009; Gittell & Douglass, 2012). Thus, responses to favor requests have the potential to establish, improve, or diminish relationships. Such a direct link to the interpersonal relationship is not present for volunteer opportunities. Finally, because favors are interpersonal and prosocial, decisions about performing them are also moral in that they may result in harm or benefit to others (Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012; Jones, 1991; Rai & Fiske,
2011; Velasquez & Rostankowski, 1985). This moral dimension provides yet another motivation to agree to perform favors.

Favors are discretionary. Although discretion does not distinguish favors from volunteer opportunities that discretion is different because refusing to perform favor requests carries the additional normative and moral burden discussed above. In fact, sometimes one of the two parties do not even consider the favor requests to be discretionary. A performer may follow the heuristic of agreeing to all requests for help without considering that it might be optional.

Given these characteristics of favors, we suggest that people will consider and make helping decisions differently based when they are presented as a favor requests versus a volunteer opportunity. Although the differences between favor requests and volunteer opportunities can be subtle because both are discretionary and prosocial, the explicit request and the one-requester-to-one-performer nature create a much stronger interpersonal situation, whereby behavioral norms and cues for correct behavior provided by environmental forces are more salient, than that of a volunteer opportunity (Mischel, 1973; Snyder, M.; Ickes, 1985). Consequently, individuals faced with favor requests may have a stronger motivation to agree to perform the behavior than those faced with volunteer opportunities.

*Hypothesis 1: Discretionary interpersonal helping rates are higher when the decision is framed as a favor request versus a volunteer opportunity.*

Next, we seek to replicate existing research, which shows that women are more likely to perform discretionary interpersonal helping behaviors than men. Gender differences in interpersonal helping behavior have been shown across many contexts (Andreoni & Vesterlund, 2001; Babcock et al., 2017; Cameron & Nadler, 2013; Eagly & Crowley, 1986; Farrell & Finkelstein, 2007; Kidder, 2002; Salminen & Glad, 1992; Sprecher et al., 2007). These gender
differences are the result of two key distinctions between men and women about helping: social expectations and personal motivations. We are not suggesting that women are always more likely to help than men—men are shown to be more likely to perform certain types of help (Allen, 2006; Eagly & Crowley, 1986)—but that women are more likely to engage in interpersonal-type helping than men.

The first reason for gender differences in discretionary interpersonal helping is gender norms and descriptive and prescriptive stereotypes (Eagly, 2009; Eagly & Crowley, 1986; Eagly et al., 1995). These norms and stereotypes stipulate interpersonal helping dictate an expectation of interpersonal helping for women more than for men. Compared to men, women are more often described as, and expected to be, empathic, altruistic, caring, and helpful, whereas men, as compared to women, are more often described as, and expected to be, independent, ambitious, competitive, and aggressive (e.g., Dobbins, 1985; Eagly & Karau, 1991; Fox, Gibbs & Auerbach, 1985; Ridgeway, 1991; Ely, 1994; Schein & Mueller, 1992; Spence and Helmreich, 1980). These descriptions lead to expectations about the kind of activities women are should do. In line with these gender- and social-role norms and stereotypes, women are expected to behave differently in social situations. Women are expected to help, especially in interpersonal, communal ways. Women can and should take time out of their day to perform discretionary interpersonal helping behaviors while men need to focus on getting their own work complete in order to push for advancement.

Not only are women expected to be helpful, they are penalized when they are not. Ignoring prescriptive gender norms about helping makes women the target of backlash (Heilman & Chen, 2005; Heilman, Wallen, Fuchs, & Tamkins, 2004) if they do not agree to help. Consequently, work-related helping behaviors are less optional for women than for men because
women both fail to receive as much credit for helping as men do and are reprimanded when failing to help while men are not (Heilman & Chen, 2005). Although job descriptions, which apply equally to men and women in the same job, may reduce sex differences regarding in-role behavior, discretionary acts are not necessarily equal. To avoid backlash, women act in accordance with these gender norms by performing more discretionary, interpersonal helping. Because women are at least subconsciously, and often consciously, aware of these norms and their penalties, they perform more discretionary interpersonal helping behavior than men. Women engage more often in interpersonal citizenship behaviors, such as aiding colleagues with heavy workloads or mentoring new coworkers (Farrell & Finkelstein, 2007; Heilman & Chen, 2005; Kidder, 2002) than men. Women reported more relationship-based workplace behavior—friendly, unselfish, or expressive acts—than men (Moskowitz, Suh, and Desaulniers, 1994).

The second reason women may be more personally motivated to perform discretionary interpersonal helping than men. This personal motivation is driven by two factors: equity sensitivity and mood benefits. Women are likely to agree to more discretionary interpersonal helping because they have different perceptions of workplace equity than men. Women report that it is important for them to give more than they receive, whereas men preferred their outputs to exceed inputs (Major, Bylsma, & Cozzarelli, 1989). Women generally allocate fewer resources to themselves and more to their coworker than do men with equivalent inputs (Major & Adams, 1983). Thus, the effort and opportunity cost of providing discretionary interpersonal help to another may be more acceptable for a woman than for a man.

Additionally, women may agree to more discretionary interpersonal helping because they expect and experience higher mood elevation from helping than do men (Sprecher et al., 2007). Across studies in a meta-analysis, women preferred job attitudes that involved helping others and
working with others more than men (Konrad, Ritchie, Jr., Lieb, & Corrigall, 2000). Responding to others’ needs for help has been shown to elevate mood (Batson, 1998; Cialdini et al., 1973; Dovidio & Penner, 2003; Piliavin et al., 1981). While most people expect mood enhancement when they help others, the effect was significantly stronger for women than for men (Sprecher et al., 2007). As a result of increased social expectations and personal motivation and consistent with previous research, we predict that women will have higher rates of discretionary interpersonal helping behavior than men.

**Hypothesis 2: Discretionary interpersonal helping rates are higher for women than men.**

Previous research on gender differences in helping behavior rarely addresses the stimulus for the help. We propose that women will be more sensitive to context framing, such that gender differences in helping will be more pronounced when the situation is framed as a favor versus a volunteer opportunity.

**Hypothesis 3: The relationship between gender and discretionary interpersonal helping rates are moderated by helping context such that there is a stronger positive relationship between female gender and helping rates when the helping context is framed as a favor request versus a volunteer opportunity.**

At least two mechanisms may be responsible for these context-based differences: higher levels of potential backlash for favors versus volunteer opportunities and higher levels of guilt triggered by favor requests versus volunteer opportunities. The first mechanism for gender differences across contexts is that helping invoked by favor requests are more visible than
volunteer helping causing gender norms to be applied more punitively. The negative social perceptions of turning down a favor request are higher than failing to volunteer. For example, if a performer (help giver) is asked to proofread a manuscript by a colleague (help requestor), the requestor and potentially other observers will notice whether the favor request is agree to or declined. However, the performer simply notices that his or her colleague would benefit from proofreading, failing to offer that help is less likely to be noticed by the colleague or other observers. Since gender norms govern expectations about providing help, the salience of a response to a favor request is more likely to trigger negative social perceptions with a favor request than with a volunteer opportunity. Women are aware of how these negative perceptions might be applied and so in the more public arena of favor requests, are more likely to agree to help.

The second reason for gender differences in the favor context is that favor requests are more likely to induce guilt than volunteer opportunities. Guilt is more likely to occur in situations when a request is turned down (favor requests) than in situations without requests (volunteer opportunities). Guilt is typically conceptualized as a negative emotional reaction on the part of individuals, which occurs when individuals feel that they have failed what they “ought” or “should” to do. Guilt motivates people to exert considerable effort to tasks that affect others’ welfare (Baumeister et al., 1994) and avoid letting them down (Flynn & Rebecca L Schaumberg, 2012; Grant & Wrzesniewski, 2010). In the case of favor requests, the way help providers can improve the welfare of others and avoid letting them down is clear: agree to the favor. In the case of volunteer opportunities, this link is less obvious. The help provider must first identify a need and then determine how to fill that need. Not delivering volunteer-based help does not involve the rejection of a specific request.
Differences in the potential for guilt across these two consequences is likely to disproportionately affect some individuals more than others. Guilt proneness is an individual difference marked by a tendency to feel guilty about committing a social transgression (Cohen et al., 2011; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007; Tracy & Robins, 2004), in this case, declining a favor request. Individuals high in guilt proneness are more likely to help others (Cohen & Morse, 2014; Cohen, Panter, Turan, Morse, & Kim, 2013; Cohen, Panter, & Turan, 2012) and are more concerned with letting others down (Flynn & Rebecca L. Schaumberg, 2012; Grant & Wrzesniewski, 2010; Wiltermuth & Cohen, 2014) compared with their low guilt-prone counterparts. Furthermore, high guilt-prone individuals are more likely to focus on the collective good than low guilt-prone people and they are better able to meet collective goals (Cohen, Panter, et al., 2014; Flynn & Rebecca L. Schaumberg, 2012). Favor requests are more likely to trigger anticipated guilt than volunteer opportunities, and those individuals who are particularly sensitive to guilt are more likely to be affected by the favor context.

Hypothesis 4: Discretionary interpersonal helping rates are higher for individuals high in guilt-proneness versus those low in guilt-proneness.

Differences in guilt proneness are particularly relevant for understanding the link between the favor context and gender. Women have higher levels of guilt proneness than men (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney, Youman, & Stuewig, 2009). Thus, women are more likely to experience guilt because of declining a favor request. Therefore, to avoid the backlash of declining the favor as well as manage their propensity for guilt, women may have a more difficult choice than men when faced with favor requests: they must perform favors to avoid the penalties related to norm violation and anticipated guilt that can occur from not helping.
Hypothesis 5: Gender differences in discretionary interpersonal helping rates are mediated by guilt proneness and moderated by helping context, such that the there mediating effect of guilt proneness on the relationship between female gender and helping rates has a stronger positive relationship when the helping context is framed as a favor request versus a volunteer opportunity.

By demonstrating the relationship between gender and the propensity to help in different contexts, we seek to contribute to the scholarly literature on individual-level antecedents of a specific type of helping behavior: favors. First, we build upon the burgeoning literature that examines favors at an intra-individual level to understand decision making processes involved (e.g., Flynn, 2003c) to suggest that individuals will be more likely to help in the case of a favor request than a volunteer opportunity. Second, we advance gender research by documenting that women perform more helping behavior at work than men and that these differences are stronger in the context of a favor request versus a volunteer opportunity.

OVERVIEW OF STUDIES

Five experimental studies examined the relationship among helping context, gender, guilt proneness, and decisions about helping situations, through the use of vignettes and behavioral experiments both online and in the laboratory. In study 1A, participants read a series of vignettes describing a hypothetical need for help. Participants rated their likelihood to agree to perform the requested help when framed as a favor request. Study 1B replicates this study but directly manipulates the helping context (volunteer opportunity versus favor requests) in the vignettes.

In studies 2 through 4, we use behavioral experiments to determine whether these findings from these vignette studies replicate when real consequences are at stake. In Study 2, we
compare helping contexts and gender online by measuring discretionary interpersonal helping rates using a money distribution task. In study 3, we examine the relationship between helping context and gender by measuring discretionary interpersonal helping rates using an effort task in an online sample. In study 4, we measure discretionary interpersonal helping rates using an effort task in a laboratory sample among participants who feel psychologically close to their partner.

**STUDY 1A**

In Study 1A, we tested part of Hypothesis 3 by asking participants to respond to vignettes that described helping situations framed as a favor to assess the probability of agreeing to do them. We then asked participants to categorize the vignettes as either volunteer opportunities or favor requests.

**Method**

**Participants.** Adult participants (n = 1168) located in the United States were recruited from two sources: a university online subject pool (n = 377) and Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT; n = 791) for a 10-minute study. Participants in the university pool who completed the study were entered into a lottery for one of seven Amazon gift cards for their participation, and participants on AMT were paid $1.00. The participants from the university pool were younger and had more racial and national diversity, i.e., they were less likely to be white or a US citizen. The demographic differences in these populations were useful to investigate the external validity of the outcomes and demonstrate robustness. Population was not correlated with the dependent variable (likelihood to agree) so we combined the pools for analysis, $X^2(92, N = 1158) = 95.48, p = .38$. Seven participants were removed because they did not pass a basic attention check\(^5\), and

\(^5\) The attention check questions asked, “Are you paying attention?” and asked the participant to select a specific number.
three participants were removed because they did not identify their gender as either female or male. Data analysis was performed on the remaining 1158 cases. Of these 1158 participants, 55% were female. 72% self-identified as white, 7% black, 14% Asian, and 8% other races. The average participant age was 34 years, and average work experience was 11 years. 93% of participants were United States citizens.

**Procedure.** After completing consent forms, participants completed two personality scales. The guilt proneness subscale of the Guilt and Shame Proneness Scale (GASP, Cohen et al., 2011), measured on a 5-point scale (1 = *extremely unlikely*, 5 = *extremely likely*), was analyzed for this study. Next, participants were presented with one of sixteen experimental vignettes about a favor they might be asked to perform at work. Appendix A contains the complete text of the vignettes. To increase the robustness of the results, we manipulated each of the vignettes to vary on three factors: a) the impact of the favor on the performer if accepted (intrapersonal harm), the impact of the recipient of the favor if declined (interpersonal harm), and the favor task (scenario). By adding these additional manipulations, we wanted to determine whether a specific favor or context drives differences in agreement, or if the phenomenon is related to favors more generally. Participants were randomly assigned to one of sixteen conditions: 2: intrapersonal harm (high, low) x 2: interpersonal harm (high, low) x 4: scenario (proofread, meeting, errand, event). We manipulated intrapersonal harm, the burden of the favor on the performer, by changing the amount of time it took to perform the favor from “15 minutes” to “at least 2 hours.” Similarly, we manipulated interpersonal harm, harm to the favor recipient if

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6 After completing consent forms, participants completed two personality scales: the 12-item Fear of Negative Evaluation (BFNE, Leary, 1983), measured on a 5-point scale (1 = *not at all characteristic of me*, 5 = *extremely characteristic of me*), and the 16-item Guilt and Shame Proneness Scale (GASP, Cohen et al., 2011), measured on a 5-point scale (1 = *extremely unlikely*, 5 = *extremely likely*) plus one additional measure of guilt proneness to complete the 5-item Guilt proneness Scale (GP-5; Cohen, Kim, et al., 2014). The data from the BFNE-II were not analyzed for this study. Only the 5 guilt proneness items were used in this study.
the favor was not performed, by changing the description of the task from a “minor part” to “an important part” of the colleague’s job. We included four favor scenarios. The first scenario (proofread) read:

“Your colleague has asked you to proofread and provide comments on a report he is submitting to his manager. You are not a member of that project team so helping with the report is not part of your job. You are the only person he asked for help, and no one else knows that he asked you. You feel free to choose whether or not to provide the requested feedback.”

The second scenario (meeting) was a request to attend a meeting for a colleague; the third scenario (errand) was a request to go to the office supplies store for a colleague; and the fourth scenario (event) was a request to help plan a social event. The first three scenarios represented favors that benefit individuals directly while the fourth scenario represented a favor that benefited a group and the organization. All individual scenarios (one through three) used male gender pronouns and “your colleague” to keep recipient gender and recipient status constant. In scenario four, a male colleague asks you to join a four-person committee. The manipulations comprise a sixteen condition matrix. Each subject was equally likely to receive one of the sixteen conditions as they were randomly distributed to the participants. Because participants were randomly assigned to conditions, dropouts created minor differences in the number of participants per condition.

**Measures.** We measured discretionary interpersonal helping rates, the dependent variable of interest, with the question, “How likely are you to agree to perform the request described in the scenario?” Participants responded by moving a slider bar, 0% = extremely unlikely and 100% = extremely likely. After indicating their likelihood to agree to perform the requested favor,
participants indicated the reasons they considered in thinking about how to respond to the scenario in both an open-ended textbox and a close-ended set of reasons. The open-ended reasons were exploratory and not included in this analysis. Next, participants were asked to categorize the scenario with two questions, “Would you categorize this scenario to be a request for a favor?” and “Would you categorize this scenario to be an opportunity to volunteer to help?” Participants rated each question on a 4-point scale (1 = definitely would not, 4 = definitely would, n/a = don’t know). Finally, participants answered demographic questions, such as gender, age, and race.

Results

Helping rates. For Study 1A, our main dependent variable was the helping rate measured as the likelihood to agree to the favor request scenario in the vignette. Because we wanted to focus on the robustness of the result, we included all four scenarios and harm manipulations in our analysis. As expected, greater harm to the performer (intrapersonal harm) reduced helping rates and greater harm to the recipient (interpersonal harm) increased helping rates. Participants were most likely to agree to the proofread scenario and least likely to agree to the errand scenario. Preliminary analysis indicated only main effects and no interactions for harm manipulations and the vignettes so they were used as control variables for this analysis.

To test our target dependent variable, we estimated a 2 (gender: male, female) one-way between-subjects analysis of covariance on estimated on likelihood to agree controlling for the harm and scenario manipulations. The means, standard deviations, and between-group gender comparisons (simple effects) for likelihood to agree are reported in Table 1. Levene's Test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variance across groups had been violated, F(1, 1156) = 8.28, p < .01 so a Generalized Linear Model (GLM) to allow for unequal variances was
conducted. GLM results are reported in Table 2. There was a significant prediction of likelihood to agree by the variables, $\chi^2(N = 1158, 6) = 235.76, p < .01$. There was a significant main effect of gender. On average, females had a higher likelihood to agree ($M = 68.18, SD = 26.95$) than males ($M = 62.84, SD = 29.56$), $\chi^2(N = 1158, 1) = 7.22, p < .01$.

**Guilt proneness.** We suggest that guilt proneness may explain gender differences in helping rates. The 5-item guilt proneness scale had high reliability, $\alpha = .79$. Consistent with previous research, women reported higher levels of guilt proneness ($M = 3.96, SD = .81$) than men ($M = 3.65, SD = .88$), $t(1,1070^7) = -6.29, p < .01$. Guilt proneness was significantly positively correlated with helping rates (likelihood to agree), $r = .14, p < .01$, supporting Hypothesis 4. A multiple regression was performed on likelihood to agree predicted by gender and guilt-proneness. In a model with gender alone, female has a significant positive effect on likelihood to agree, $B = 4.10, SE = 1.52, p < .01$. When guilt proneness is added to the model, it explains additional variance in likelihood to agree when controlling for gender, $B = 4.18, SE = .89, p < .01$. Gender was reduced but still a marginally significant predictor of likelihood to agree after controlling for the mediator, guilt-proneness, $\Delta B = -1.32, \Delta SE = .01, p < .07$.

Approximately 20% of the variance in likelihood to agree was accounted for by the predictors, $R^2 = .20, F(7,1149) = 41.01, p < .01$. We were unable to test Hypothesis 5 because context was not manipulated in this study.

Given these regression results, we performed a mediation analysis to determine whether guilt-proneness partially explained the relationship between gender and likelihood to agree. Results indicated that gender was a significant predictor of guilt-proneness, $B = .32, SE = .05, p$

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7 Levene's Test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variance across groups had been violated, $F(1,1156) = 5.45, p = .02$, so a Welch-Satterthwaite correction was made.
A bootstrap estimation approach with 10,000 samples using the PROCESS macro in SPSS (Model 4, Hayes, 2013) indicated the indirect coefficient was significant, 95% CI = [.70, 2.17]. A Sobel test confirmed mediation of the relationship between gender and likelihood to agree by guilt proneness, $z = 3.75, p < .01$.

**Exploratory analysis: Helping context categorization.** Although we have a clear theoretical definition of favors, we were not sure participants’ perceptions of the vignettes would match our favor request definition. Thus, we checked participants’ perceptions of the vignette to see if they believed the scenario to be a request for a favor. Participants rated the two categorization questions (“request for a favor,” “an opportunity to volunteer to help”) on a scale of 1 to 4. We considered a 3 or a 4 to be a confirmation of the categorization and a 1 or a 2 to be a rejection of the classification.

The results indicated that many participants did not consider the vignette to be a favor request as was our intent. Only 362 of the 1158 participants rated the vignette as only a favor request; 73 categorized the scenario as a volunteer opportunity but not a favor request; 522 participants rated the scenario as both a favor request and a volunteer opportunity; and 201 participants rated it as neither or “don’t know.” Interestingly, those who classified the situation as a favor were the least likely to agree to perform it, $M = 55.22, SD = 30.96$. The participants who categorized the scenario as both favor and volunteer were the most likely to agree, $M = 73.69, SD = 24.04$; the volunteer only participants were the next most likely, $M = 71.89, SD = 29.38$; the neither and don’t know group was third: $M = 61.97, SD = 26.20$. For the favor only group, there was a significant gender difference with women, $(M = 59.16, SD = 28.91)$ more likely than to agree than men $(M = 51.18, SD = 32.51)$, $t(1, 353^8) = -2.47, p = .01$. For the other

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8 Levene's Test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variance had been violated, $F(1, 360) = 7.078$, p
groups, there were no gender differences: volunteer only, \( p = .38 \), both, \( p = .41 \), don’t know, \( p = .42 \). These categorizations may indicate a gap between participants’ perceptions of the context of the vignette and the intended context of the vignette.

**Exploratory analysis: Helping scenario.** We did not make a priori predictions about the effect of the content of the scenario on helping rates as the intention of the scenarios was to provide additional breadth for our analysis. In our analysis, we controlled for differences because the errand scenario had a significant negative main effect on helping behavior, and there were gender differences in the proofreading (\( p = .02 \)) and errand (\( p = .05 \)) scenarios but not the meeting (\( p = .80 \)) and event planning (\( p = .26 \)) scenarios. Participants who were shown the errand scenario were significantly less likely to agree to help\(^9\) (\( M = 59.76, SD = 30.37 \)) than those in the proofread (\( M = 69.10, SD = 27.28 \)), \( t(1, 569) = 3.90, p < .01 \), meeting (\( M = 67.99, SD = 27.35 \)), \( t(1, 575) = 3.42, p < .01 \), and event, (\( M = 66.12, SD = 27.23 \)), \( t(1,566) = 2.64, p < .01 \), scenarios.

**Discussion**

This study provides initial evidence for the link between gender and the likelihood to perform favors, and the role of guilt proneness in explaining this link. Although we measured perceptions of the scenario, we did not manipulate the context within the vignettes; all vignettes were written to be favor requests. As such, we were only able to investigate part of Hypothesis 3. In Study 1B, we test Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 by manipulating participants’ perceptions of the helping context to determine whether gender differences are related to the helping in general or

\(^9\) Levene's Test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variance across groups had been violated for all three comparisons versus the errand scenario: proofread, \( F(1,578) = 8.48 \), meeting, \( p < .01 \); \( F(1,575) = 9.01, p < .01 \), and event, \( F(1,573) = 8.62, p < .01 \), so a Welch-Satterthwaite correction was made.

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<.01.
varied based on the helping context. As in Study 1A, we examine participants’ classifications of the vignettes to see whether their perception matches our manipulation.

**STUDY 1B**

Study 1A left a key question unanswered: whether gender differences in helping rates were specific to the favor request context, or generalized to all workplace helping. In Study 1B, we seek to test both components of Hypothesis 3 and test Hypotheses 1 and 2 by manipulating the scenarios to describe the same behavior framed as either a favor request versus a volunteer opportunity.

**Method**

**Participants.** Adult participants (n = 483) located in the United States were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk for a 10-minute study and paid $1.00 for their participation. One participant was removed because he or she did not identify his or her gender. Data analysis was performed on the remaining 482 cases. Of these 482 participants, 47% were female. 76% self-identified as white, 8% black, 7% Asian, 6% Hispanic, and 3% other or mixed races. The average participant age was 34 years, and average work experience was 12 years. 99% of participants were United States citizens.

**Procedure.** The study procedure was the same as in Study 1B except two of the scenarios (meeting and event) were dropped to reduce complexity, and a new manipulation for helping context was added. (All scenarios in Study 1A were written as favor requests.) To manipulate helping context, we used the same proofread (see above) and errand scenarios, but we changed “Your colleague has asked you…” (favor request) to “You notice that your colleague needs someone….,” (volunteer opportunity) and “You are the only person he asked for help, and no one else knows that he asked you.” (favor request) to “He does not ask anyone for help, and you are
the only person who notices that he needs it.” (volunteer opportunity). Appendix A contains the complete text of the vignettes.

Participants were randomly assigned to one of sixteen conditions: 2: intrapersonal harm (high, low) x 2: interpersonal harm (high, low) x 2: scenario (proofread, errand) x 2: helping context (volunteer opportunity, favor request). The manipulations comprise a sixteen condition matrix. Each subject was equally likely to receive each of the sixteen conditions as they were randomly distributed to the participants. Because participants were randomly assigned to conditions, dropouts created minor differences in the number of participants per condition.

Results

**Helping rates.** Our main dependent variable was the helping rate measured as the likelihood to agree to the vignette scenario. As in Study 1A, preliminary analysis indicated only main effects and no interactions for the harm manipulations and the scenarios so they were used as control variables for this analysis. To test our hypotheses, we estimated a 2 (gender: male, female) x 2 (condition: volunteer, favor) two-way between-subjects analysis of covariance on estimated likelihood to agree controlling for the harm and scenario manipulations. The means, standard deviations, and between-group gender comparisons (simple effects) for likelihood to agree are reported in Table 3, and the ANCOVA results are reported in Table 4.

There were no significant differences in helping decision (likelihood to agree) between participants in the favor condition (M = 62.30, SD = 28.67) and those in the volunteer condition (M = 60.05, SD = 30.83, F(1,475) = 1.52, p = .22, which fails to support Hypothesis 1. There was a marginally significant main effect on helping decision by participant gender. On average, females had a higher likelihood to agree (M = 64.70, SD = 29.16) than males (M = 58.09, SD = 30.00), F(1,475) = 3.57, p = .06, which provides weak support for Hypothesis 2. There was a
marginally significant effect of the interaction of condition and gender on likelihood to agree, F(1,475) = 3.19, p = .08, whereby women were more likely than men to agree in the favor condition, p < .01, but there were no gender differences in the volunteer condition, p = .94, which provides weak partial support for Hypothesis 3. This hypothesis is only partially supported because we predicted that context would have an amplifying effect in which gender differences would be seen in both conditions but would be intensified in the favor context.

Guilt proneness. Given that we were unable to support our interaction hypothesis, we cannot test a moderated mediation model (PROCESS Model 8, Hayes, 2013) with helping context moderating the indirect effect of guilt proneness as the mediator between gender and helping rates. Although the interaction between gender and helping context had a direct effect on helping rates (Hypothesis 3), and guilt proneness had a direct effect on helping rates (Hypothesis 4), the interaction between helping context and gender did not predict guilt proneness, p = .36.

As in Study 1, we examined the relationships among guilt proneness, gender, and helping rates in the favor condition only. The 5-item guilt proneness scale had high reliability, α = .79. Consistent with previous research, women reported higher levels of guilt proneness (M = 4.01, SD = .80) than men (M = 3.66, SD = .88), t(1,480) = -4.45, p < .01. Guilt proneness was significantly positively correlated with helping rates (likelihood to agree), r(482) = .24, p < .01, which supported Hypothesis 4.

A multiple regression was performed on likelihood to agree predicted by gender and guilt-proneness for participants in the favor condition. In a model with gender alone, female has a significant positive prediction on likelihood to agree, B = 8.51, SE = 3.14, p < .01. When guilt proneness is added to the model, it explains additional variance in likelihood to agree when controlling for gender, B = 5.18, SE = 1.65, p < .01. Gender was reduced but still a significant
predictor of likelihood to agree after controlling for the mediator, guilt-proneness, $\Delta B = -1.67$, $\Delta SE = -.01$, $p < .03$. Approximately 32% of the variance in likelihood to agree was accounted for by the predictors, $R^2 = .32$, $F(5,234) = 22.26$, $p < .01$.

Given these regression results, we performed a mediation analysis to determine whether guilt-proneness partially explained the relationship between gender and likelihood to agree. Results indicated that gender was a significant predictor of guilt-proneness, $B = .27$, $SE = .11$, $p < .01$. A bootstrap estimation approach with 10,000 samples using the PROCESS macro in SPSS (Model 4, Hayes, 2013) indicated the indirect coefficient was significant, $95\% CI = [.43, 3.70]$. A Sobel test confirmed mediation of the relationship between gender and likelihood to agree by guilt proneness in the favor condition, $z = 1.95$, $p = .05$.

**Exploratory analysis: Helping context categorization.** As in Study 1A, we measured participants’ perceptions of the scenario to see if our definition and manipulation of a favor request versus a volunteer opportunity matched theirs. The results indicated that many participants’ perceptions of the vignettes did not match our theory. For the 242 participants in the volunteer condition, only 127 categorized the scenario as a volunteer opportunity and not a favor request. 72 participants rated the scenario as both favor and volunteer; 15 participants rated it as favor only; and 28 participants rated it as neither or “don’t know.” In the favor condition, there was even more confusion about whether the scenario was a volunteer opportunity or a favor request. Of the 240 participants in the favor condition, only 75 participants rated the vignette as a favor and not a volunteer opportunity. 126 participants rated it as both; 5 rated it as a volunteer only; and 34 rated it as neither or “don’t know.” As in Study 1A, across both conditions, participants who rated the scenario as both a favor and a volunteer opportunity were most likely to agree to perform it (volunteer: $N = 72$, $M = 68.26$, $SD = 24.27$; favor: $N = 126$, $M = 71.98$, $SD = 24.07$).
FAVOR REQUESTS

SD = 25.02) while those who rated it as only a favor were least likely (volunteer: N = 15, M = 39.07, SD = 31.77; favor: (N = 75, M = 46.65, SD = 29.50); those who rated it as a volunteer opportunity only were in the middle (volunteer: N = 127, M = 59.69, SD = 33.19; favor: (N = 5, M = 69.20, SD = 32.29). Gender differences in likelihood to agree occurred only for participants in the favor condition who also rated the vignette as a favor only. Females (M = 56.92, SD = 28.50) were more likely to agree than males (M = 35.53, SD = 26.71), t(73) = -3.35, p < .01.

We examined the results to compare the participants who categorized the scenario as we intended versus those who did not. Participants were classified based on whether their categorization of the scenario context matched the intended manipulation, i.e., people in the volunteer condition rated the scenario as a volunteer opportunity (N = 127), and participants in the favor condition rated it as a favor request (N = 75). Using only those participants whose perceptions matched the intended manipulation, we estimated a 2 (gender: male, female) x 2 (condition: volunteer, favor) two-way between-subjects analysis of covariance on estimated likelihood to agree controlling for the harm and scenario manipulations. The means, standard deviations, and between-group gender comparisons (simple effects) for likelihood to agree are reported in Table 5, and the ANCOVA results are reported in Table 6.

When considering only these cases, there was a marginally significant differences in helping decision (likelihood to agree) by helping-type such that participants in the favor condition had a lower likelihood to agree (M = 46.65, SD = 29.50) than those in the volunteer condition (M = 59.69, SD = 33.19, F(1,195) = 3.70, p =.06, contrary to the direction predicted in Hypothesis 1. There was a significant effect of gender, consistent with hypothesis 2. On average, females had a higher likelihood to agree (M=59.85, SD=32.06) than males (M=49.74, SD=32.14), F(1,195) = 6.31, p=.01, but this was qualified by a significant effect of the
interaction between gender and condition on likelihood to agree, $F(1,195) = 5.53$, $p=.02$. These results indicate that gender differences in helping are larger in the favor condition than in the volunteer condition.

Planned contrasts indicated that in the volunteer condition, there was no significant difference in the simple effect of the likelihood of helping by men ($M=57.73$, $SD=32.35$) versus women ($M=61.67$, $SD=34.17$), $p = .89$, but in the favor condition, men were significantly less likely to agree to help ($M=35.53$, $SD =26.71$) than women ($M=56.92$, $SD=28.50$), $p < .01$. Although there was a significant interaction between condition and gender, the interaction type was different when looking at those who incorrectly categorized the vignettes versus those who correctly categorized it. In the incorrect categorization group, women changed their behavior based on the context by increasing their likelihood to help in the favor condition as predicted by Hypothesis 3; in the correct categorization group, on the other hand, men changed their behavior based on the context by decreasing their likelihood to agree to help in the favor condition relative to the volunteer condition, contrary to the interaction predicted in Hypothesis 3. Therefore, these results also identify a potential gap between the intended manipulation of the scenario and participants’ perceptions of them.

**Discussion**

When viewed as a whole, this study provides weak evidence of the relationship between gender and likelihood to perform favors. This study failed to support a main effect of helping context but did provide marginally significant support for a main effect of gender. Women were more likely to agree than men, and for the hypothesized interaction, where the gender differences were larger in the favor condition versus the volunteer condition. Our exploratory analysis of the categorization results showed that participants’ perceptions of our vignettes might not match our
intended manipulations. This incongruity deserves additional attention to understand why these mismatches occurred but is beyond the scope of this paper. However, our next step was to move away from vignette studies, which allowed participants to act according to their perception of a helping situation, not our description of it. In studies 2 through 4, we move beyond vignette studies to attempt to replicate our findings using behavioral evidence.

**STUDY 2**

This study seeks to build on results obtained in the vignette studies by adding behavioral evidence of the phenomenon. Behavioral differences between women and men have been observed in a wide variety of economic experiments (cf. Eckel & Grossman, 2008; Croson & Gneezy, 2009). This study utilizes the dictator game paradigm (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thayler, 1986), a standard tool in economics that involves altruistic behavior, to determine rates of favor agreement. In the dictator game, a one-person decision task with two “players” in which Player 1, the “decider,” decides how to distribute a fixed amount money between herself/himself and Player 2, the “recipient.” Context (List, 2007; Levitt & List, 2007) and behavioral expectations (Bardsley, 2008; Dana et al., 2006; Koch & Norman, 2008) matter in these games so the goal of the present research is to examine the favor context, i.e., we compare the game being framed as a favor versus no framing. Favor agreement is measured by participants (deciders) agreeing to divide money the way requested by Player 2, allocating higher payments to the favor requestor (recipient). There are clear gender stereotypes that might guide behavior in this game: people expect women to be more generous and men to be more egoist (keep more money for themselves). My goal is to determine whether gender influence this decision directly in the two framing versions of the game.
Just like the vignette studies, we compare women versus men to determine which group is more likely to give money to others when the allocation decision is framed as a favor versus a volunteer opportunity. Although gender is not often reported, gender effects have been tested in dictator games with mixed results. For example, Bolton and Katok (Bolton & Katok, 1995) found no significant gender differences, but Eckel and Grossman (Eckel & Grossman, 1997) found all-female groups to be more altruistic than all-male groups, Men were shown to be even more selfish than women when giving is expensive, e.g., the harm to the self is high (Andreoni & Vesterlund, 2001). These results signal some boundary conditions of gender differences in dictator games. In a meta-analysis of dictator games that have explicitly tested gender, women gave significantly more than men (Engel, 2011). This prosocial behavior in dictator games may be another example gender norms and expectations relating to interpersonal- and relationship-type helping behavior (Bardsley, 2008; Dana et al., 2006; Koch & Norman, 2008; Aguiar et al., 2009).

Just as in previous studies, we predict that all participants will help (choose the more generous option) more in the favor context than in the volunteer context, and we predict that women will help more than mean. In addition to a higher rate of helping expected at baseline, we argue that triggering the interpersonal relationship via the favor context will create even larger gender differences as a result of women helping more often in the favor context versus the volunteer context. The hypotheses for this study are the same as the vignette studies except the dependent variable to measure helping is whether the individual chooses the higher payout for the other player, not likelihood to agree.
Method

Participants. Adult participants (n = 515) located in the United States were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk for a 10-minute study and paid $0.50 plus their selected allotment from the dictator game ($0.40 or $0.60) for their participation. Two participants were removed because they did not identify their gender as either female or male. Eighteen participants were removed for failing to pass a basic attention check. Debriefing indicated that ten participants were suspicious of the deception (the sham partnership assignment explained below) and were removed from the analysis. Data analysis was performed on the remaining 485 cases. Of these participants, 52% were female. 81% self-identified as White, 6% Black, 8% Asian, and 5% other races. The average participant age was 36 years. 98% of participants were United States citizens.

Procedure. This study used a modified “dictator game,” (Kahneman et al., 1986) a one-person decision task with two “players” in which Player 1, the “decider,” decides how to distribute a fixed amount money between herself/himself and Player 2, the “recipient.” The dictator game requires participants to distribute money (in this case, $0.70) between themselves (Player 1) and another person (Player 2) according to the payoff matrix. Participants were told that they were randomized to be either the decider or the recipient and paired with another study participant. After a sham randomization and an 80-second delay, all participants were told that they had been randomly assigned to be deciders and given a sham participant number as a partner. Participants were told that their choices would be completely anonymous.

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10 The attention check question read, “If you have read this question, please select does not describe me.”
11 Participant work experience was not collected.
Participants were actually randomized into two conditions: volunteer and favor. In the volunteer condition, participants were taken immediately to the distribution decision where they were asked to distribute money ($0.70) between the two “players.” They were given two choices:

Option A: You (Player 1) receive $0.40, and Player 2 receives $0.30; and
Option B: You (Player 1) receive $0.60, and Player 2 receives $0.10.

If participants helped in this condition, they did so because they volunteered to do so. There were no other cues or frames to suggest that they should choose the more generous option.

For the favor condition, right before they were given the allocation choice, participants saw the following message: “Person 2 has asked you to do a favor and choose Option A.” The intention of this message was to create a favor request from the other player and thus frame the monetary allocation as a favor decision. Although economic theory would predict that rational allocators would seek to maximize earnings, previous results show that deciders often give 30 percent and may give over 50 percent of the allocation to recipients (Bolton, Katok, & Zwick, 1998; Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton, 1994). Heightening the social interaction by allowing the two players to communicate increases concern for others and leads to less selfish allocations (Andreoni & Rao, 2011; Caporael, Dawes, Orbell, & van de Kragt, 1989).

We coded individuals’ choice on the dictator game and asked an open-ended question about the reason for their choice. We measured guilt proneness using the 5-item Guilt proneness Scale (GP-5; Cohen, Kim, Jordan, & Panter, 2014), measured on a 5-point scale (1 = extremely unlikely, 7 = extremely likely). We collected demographic information (race, education level, age, citizenship) to control for it in the analysis. As in previous studies (Engel, 2011), age had a main effect on choice but did not vary by condition. Participants’ race and citizenship did not significantly predict choice in this experiment.
Results

Helping rates. Participants were classified by their allocation choice: higher allocation for the recipient, the helping choice (Choice A; .40/.30) or higher allocation for the decider, the no helping choice (Choice B; .60/.10). In the favor condition, the helping choice represented agreeing to the favor request; in the volunteer condition, the helping choice represented volunteering to help the other person. We predicted higher levels of helping for the favor context than in the volunteer context and higher levels of helping for women than men. Furthermore, we predicted an interaction between condition and gender whereby the effect of context would be stronger for women than for men. The means, standard deviations, and between-group comparisons (simple effects) for choice are reported in Table 7.

A logistic regression analysis was performed to investigate these hypotheses. Table 8 shows the results of regression models with condition and female only (Model 1) and with the condition by gender interaction (Model 2). In Model 1, condition and gender each had significant positive predictions on choice, $\chi^2(2) = 28.15, p < .01$, Negelkerke $R^2 = .08$, which supported Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. The likelihood of choosing to help was significantly greater for participants in the favor condition versus the volunteer condition, $B = .71$, SE = .21, exp(B) = 2.04, $p < .01$. The likelihood of choosing to help was significantly greater for women versus men, $B = .74$, SE = .21, exp(B) = 2.09, $p < .01$. In Model 2, there was no significant interaction between condition and gender for choice, $B = .23$, SE = .18, exp(B) = 1.55, $p = .29$, which failed to support Hypothesis 3.

Open-ended reasons$^{12}$. Interesting, although participants’ choices differed by condition, the reasons they provided for their allocation decision did not. Although complete analysis of the

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$^{12}$ Percentages may exceed 100% due to some participants mentioning more than one category.
open-ended responses is beyond the scope of this paper, we coded responses for key words. In both conditions, over 82% of participants who chose the higher allocation for the recipient (.40/.30) mentioned words related to fairness, equality, or morality while over 75% of those who chose the higher allocation for the decider (.60/.10) mentioned words related to self-interest. 2% of generous participants in the volunteer condition mentioned self-interest while 0% of generous participants mentioned self-interest in the favor condition. Only 9% of participants in the favor condition mentioned the favor request message. These results might signal that even though choice was influenced by framing, people did not explicitly recognize the effect of the favor as their rationale for making their choice.

**Discussion**

Although Study 2 provided support for Hypotheses 1 and 2, showing that individuals are more likely to agree to the generous choice when it included the favor request than when it was a volunteer opportunity and that women were more likely to agree to the generous choice than men. However, the study failed to support Hypothesis 3, an interaction effect between helping context and gender. We suggest that these results may be caused by the nature of this experiment. Helping decisions at work are usually about whether to give one’s time and effort, not one’s money. Money and effort have been shown to have different psychological meanings (Mogilner & Aaker, 2009; Reed II, Aquino, & Levy, 2007) and evoke very different mindsets (Mogilner, 2010; Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2008). Therefore, in our next studies, we utilize an effort allocation task instead of a monetary allocation task, which may be more comparable to the context in which helping occurs in natural situations.

Given that past research has shown that social interactions affect giving in dictator games (Andreoni & Rao, 2011; Caporael et al., 1989), another possible issue with this experiment is the
message itself. Although participants were told that they had been paired with another participant, the volunteer condition did not involve receiving a message. Results could reflect an observer effect due to the message itself, not the content of that message. Another condition could be added in which participants receive a message that does not ask for a favor.

**STUDY 3**

Study 3 changed the dependent variable of the dictator game from a binary monetary allocation to a continuous effort task allocation to better represent the psychological processes of helping decisions within a favor request.

**Method**

**Participants.** Adult participants (n = 248) located in the United States were recruited on Mechanical Turk for a 15-minute study and paid $1.00 for participation in the study plus a bonus based on their performance on the effort task (see details below). One participant was removed because he or she did not identify his or her gender as female or male. Twelve participants were removed for failing to pass a basic attention check. Debriefing indicated that eight participants were suspicious of the deception (the sham partnership, see below) and were removed from the analysis. Data analysis was performed on the remaining 227 cases. Of these 227 participants, 53% were female. 73% self-identified as White, 8% Black, 8% Asian, 8% Hispanic, and 3% other races. The average participant age was 34 years. 98% of participants were United States citizens.

**Procedure.** This study was similar to Study 2 in that participants were again paired online to participate in a “dictator game.” However, in Study 3, participants distributed an effort

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13 The attention check question read, “If you have read this question, please select does not describe me.”
14 Participant work experience was not collected.
task, not money. First, participants were instructed on how to complete the effort task. After reading the instructions, they were required to pass a short quiz to ensure comprehension. They were given unlimited chances to correct their answers.

The effort task required participants to find two numbers that added up to ten in a series of 2x2 and 4x4 grids of numbers, see Appendix B for the task instructions and an example. Each grid had only one correct matching pair. Participants were told that they would be awarded $0.10 bonus per correct grid for a maximum bonus of $0.90. Participants were told that for the remainder of the experiment, they would not be allowed to talk aloud to each other but might be given an opportunity to send electronic messages to each other. To ensure comprehension of the task, participants completed a practice round of two grids.

Next, participants were told that they were randomly match with a partner. In fact, all participants were assigned to be deciders and given a sham participant number as a partner. Participants were actually randomized into two conditions: volunteer and favor. In the volunteer condition, participants were taken directly to the effort allocation task. They were asked to divide the 18 grids between themselves and their partner. Participants were asked to divide the 18 grids, 9 easy grids (2x2) and 9 hard grids (4x4), between the two players such that each person would have 9 grids. Participants selected a number of grids from a 10-point scale (0 = I will keep all 9 EASY grids. My partner will get all 9 HARD grids, 9 = I will keep all 9 HARD grids. My partner will get all 9 EASY grids.) In the favor condition, prior to deciding how to divide the grids, participants were told that their partner was sending them a message. The message read, “Would you please do me a favor and give me more EASY grids?” After they saw the message, participants selected how to allocate the grids.
After the decision, participants responded to an open-ended question about how they made their decision, “How did you decide to divide the grids?” Based on the number of grids selected, participants were presented with their actual allocation on the task. For example, if a participant selected to do 4 easy and 5 hard grids, he or she was presented with 4 easy and 5 hard grids to solve. Participants were given up to two hours to complete their grids although participants spent an average of 8 minutes on the task.

Following their work on the grids, participants who worked on the grids answered the following four questions about the task. First, they answered, “Have you done number grids like these before,” on a 5-point scale (1 = unsure, 2 = never, 3 = one or two times, 4 = a few times, 5 = many times). Next, they answered two open-ended questions, “How did you feel working on these number grids” and “Did you have a strategy in working on this task? If so, what was it?” Please rate your performance on this task on a 5-point scale (5 = excellent—I did much better than the average MTurk Worker, 1 = poor—I did much worse than the average MTurk Worker).

Participants answered questions a set of exploratory follow-up questions to assess interpersonal responsibility, anticipated guilt, and anticipated gratitude related to their actions toward a specific person (their partner) during this interaction (the effort task). For interpersonal responsibility, participants rated their agreement with four statements on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree), which were combined into a scale, α = .88: “I feel accountable for my partner's earnings”, “I feel a sense of responsibility towards my partner”, “I care whether or not my partner earn a MTurk bonus”, and “I feel an obligation to act responsibly towards my partner.” We adapted these items from Salamon and Robinson’s (2008) Responsibility Norms scale similar to Cohen (2017). Anticipated guilt was measured using items adapted from Wiltermuth and Cohen (2014). Participants rated their agreement with the
following items on a 7-point scale (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *extremely*), “I would feel guilty if I kept all the EASY grids.” and “It would bother me if my partner did not receive any EASY grids.” We combined these two items to form a single measure of anticipated guilt, \( r(227) = .82, p < .01. \)

Anticipated gratitude was measured with a single item on a 7-point scale (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *extremely*), “I think my partner will appreciate the way I divided the grids.”

We counterbalanced the order in which participants responded to the interpersonal responsibility and personality scales and made their decision. That is, half of the participants rated these scales and then made their decision, and half of the participants made their decision and then rated these scales. All participants learned about the decision prior to the scale. Order did not influence choice \( (p > .74), \) and thus, we present our analyses collapsed across this factor. Anticipated guilt and anticipated gratitude were always measured immediately after the decision.

We included several personality scale for purposes\(^{15}\). We only analyzed the 5-item Guilt proneness Scale (GP-5; Cohen, Kim, Jordan, & Panter, 2014), \( \alpha = .82, \) for this study. At the end, participants completed basic demographic questions (i.e., gender, age, race).

**Results**

**Helping rates.** The means, standard deviations, and between-group comparisons (simple effects) for choice in Table 9. Levene's Test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variance across groups had been violated, \( F(3,223) = 2.68, p = .05 \) so a Generalized Linear

\(^{15}\) For exploratory purposes, we included four additional personality traits using seven items taken from existing scales. All items were randomized into a single list and presented with a 5-point scale (1 = *does not describe me*, 5 = *describes me extremely well*); a one-item measure of agreeableness “I am considerate and kind to almost everyone,” from the Ten-item Personality Inventory (TIPI; Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003), two items each from the perspective-taking, “I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both” and “I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision,” and empathetic concern sub-scales, “I am often quite touched by things that I see happen” and “I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me,” of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983), and two items from the honesty sub-scale, “I would never accept a bribe, even if it were very large” and “I’d be tempted to use counterfeit money, if I were sure I could get away with it,” of the HEXACO (Lee & Ashton, 2004). These additional seven items were not analyzed for this study.
Model (GLM) to allow for unequal variances. GLM results are reported in Table 10. A 2 (Condition: volunteer, favor) x 2 (Gender: male, female) between-subjects ANOVA was estimated on choice. There was no significant difference in choice by the variables, \( \chi^2(N = 227, 3) = 4.75, p = .19 \), showing poor model fit and failure to support Hypotheses 2 and 3. The only significant effect in this model is a significant main effect for condition, \( \chi^2(N = 227, 1) = 3.73, p = .05 \). Participants allocated more easy grids to their partner in the favor condition (M = 3.31, SD = 2.92) compared to the volunteer condition (M = 2.58, SD = 2.27), \( t(1,225) = 2.08, p = .04 \).

**Exploratory Analysis: Covariates.** In our theory for Hypothesis 3, one reason we proposed that women would be more likely to help in the favor context versus the volunteer context was higher levels of guilt proneness, which has been conceptualized in terms of anticipated guilt and interpersonal responsibility. Given that we did not find gender differences in choice, we were unable to test a moderated mediation model, but we did examine the relationships among the variables. The descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations of these variables by condition are reported in Table 11. Interpersonal responsibility, \( r(227) = .38, p < .01 \), anticipated guilt, \( r(227) = .63, p < .01 \), and anticipated gratitude, \( r(227) = .74, p < .01 \), were all significantly correlated with choice but none were correlated with the helping context. Guilt proneness was significantly correlated with choice in the favor condition, \( r(114) = .24, p < .01 \), but not the volunteer condition, \( r(111) = .13, p = 18 \), and unrelated to condition, \( r(227) = .07, p = .27 \), confirming random assignment. Guilt proneness was correlated with gender, \( r(227) = .21, p < .01 \). The three state measures were highly correlated with each other with Pearson correlations ranging from .48 to .66, \( p < .01 \).
Discussion

This study failed to both Hypotheses 2 and 3 and only supported the Hypothesis 1 finding that participants allocated more easy grids to their partner in the favor condition relative to the volunteer condition. This difference in findings between studies 1a and 1b and studies 2 and 3 are puzzling. We wondered if the online tasks in studies 2 and 3 were too different from the context in which favors typically take place—in the context of existing relationships. Research indicates that indeed most favor exchanges occur between two individuals with an existing relationship (Flynn, 2003b; Flynn & Brockner, 2003). Therefore, we reasoned that this online experiment, during which participants were paired with strangers who had no opportunity to get to know their partner, might not represent the psychological processes that we were seeking to study. We ran a final study in which we replicated Study 3, the effort allocation, in a laboratory environment. In addition, we felt that participants should have an opportunity to get to know each other. Therefore, we added a task to evoke psychological closeness for the paired participants. Because favors have important interpersonal implications, we wanted to investigate whether these initial findings were robust beyond the online environment and within the context of a partnership with psychological closeness. As with Study 2, this study also lacked a condition in which the participant received a message that did not include a favor request to compensate for potential observer effects. Having a message that said something innocuous, like “Hello!” might change the results. Although we did not introduce this condition in Study 4, participants interacted in the laboratory so they could more closely observe the actions of other participants. This environment may partially mitigate potential observer effects from Studies 2 and 3.
STUDY 4

In this study, we measured discretionary interpersonal helping rates using the same effort task as Study 3, but we had participants come to the laboratory and had them make their allocation decision after participating in a separate task designed to evoke psychological closeness with another participant.

Method

Participants. Adult participants (n = 90) located in the United States were recruited individually from a university-administered research subject pool in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania for a 50-minute laboratory study. Each participant received either $7 or course credit for taking part in the study. One participant was dropped from the analysis for failing to complete the experiment. Data analysis was performed on the remaining 89 cases. Of these 89 participants, 54% were female. 35% self-identified as White, 8% Black, 53% Asian, and 4% other races. The average participant age was 28 years, and average work experience was 5 years. 64% of participants were United States citizens.

Procedure. This study consisted of three parts: personality and demographic assessments, a psychological closeness task (“Communications Task”), and an effort distribution task (“Math Task”). After completing consent forms, participants were assigned to individual cubicles to complete a brief computerized survey in which participants completed basic demographic questions (i.e., gender, age, race) and four personality scales. We included the 5-item Guilt proneness Scale (GP5; Cohen, Kim, et al., 2014) for exploratory purposes, α = .70.

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16 Compensation type (course credit vs. payment) did not significantly influence binary choice, $p = .51$ or integer choice, $p = .77$.
17 For exploratory purposes, we also included three additional scales: Ten-item Personality Inventory (TIPI; Gosling et al., 2003), a single-item measure of general risk attitude in the format of the TIPI items (“risk-seeker, thrill-seeker”), and the 16-item Individualism and Collectivism Scale (ICS; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). These data were not analyzed for this study.
After the survey, participants were randomly paired with a partner who was also participating in the study. Each pair met in person for 20 minutes to complete the Communications Task adapted from Aron et al. (1997). The purpose of this task was to induce feelings of psychological closeness between the partners. The partners asked and responded to a series of questions that required a high amount of self-disclosure and emphasized participants’ relationship with their partner. Example questions included “What does friendship mean to you?” and “Tell your partner what you like about them.” The complete set of questions for each version of the task is provided in Appendix C.

Participants were instructed to take their time answering each question and not to worry about getting through all twenty of them. The original version of this task was designed to take 45 minutes to complete, but the study design allotted only 20 minutes for this task. Therefore, the number of questions was reduced to twenty to fit within the allotted time. Minor revisions were made to the task instructions to clarify the purpose of the activity. No other modifications were made.

After 20 minutes, the experimenter separated the pair and asked them to return to their individual cubicles. Once seated, participants answered five questions designed to measure whether the Communications Task had evoked feelings of psychological closeness toward their partners previously used in Gino & Galinksy, 2012. “How similar do you feel to your partner?”, “How related do you feel to your partner?”, “How easy would it be for you to take the perspective of your partner?”, “How much do you like your partner?”, and “How psychologically close do you feel to your partner?” Responses to these questions ranged from 1

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18 Two participants (who did not belong to the same pair) reporting knowing their randomly assigned partner before the study. Results were consistent when these participants (and their partners) were excluded from the analyses.
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= not at all to 7 = very much. These items were averaged into a 5-item measure of psychological closeness, \( \alpha = .87 \).

Next, participants were presented with instructions for the Math Task. They were told that they would be paired with the same participant from the Communications Task. Then they were told that they would randomized into one of two roles. Within each pair, one participant (“Person A”) would be randomly selected to work on the Math Task, and the other participant (“Person B”) would be randomly selected to skip the Math Task. Person A would work on the Math Task for up to 10 minutes and then answer a final survey. Person B would only answer the final survey and that they could leave after finishing that survey. Before the randomization occurred, both participants were given an opportunity to learn the Math Task.

Similar to the effort task in Study 3, the Math Task required participants to find two numbers that added up to ten in a number grid. Unlike Study 3, we used a series of 12 4x4 grids. See Appendix D for the complete instructions and a task example. Each grid had only one correct matching pair. Participants were told that they would be awarded $0.25 per correct grid for a maximum bonus of $3.00. Participants were told that for the remainder of the experiment, they would not be allowed to talk aloud to each other but might be given an opportunity to send electronic messages to each other.

Next, participants were told that they had been randomized into the Person B role and that their partner from the Communication Task was assigned to the role opposite them. In reality, all participants were assigned to the role of Person B and were not assigned to solve any grids. Participants were actually randomized into two conditions: volunteer and favor. In the volunteer condition, participants were told that they could volunteer to help their partners with the Math Task but that any bonuses that they earned would be given to their partners not them.
Participants were told that money would be paid electronically via email and that they would not know the amount their partner had earned. If they agreed to volunteer to help, they were asked how many grids they would be willing to do for their partners (out of the 12). Participants were presented with the number grids selected and given up to 10 minutes to work on them. Participants spent an average of 6 minutes working on the task.

After they were finished with the task, participants answered questions a set of follow-up questions to assess anticipated guilt and interpersonal responsibility related to their actions toward a specific person (their partner) during this interaction (the effort task). For interpersonal responsibility, participants rated their agreement with four statements on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree), which were combined into a 4-item scale, α = .83: “I felt accountable for my partner's earnings”, “I felt a sense of responsibility towards my partner”, “I cared whether or not my partner earned a large bonus”, and “I felt an obligation to act responsibly towards my partner.” We adapted these items from Salamon and Robinson’s (2008) Responsibility Norms scale similar to Cohen (2017). Anticipated guilt was measured using items adapted from Wiltermuth and Cohen (2014). Participants rated their agreement with the following items on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely), “I thought I would feel guilty if I did not help with the grids” and “I thought it would bother me if I did not help with the grids.” We combined these two items to form a single measure of anticipated guilt, r(89) = .82, p < .001.

If they did not volunteer to help, participants answered the follow-up questions. Then they were presented with a filler task to keep them at their computer and maintain the deception. The filler task contained two personality scales: the 14-item Personal Fear of Invalidity Scale (PFI-14, Thompson et al., 1989) and the 15-item Need for Cognitive Closure (NFC-15; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011). These data were discarded.
In the favor condition, prior to deciding whether to help with the Math Task, participants were told that their partner was sending them a message. The message read, “Hi. Will you do me a favor and help me earn money on this task? You can help me by taking some of these grids to do.” Similar to the volunteer condition, when participants agreed to the favor, they would be asked how many grids they would be willing to do.

If they agreed to the favor, participants were presented with the grids to work on for 10 minutes and then follow-up questions; if they decided not to the do the favor, they answered follow-up questions and were taken to the filler task. All participants who worked on the grids answered the following six questions about the task. First, they answered, “Have you done number grids like these before,” on a 5-point scale (1 = unsure, 2 = never, 3 = one or two times, 4 = a few times, 5 = many times). Next, they answered two open-ended questions, “How did you feel working on these number grids” and “Did you have a strategy in working on this task? If so, what was it?” Finally, they answered the following questions about the task following items on a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree): “The Math Task was easy for me to complete,” “The Math Task was interesting for me to complete,” “My partner appreciated my help with the grids,” “My performance on the grids was much better than the average participant.” At the end, all participants were asked about the purpose of the experiment and paid for their time.

**Results**

**Psychological closeness manipulation.** Twelve participants (6 in the volunteer condition and 6 in the favor condition) failed to report at least average levels (<4 on a 7-point scale) of psychological closeness with their partners. Thus, the intended effect of the Communications Task was not achieved for these participants. There was a significant difference in integer
helping rates for those who reported at least average psychological closeness (M = 5.17, SD = 4.07), versus those who did not (M = 2.33, SD = 3.06), t(1, 87) = 2.31, p = .02. Given that this experiment was specifically designed so that participants would feel psychological closeness toward their partners, we dropped these twelve participants from the rest of the analysis.

With the remaining 77 participants, we examined both the binary decision whether to provide help as well as the amount of help offered. For the binary decision analysis, participants were classified into yes and no. For the analysis of the amount of help, we treated the number of grids offered out of 12 as a continuous variable. Participants who declined to help were classified as 0 grids.

**Binary helping rates.** The means, standard deviations, and between-group comparisons (simple effects) for binary choice are reported in Table 12. A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relationship between choice and condition. There was a significant difference for binary choice between participants in the volunteer (M = .74, SD = .44) versus favor condition (M = .97, SD = .16), $\chi^2(1, N = 77) = 8.32, p < .01)$. A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relationship between choice and gender by condition. For the binary yes/no decision, there were no gender differences in the volunteer condition, males (M = .76, SD = .44) versus females (M = .73, SD = .46), $X^2(1, N = 39) = .07, p = .79$, nor the favor condition, males (M = 1.00, SD = .00) versus females (M = .95, SD = .23), $X^2(1, N = 38) = 1.03, p = .31$.

Table 13 shows the results of a logistic regression model with condition and gender. Given that 100% of men helped in the favor condition, we were unable to estimate a logistic regression with condition by gender. There was a significant prediction of choice by the predictors, $X^2(2, N = 77) = 9.87, p < .01$. The likelihood of choosing to help was significantly
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greater for participants in the favor condition versus the volunteer condition, $B = 2.53$, $SE = 1.08$, $exp(B) = 12.55$, $p = .02$, which supports Hypothesis 1. There was no significant prediction of choice by gender, $B = -.42$, $SE = .71$, $exp(B) = .66$, $p = .55$, which fails to support Hypothesis 2. Because there are no gender differences in either the favor or the volunteer condition, this fails to support Hypothesis 3.

**Integer helping rates.** The means, standard deviations, and between-group comparisons (simple effects) for integer choice are reported in Table 14. A 2 (Condition: volunteer, favor) x 2 (Gender: male, female) between-subjects ANOVA was estimated on integer choice, reported in Table 15. For the integer decision, the amount of help, there was a significant difference in choice between the volunteer ($M = 4.08$, $SD = 3.64$) and favor conditions, ($M = 6.29$, $SD = 4.23$), $F(1,73) = 6.22$, $p = .02$, which supported Hypothesis 1. There was no significant difference in gender, $F(1,73) = .06$, $p = .81$, or the interaction of condition and gender, $F(1,73) = 1.18$, $p = .28$, which failed to support Hypotheses 2 and 3.

**Exploratory analysis: Covariates.** We examined the trait measure of guilt proneness and the three state measures, interpersonal responsibility, anticipated guilt, and anticipated appreciation. The descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations of these variables by condition are reported in Table 16. Again, since we did not find gender differences in choice, we were unable to test the proposed moderated mediation models. Instead, we examined the relationships among the variables. Interpersonal responsibility, $r(77) = .38$, $p < .01$, anticipated guilt, $r(77) = .24$, $p = .03$, and anticipated happiness, $r(77) = .47$, $p < .01$, were correlated with binary choice. The three state measures were highly correlated with each other with Pearson correlations ranging from .47 to .63, $p < .01$, but none were correlated with helping context: interpersonal responsibility, $p = .88$, anticipated guilt, $p = .46$, anticipated happiness, $p = .31$. These results
suggest additional exploration of the effect of interpersonal responsibly, anticipated guilt, and anticipated happiness on helping rates may be fruitful especially in studies that do show gender differences. Unlike all other studies, guilt proneness was unrelated to binary choice, $r(77) = .07, p = .54$. Reliability for the guilt proneness scale was somewhat lower than previous studies as well, $\alpha = .67$ in the volunteer condition and $\alpha = .71$ in the favor condition. Given the strength and replicability of the relationship between helping choice and guilt proneness in previous studies, these results might signal an anomaly with this study population.

**Discussion**

Although we replicate Hypothesis 1, our finding that helping context influences discretionary interpersonal helping rates whereby people help more in favor requests than volunteer opportunities, this study did not show gender differences. In addition to differences in guilt proneness, this study raised two additional issues with our experimental design. Participants’ decisions about the Math Task may have had less to do with their helping intentions and more to do with their mathematics self-efficacy. To wit, there was a significant difference in integer choice between participants in volunteer condition who got at least one correct answer on the practice round ($M = 5.65, SD = 3.91$) versus those who did not ($M = 3.00, SD = 4.21$), $t(1, 75) = 2.26, p = .03$. A possible cause of this difference is stereotype threat related to race and gender in the performance of math tasks (Cadinu, Maass, Rosabianca, & Kiesner, 2005; Schmader, 2002; Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999). Additionally, for the statement, “The Math Task was easy for me to complete,” there was a marginally significant gender difference between female ($M = 3.32, SD = 1.30$) and male ratings, ($M = 3.84, SD = 1.11$), $t(1, 64) = 1.75, p = .09$. Similarly, for the statement, “My performance on the grids was much better than the average
participant,” there was a significant gender difference between female (M = 3.00, SD = 1.10) and male ratings, (M = 3.59, SD = 0.98), t(1, 64) = 2.31, p = 02.

Second, some participants commented that the lab setup in which multiple pairs were working during the same sessions was distracting. Although we arranged the pairs separately in different areas in the lab space, we did have up to three pairs in a session. Furthermore, although they could not see each other’s screens and did not know about the deception, participants were able to see how long their partners worked on the task. They might have been influenced by the actions of their partners. We tried to address this issue by forcing participants who chose not to help to complete the filler task. However, participants did leave the lab at different times.

**GENERAL DISCUSSION**

The current research addressed differences in workplace helping decisions based on the helping context and the gender of the help provider. Across five studies, we found mixed results for our hypotheses. The first two studies demonstrated that females have a greater intention to perform interpersonal helping behaviors than men, especially in the favor context. Study 2 replicated differences in helping context and gender while Studies 3 and 4 only replicated differences in helping context. We suggest four potential reasons for the inconsistent results that need to be addressed in future research: a) our manipulation of helping context, b) differences between our theoretical definition and empirical manipulation of favor requests and volunteer opportunities versus lay conceptualizations of the terms, c) inconsistent treatment of the gender of the receiver, d) lack of an existing interpersonal relationship between performers and recipients.

The first potential reason for our inconsistent results is our manipulation of the helping context. In our studies, we focused our manipulations on whether or not the helping behavior
was triggered by an interpersonal ask or personal volition. However, there may be other important differences between favor requests and volunteer opportunities to address. First, we did not manipulate the relative psychological distance of the requestor to the performer, i.e., whether the helping scenario was targeted toward a specific individual, several individuals, or the organization. Second, we focused the volunteer opportunity scenarios on cases in which the performer notices a specific need for a specific individual; these studies did not consider situations in which a generalized ask for volunteers is made. Our theory would not consider either of these cases, help that is not targeted to a specific individual as well as help in response to a generalized ask, to meet the conditions for a favor because it lacks an 1-to-1 interpersonal context, but this theory needs to be tested empirically. Third, we did not explore all three of the characteristics of favors; we kept the levels of prosociality and discretion consistent across the two contexts. Although our theoretical model posits that both favors and volunteer opportunities are prosocial and discretionary, perhaps there are different degrees of these characteristics for each context. For example volunteer opportunities might be perceived to be more discretionary than favor requests. Finally, our manipulation of favors and volunteer opportunities in the behavioral experiments did not control for observer effects and social interaction. We did not include a condition in which participants are contacted by their partner but not asked for a favor. Prior research shows an effect of social interaction on help decisions so our inability to separate the social interaction from the favor request limits our ability to generalize the results. In other words, differences in the favor context versus the volunteer context could be due to the social interaction and not the content of the communication.

Second, we found differences between lay interpretations of our vignettes and our intended manipulations. In Studies 1A and 1B, many participants failed to classify the vignettes
into volunteer opportunities and favor requests as intended. We have conceptualized the difference between favor requests and volunteer opportunities as the interpersonal ask. Most of our participants did not make this same distinction. In fact, 45% of the participants in Study 1A and 53% of the participants in the favor condition in Study 1B categorized the vignette as both a favor and a volunteer opportunity, not making the distinction that we intended. Furthermore, when analyzing only the participants who match their categorization to our intended manipulation, the results were opposite of the results for the entire dataset. These gaps are likely driven by difference in definitions and conceptualizations of favor requests. The dictionary definition of a favor is “an act of gracious kindness” or “effort in one’s behalf or interest.” This definition does not differentiate between acts that are perform in response to a request versus one’s own initiative. In our studies, except for these categorization questions, we have avoided the use of the word “favor” for this reason. Instead, we use the word, “request.” Although it is clear that adding the interpersonal ask to the situation, makes a difference, the word favor is potentially problematic. Additional research needs to identify naïve perceptions of favors and incorporate those perceptions in our theoretical framework and empirical analysis.

Third, the gender of the help receiver may be an important moderator, and it was not consistently invoked across studies. Prior research shows that women are more likely to receive help than men. In dictator games, men receive less than women and fewer men give non-zero amounts (Boschini, Muren, & Persson, 2012; Dufwenberg & Muren, 2006) do. Women are generally more likely to receive help than men (Gruder & Cook, 1971), especially when that help the type that is normative for women, e.g., providing interpersonal support (Eagly & Crowley, 1986). In the vignette studies, we held the gender (male) constant across all vignettes. In Studies 2 and 3, we kept the help receiver’s gender unknown. In Study 4, participants knew the help
receiver’s gender, but receivers did not know whether help had been given until after the experiment was complete so participants may have ignored gender. These inconsistencies in the gender of the help receiver might explain some inconsistencies in the findings. Since previous research has shown that the help receiver’s gender plays a role in helping, gender needs to be considered more explicitly in future work.

Fourth, none of these studies measured favors between individuals with existing interpersonal relationships. Testing helping behaviors using strangers on the internet was a limitation of Studies 1A through 3. We attempted to mitigate this shortcoming with a psychological closeness manipulation in the laboratory. 16% of participants failed to be influenced by the manipulation requiring us to drop their cases from the analysis. Furthermore, even when the manipulation was successful, it is unclear whether it was sufficient to influence individuals’ choices to match those in an existing interpersonal relationship. People in existing relationships may view these helping contexts differently. Future research should try to more closely replicate the common circumstances in which favors are requested: within the boundaries of an existing interpersonal relationship.

Future Directions

This paper represents an initial investigation into gender differences in discretionary interpersonal helping rates based on helping context (favor request versus volunteer opportunity). We have plans to conduct a few extensions of this project. First, we are exploring different tasks for the behavioral experiment. Given that we saw differences across the vignette studies, it is reasonable to believe that differences might occur with different behavioral tasks. For example, gender differences might be seen with a verbal task instead of a math task. Instead, we are exploring the use of tasks that are common in the workplace. Given that we are investigating
workplace favors, some examples of tasks that might potentially improve ecological validity are a resume review, e.g., (e.g., Cox & Barron, 2012; Rosen & Jerdee, 1976) or inbox task that involves organizing and responding to various emails (e.g., Chernikova et al., 2016; Jimmieson & Terry, 1999), which could include emails that contain volunteer opportunities, favor requests, and job requirements.

Next, an important extension of the present research would entail examining the mechanisms that might account for differences in discretionary interpersonal helping rates in the volunteer opportunity versus favor request framing. If favor requests are more likely to trigger the interpersonal context than volunteer opportunities, what mechanism might explain why this context influences decisions? Although guilt proneness did not explain this difference, future research could investigate other potential mediators. We did not analyze the exploratory personality data that we collected, but we speculate that personality differences, such as agreeableness or empathy, may explain differences in helping rates across contexts and genders. On the other hand, perhaps differences are not trait-based but rather state-based. We found exploratory evidence that the increase levels of anticipated guilt or interpersonal responsibility toward the favor requestor influenced helping rates. State-based measures, such as these, might play an important role in disentangling context and gender differences.

Finally, for the behavioral experiments, to focus on the psychological processes of workplace favors, it might be fruitful to limit our population of subjects to individuals who are currently working in full-time jobs. While the populations used are not a fatal flaw of the current study, many of the participants were either college students or online participants with unknown occupations. Although it is reasonable to expect similar results, collecting data from a population of working adults might lead to more nuanced conclusions.
Practical Implications

The implications of these results for practice depend upon one’s perspective. From the point of view of the employee, decisions about discretionary workplace helping are critical to balancing one’s workload and performance. For women, especially, workplace favors can be an almost required activity. From the point of view of managers, understanding how people make decisions about helping is important to promote helping behavior and to maintain equality across discretionary workloads. If women performing more helping behavior than men, managers can intervene to change this dynamic.

Conclusion

We have argued that helping context, gender, and guilt proneness will affect rates of discretionary interpersonal helping. We find inconsistent support for our hypotheses. Future research is needed to identify when these relationships hold and when they break down as well as find the mechanisms that explain the differences. Because discretionary interpersonal helping is such an important part of organizational life, we need to better understand how helping context, gender, and guilt proneness affect helping behavior.
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100: 1239–1248.


### TABLE 1
Favor Decision Making: Reasons for Potential Performers to Agree to Favor Requests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Instrumental (to improve resources)</th>
<th>Hedonic (to improve emotional satisfaction)</th>
<th>Normative (to act appropriately)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Focus: Self (Potential benefits and costs for the intended performer)</td>
<td>Focus: Others (Potential benefits for favor requestors, recipients, and/or organizations)</td>
<td>Focus: Relationship (Potential benefits for the relationship between the requestor and performer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Own financial, social, and reputational benefits and costs and other instrumental benefits and costs</td>
<td>Others’ financial rewards, social, and reputational rewards and other instrumental benefits</td>
<td>Relationship improvement or maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Own positive affect and reduced negative affect</td>
<td>Others’ positive affect and reduced negative affect</td>
<td>Satisfies need for affiliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fulfills expectations one has for one’s self</td>
<td>Fulfills others’ expectations</td>
<td>Fulfills requestor’s expectations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 2
Beneficiaries of Favors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Familiarity of Beneficiary</th>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Collective (group or organization)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Familiar                   | A: Familiar individual  
Example: coworker, customer | C: One’s in-group or organization  
Example: one’s employer |
| Non-familiar               | B: Non-familiar individual  
Example: stranger | D: An out-group or external organization  
Example: charity that one is not affiliated with |
FIGURE 1

Interpersonal Process Model of Favors

1. Favor Request Stimulus: Identify need for help
2. Favor Request: Ask for help
3. Favor Decision: Decide to agree or decline to provide help
4. Favor Request Response: Communicate decision to agree or decline to provide help
5. (If agree) Favor: Perform favor request
TABLE 1
Means and Standard Deviations among Motivation Items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Construct</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental</td>
<td>1. It will improve my performance evaluations</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental</td>
<td>2. People will view me more positively</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental</td>
<td>3. It will speed my career progression</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental</td>
<td>4. It will make my job more influential or impactful&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonic</td>
<td>5. Helping makes me feel good</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonic</td>
<td>6. Helping makes me feel more confident</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonic</td>
<td>7. Helping makes me feel better about myself</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonic</td>
<td>8. Helping puts me in a good mood&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative</td>
<td>10. I want to be someone who does his/her part&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative</td>
<td>11. It supports my moral code</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative</td>
<td>12. It is the fair thing to do</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative</td>
<td>13. It is the right thing to do&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative</td>
<td>14. Helping is part of who I am&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. N = 640 except items marked with <sup>a</sup> had 1 case with missing value, N = 639. Cases with missing values were different for each item. Items rated on a scale of 1 = not at all influential to 5 = extremely influential. All correlations significant p < .01.
## TABLE 2
Goodness of Fit Statistics for Comparative Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>SRMR</th>
<th>$\Delta \chi^2$</th>
<th>$\Delta df$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>511.053</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>.914</td>
<td>{.088, .104}</td>
<td>.070</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 factors (Inst, Hedo, Norm)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>1281.108</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>.764</td>
<td>{.149, .164}</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>770.055**</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 factor (All)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 3</td>
<td>633.277</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>.891</td>
<td>{.099, .115}</td>
<td>.073</td>
<td>122.224**</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 factors (Inst, Hedo-Norm)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 4</td>
<td>1148.987</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>{.141, .156}</td>
<td>.102</td>
<td>637.934**</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 factors (Inst-Hedo, Norm)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 5</td>
<td>539.034</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>.911</td>
<td>{.084, .099}</td>
<td>.066</td>
<td>27.981*</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With gender covariate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 6</td>
<td>352.598</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>.895</td>
<td>{.094, .117}</td>
<td>.090</td>
<td>158.455</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 1, Male only</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 7</td>
<td>267.779</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>.923</td>
<td>{.081, .105}</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>243.274</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 1, Female only</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 8</td>
<td>298.126</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>.920</td>
<td>{.086, .109}</td>
<td>.068</td>
<td>212.927</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 1, Sample 1 only</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 9</td>
<td>322.865</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>.894</td>
<td>{.091, .114}</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td>188.188</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Model 1, Sample 2 only</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 10</td>
<td>151.681</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>.929</td>
<td>{.076, .108}</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>146.445</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 1, Sample 2, Cross-loading Items Removed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. RMSEA = root mean squared error of approximation; SRMR = standardized root mean square residual; CFI = Comparative fit index; Inst = Instrumental; Hedo = Hedonic; Norm = Normative; RMSEA shown with 90% confidence interval. All Models compared against Model 1, the hypothesized model, except Model 10, which is compared against Model 8. *$p < .001$. Model 1-6: N = 640; Model 6: N = 339; Model 7: N = 301; Model 8-10: N = 320. *$p < .01$; **$p < .001$. 

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### TABLE 3
Factor Loadings (Standardized Solution)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>z</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>R²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Item Loadings</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 1 (Instrumental)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. It will improve my performance evaluations</td>
<td>.745</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>31.99</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>.556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. People will view me more positively</td>
<td>.674</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>25.231</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>.455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. It will speed my career progression</td>
<td>.790</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>36.930</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>.623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. It will make my job more influential or impactful</td>
<td>.758</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>33.300</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>.575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 2 (Hedonic)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Helping makes me feel good</td>
<td>.868</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>71.866</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>.754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Helping makes me feel more confident</td>
<td>.762</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>40.853</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>.580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Helping makes me feel better about myself</td>
<td>.825</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>55.880</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>.681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Helping puts me in a good mood</td>
<td>.792</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>47.461</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>.628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. I enjoy helping people</td>
<td>.808</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>50.746</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>.653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 3 (Normative)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. I want to be someone who does his/her part</td>
<td>.624</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>23.096</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>.390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. It supports my moral code</td>
<td>.736</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>34.675</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>.542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. It is the fair thing to do</td>
<td>.632</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>23.287</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>.400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. It is the right thing to do</td>
<td>.759</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>36.557</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>.576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Helping is part of who I am</td>
<td>.798</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>43.987</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>.637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Factor Correlations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 1 with Factor 2</td>
<td>.452</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>11.672</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 1 with Factor 3</td>
<td>.400</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>9.541</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 2 with Factor 3</td>
<td>.873</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>52.534</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 4
Factor Loadings by Gender (standardized solution)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Females (n = 301)</th>
<th>Males (n = 339)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Factor Loadings</strong></td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 1 (Instrumental)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. It will improve my performance evaluations</td>
<td>.729 (.035)</td>
<td>.798 (.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. People will view me more positively</td>
<td>.697 (.037)</td>
<td>.621 (.040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. It will speed my career progression</td>
<td>.747 (.033)</td>
<td>.857 (.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. It will make my job more influential or impactful</td>
<td>.786 (.031)</td>
<td>.709 (.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 2 (Hedonic)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Helping makes me feel good</td>
<td>.889 (.016)</td>
<td>.851 (.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Helping makes me feel more confident</td>
<td>.782 (.025)</td>
<td>.737 (.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Helping makes me feel better about myself</td>
<td>.839 (.020)</td>
<td>.811 (.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Helping puts me in a good mood</td>
<td>.778 (.025)</td>
<td>.811 (.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. I enjoy helping people</td>
<td>.810 (.023)</td>
<td>.811 (.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 3 (Normative)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. I want to be someone who does his/her part</td>
<td>.659 (.037)</td>
<td>.590 (.040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. It supports my moral code</td>
<td>.740 (.030)</td>
<td>.733 (.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. It is the fair thing to do</td>
<td>.628 (.039)</td>
<td>.636 (.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. It is the right thing to do</td>
<td>.779 (.028)</td>
<td>.739 (.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Helping is part of who I am</td>
<td>.827 (.023)</td>
<td>.769 (.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Factor Correlations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 1 with Factor 2</td>
<td>.503 (.052)</td>
<td>.355 (.058)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 1 with Factor 3</td>
<td>.445 (.058)</td>
<td>.318 (.061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 2 with Factor 3</td>
<td>.873 (.023)</td>
<td>.872 (.024)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All loadings are significant $p < .001$. 
### TABLE 5
Descriptive Statistics for Random Split Halves of Data Set

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sample 1</th>
<th>Sample 2</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average age (years)</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average work experience (years)</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Citizen</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-year degree or higher</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single, never married</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No children</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FIGURE 1
Hypothesized Model of Factorial Structure of the Self-Focused Favor Motivation Items

Instrumental goals: to improve resources; acquiring financial, social, or reputational benefits

Hedonic goals: to improve emotional satisfaction; increasing one's positive affect

Normative goals: to act appropriately; fulfilling expectations of the self

1. It will improve my performance evaluations
2. People will view me more positively
3. It will speed my career progression
4. It will make my job more influential or impactful
5. Helping makes me feel good
6. Helping makes me feel more confident
7. Helping makes me feel better about myself
8. Helping puts me in a good mood
9. I enjoy helping people
10. I want to be someone who does his/her part
11. It supports my moral code
12. It is the fair thing to do
13. It is the right thing to do
14. Helping is part of who I am
FIGURE 2
Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the Self-Focused Favor Motivation Items

Instrumental goals

- .745 (.023) 1. It will improve my performance evaluations
- .674 (.027) 2. People will view me more positively
- .790 (.021) 3. It will speed my career progression
- .758 (.023) 4. It will make my job more influential or impactful

.452 (.039)

Hedonic goals

- .855 (.012) 5. Helping makes me feel good
- .762 (.019) 6. Helping makes me feel more confident
- .825 (.015) 7. Helping makes me feel better about myself
- .792 (.017) 8. Helping puts me in a good mood
- .808 (.016) 9. I enjoy helping people

.400 (.042)

Normative goals

- .624 (.027) 10. I want to be someone who does his/her part
- .736 (.021) 11. It supports my moral code
- .632 (.027) 12. It is the fair thing to do
- .759 (.021) 13. It is the right thing to do
- .798 (.018) 14. Helping is part of who I am
TABLES AND FIGURES FOR PAPER 3

TABLE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>M (SD)</th>
<th>Gender comparison</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>62.84 (29.56)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-3.19</td>
<td>1070.86</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>68.18 (26.95)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1158</td>
<td>65.77 (28.28)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Means are likelihood to agree rated on a 100-point scale, with higher numbers reflecting higher likelihood. Levene's Test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variance across groups had been violated, F(1, 1156) = 8.28, p < .01 so a Welch-Satterthwaite correction was made.

TABLE 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B (SE)</th>
<th>Wald X²</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>70.88 (1.95)</td>
<td>1323.36</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-4.07 (1.51)</td>
<td>7.22</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrapersonal harm</td>
<td>-18.83 (1.50)</td>
<td>157.2</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal harm</td>
<td>12.60 (1.50)</td>
<td>70.51</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proofread</td>
<td>3.22 (2.12)</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>1.90 (2.13)</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Errand</td>
<td>-6.00 (2.13)</td>
<td>7.91</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale</td>
<td>651.78 (27.09)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. N = 1158. The dependent variable is the likelihood to agree to the need for help presented in the vignette. Model includes dummy variables to control for the scenario and harm manipulations.
### TABLE 3
**Descriptive Statistics and Gender Comparisons of Likelihood to Agree by Condition (Study 1B)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>M (SD)</th>
<th>Gender comparison</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>58.31 (30.39)</td>
<td>-.95</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>111</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>62.10 (31.35)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>242</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>60.05 (30.83)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favor</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>57.85 (29.71)</td>
<td>-2.56</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>114</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>67.23 (26.76)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>242</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>62.30 (28.67)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>58.09 (30.00)</td>
<td>-2.45</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>225</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>64.70 (29.16)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>482</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>61.17 (29.76)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Means are likelihood to agree rated on a 100-point scale, with higher numbers reflecting higher likelihood. Group comparisons represent the simple effects of gender by condition. Levene's Test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variance across groups had not been violated for all comparisons, volunteer, \( p = .28 \); favor, \( p = .75 \); total, \( p = .07 \), so no corrections were made.

### TABLE 4
**ANCOVA Analyses of Likelihood to Agree by Condition and Gender (Study 1B)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>544,266.51</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>841.96</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrapersonal harm</td>
<td>96,397.88</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>149.12</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal harm</td>
<td>10,776.45</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16.67</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proofread</td>
<td>5,890.46</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9.11</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition</td>
<td>979.17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2,308.97</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female x Condition</td>
<td>2,058.75</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>307,053.41</td>
<td>475</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. N = 482. The dependent variable is the likelihood to agree to the favor presented in the vignette. ANCOVA includes a dummy variables to control for the scenario harm manipulations.
TABLE 5
Descriptive Statistics and Gender Comparisons of Likelihood to Agree by Condition for Participants with Correct Context Categorization (Study 1B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>M (SD)</th>
<th>Gender comparison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>57.73 (32.35)</td>
<td>t = -0.67, df = 125, p = .51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>63</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>61.67 (34.17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>127</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>59.69 (33.19)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favor</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>35.53 (26.71)</td>
<td>t = -3.35, df = 73, p &lt; .01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>56.92 (28.5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>46.65 (29.5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>49.74 (32.14)</td>
<td>t = -2.24, df = 200, p = .03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>102</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>59.85 (32.06)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>202</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>54.85 (32.42)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Means are likelihood to agree rated on a 100-point scale, with higher numbers reflecting higher likelihood. Group comparisons represent the simple effects of gender by condition. Levene's Test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variance across groups had not been violated for all comparisons, volunteer, p = .88; favor, p = .65; total, p = .66, so no corrections were made.

TABLE 6
ANCOVA Analyses of Likelihood to Agree by Condition, Gender for Participants with Correct Context Categorization (Study 1B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>174,249.48</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>315.95</td>
<td>&lt; .01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrapersonal harm</td>
<td>64,012.37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>116.07</td>
<td>&lt; .01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal harm</td>
<td>17,794.34</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32.27</td>
<td>&lt; .01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proofread</td>
<td>1,826.43</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition</td>
<td>2,041.78</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>3,477.92</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.31</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female X Condition</td>
<td>3,049.20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>107,543.67</td>
<td>195</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. N = 202. Only participants who matched perception of the context to the intended context were included: volunteer condition, n = 127; favor condition, n = 75. The dependent variable is the likelihood to agree to the favor presented in the vignette. ANCOVA includes dummy variables to control for the scenario harm manipulations. Levene's Test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variance across groups had not been violated, p = .85.
### TABLE 7
Descriptive Statistics and Gender Comparisons of Choice by Condition (Study 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>M (SD)</th>
<th>Gender comparison</th>
<th>( \chi^2 )</th>
<th>df, N</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>.56 (.50)</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td></td>
<td>1, 239</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>108</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.69 (.47)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>239</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>.62 (.49)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favor</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>.68 (.47)</td>
<td>10.13</td>
<td></td>
<td>1, 246</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>140</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.85 (.36)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>246</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>.78 (.42)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>.61 (.49)</td>
<td>15.89</td>
<td></td>
<td>1, 485</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>248</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.78 (.42)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>485</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>.70 (.46)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Means are choice; choice was coded as 0 = higher for the decider, not helping; 1 = for higher for the recipient, helping. Group comparisons represent the Pearson Chi-Square 2-tailed significance test by condition.

### TABLE 8
Logistic Regression Analysis Predicting Choice (Study 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
<td>e(^B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.15 (.16)</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition</td>
<td>.71 (.21)**</td>
<td>2.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.74 (.21)**</td>
<td>2.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition x Gender</td>
<td>.23 (.18)</td>
<td>1.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( \chi^2 \) 28.15** 29.25**

df 2 3

Nagelkerke R Square .08 .08

Note. N = 485. The dependent variable is choice. Choice was coded as 0 = higher for the decider, not helping; 1 = for higher for the recipient, helping. Condition was coded as 0 = volunteer, 1 = favor. Gender was coded as 0 = male, 1 = female; †p < .10; *p < .05. **p < .01. There was no significant difference between observed and predicted group membership, Hosmer-Lemeshow, for Model 1, \( \chi^2(2) = 1.10, p = .58 \), and Model 2, \( \chi^2(2) = .00, p = 1.00 \), indicating good fit.
### TABLE 9
Descriptive Statistics and Gender Comparisons of Choice by Condition (Study 3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>M (SD)</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2.74 (2.46)</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>59</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2.44 (2.10)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>113</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.58 (2.27)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favor</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3.25 (3.02)</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>62</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>3.35 (2.86)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>114</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3.31 (2.92)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2.99 (2.75)</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>121</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2.91 (2.55)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>227</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.95 (2.64)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Means are number of easy grids given to the recipient rated on a 10-point scale, with higher numbers reflecting a more generous allocation. Group comparisons represent the simple effects of gender by condition. Levene's Test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variance across groups had not been violated for all comparisons, volunteer, \( p = .24 \); favor, \( p = .48 \); total, \( p = .35 \), so no corrections were made.

### TABLE 10
GLM of Choice by Gender and Condition (Study 3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B (SE)</th>
<th>Wald ( \chi^2 )</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>3.36 (.33)</td>
<td>103.07</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition</td>
<td>-.91 (.47)</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.11 (.49)</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition x Gender</td>
<td>.41 (.69)</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>6.77 (.64)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. \( N = 227 \). The dependent variable is choice, number of easy grids given to the recipient. Condition was coded as 0 = volunteer, 1 = favor. Gender was coded as 0 = male, 1 = female.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>M (SD)</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>1. Choice</td>
<td>2.58 (2.27)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Gender</td>
<td>0.52 (0.50)</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. GP</td>
<td>3.77 (0.93)</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>(.83)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. IR</td>
<td>4.11 (1.65)</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>(.88)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Ant. Guilt.</td>
<td>4.42 (2.28)</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>(.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Ant. Grat.</td>
<td>3.84 (2.28)</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favor</td>
<td>1. Choice</td>
<td>3.31 (2.92)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Gender</td>
<td>0.54 (0.50)</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. GP</td>
<td>3.91 (0.88)</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>(.82)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. IR</td>
<td>3.96 (1.54)</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>(.88)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Ant. Guilt.</td>
<td>4.61 (2.05)</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>(.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Ant. Grat.</td>
<td>3.77 (2.21)</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Volunteer N = 111; Favor N = 114. Only 99 (volunteer) and 103 (favor) responses were available for anticipated gratitude due to technical errors. GP = 5-item guilt proneness scale; IR = 4-item interpersonal responsibility scale; Ant. Guilt. = 2-item anticipated guilt scale; Ant. Grat. = 1-item anticipated gratitude scale. Cronbach alpha reliabilities shown on the diagonal where applicable. Correlations > .19 are significant at \( p < .05 \).
### TABLE 12
Descriptive Statistics and Gender Comparisons of Binary Choice by Condition (Study 4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>M (SD)</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>df, N</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Binary choice</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>.76 (.44)</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>1,39</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Yes/No)</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.73 (.46)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>.74 (.44)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favor</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1.00 (.00)</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1,38</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.95 (.23)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>.97 (.16)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>.89 (.32)</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>1,77</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.83 (.38)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>77</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>.86 (.35)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Means are yes/no choice; Choice was codes as 0 = no, 1 = yes.

### TABLE 13
Logistic Regression Analysis Predicting Binary Choice (Study 4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>B (SE)</th>
<th>$e^B$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.57 (1.31)*</td>
<td>3.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition</td>
<td>2.53 (1.08)*</td>
<td>12.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.42 (.71)</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2$ 9.87**

df 2

Nagelkerke R Square .22

Note. N = 77. The dependent variable is binary choice (yes/no) of whether to help; choice was coded as 0 = no; 1 = yes. Condition was coded as 0 = volunteer, 1 = favor. Gender was coded as 0 = male, 1 = female; † p<.10; * p<.05. ** p < .01. There was no significant difference between observed and predicted group membership, Hosmer-Lemeshow, $\chi^2(2) = .77$, $p = .68$, indicating good fit.
### TABLE 14

Descriptive Statistics and Gender Comparisons of Integer Choice by Condition (Study 4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>M (SD)</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integer choice</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3.65 (3.14)</td>
<td>-.64</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4.41 (4.02)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4.08 (3.64)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favor</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>6.89 (4.23)</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>5.68 (4.26)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6.29 (4.23)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>5.36 (4.05)</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>5.00 (4.13)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>77</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5.17 (4.07)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Means are number of grids to do for the recipient, rated on a 13-point scale, with higher numbers reflecting a more generous allocation. Participants who did not agree to help were coded as 0 grids.

### TABLE 15

ANOVA of Integer Choice by Gender and Condition (Study 4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2032.09</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>129.55</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition</td>
<td>97.62</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.22</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition x Gender</td>
<td>18.57</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>1145.10</td>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. N = 77. The dependent variable is integer choice (amount of help) represented by number of grids to do for the recipient. Condition was coded as 0 = volunteer, 1 = favor. Gender was coded as 0 = male, 1 = female. Levene's Test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variance had not been violated, $p = .26$. 
### TABLE 16
Descriptive Statistics of Covariates (Study 4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>M (SD)</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>1. Choice</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Gender</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. GP</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>(.67)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. IR</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>(.82)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Ant. Guilt.</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>(.79)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Ant. Happ.</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favor</td>
<td>1. Choice</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Gender</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. GP</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>(.71)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. IR</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>(.92)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Ant. Guilt.</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>(.77)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Ant. Happ.</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Volunteer N = 111; Favor N = 114. Only 99 (volunteer) and 103 (favor) responses were available for anticipated gratitude due to technical errors. GP = 5-item guilt proneness scale; IR = 4-item interpersonal responsibility scale; Ant. Guilt. = 2-item anticipated guilt scale; Ant. Grat. = 1-item anticipated happiness scale. Cronbach alpha reliabilities shown on the diagonal where applicable. Correlations > .19 are significant at p < .05.
FIGURE 1
Hypothesized model of gender and helping context on discretionary interpersonal helping rates.

Note: Scenario and harm manipulation are included as covariates.
APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
Vignettes for Studies 1A and 1B

Note:
F = favor condition; V = volunteer condition (*V manipulation only used in Study 1B)
LoS = low self (intrapersonal) harm; HiS = high self (intrapersonal) harm
LoO = low other (interpersonal) harm; HiO = high other (interpersonal) harm

Scenario 1: Proofread report (1A and 1B)

<F: Your colleague asks you / V*: You notice that your colleague needs someone> to proofread and provide comments on a report he is submitting to his manager. You are not a member of that project team so helping with the report is not part of your job. <F: You are the only person he asked for help, and no one else knows that he asked you. / V: He does not directly ask anyone for help, and you are the only person who notices that he needs it.> You feel free to choose whether to agree to his request to provide the feedback.

The report is a <LoO: minor / HiO: important> part of your colleague's project. You have a deadline for your own work at the end of the day, but you estimate that it will <LoS: only take 15 minutes / HiS: take over two hours> to provide the necessary feedback.

Scenario 2: Meeting (1A only)

One of your colleagues is your department’s delegate to a special task force. He’s unable to attend a meeting to discuss the status of the project. Even though it’s not part of your job, he asks you to attend the meeting for him. You are the only person he asked to go, but you feel free to choose whether or not to help.

The status meeting is an important part of your colleague's project. You have a deadline for your own work at the end of the day, but you estimate that it will <LoS: only take 15 minutes / HiS: take over two hours> to attend the meeting.

Scenario 3: Run errand (1A and 1B)

<F: Your colleague asks you / V*: You notice that your colleague needs someone> to go to the office supplies store to pick up some materials for a work project that is due today because the rest of his day is booked with meetings. You are not a member of that project team so helping with the report is not part of your job.
<F: You are the only person he asked for help, and no one else knows that he asked you. / V: He does not directly ask anyone for help, and you are the only person who notices that he needs it.> You are free to choose whether <F: to agree to his request / V: to offer> to go pick up the supplies.

The supplies are a <LoO: minor / HiO: essential> part of your colleague's project. You have a deadline for your own work at the end of the day, <LoS: but / HiS: and> you estimate that it
will take <LoS: only take 15 minutes / HiS: take over two hours> to provide the necessary feedback.

Scenario 4: Event (1A only)

Your company wants to host a social event at a local restaurant to celebrate the end of the fiscal year. Even though it’s not part of your job, a colleague asks if you’d be willing to join the other three members of the organizing committee. You are the only person he asked, but you feel free to choose whether or not to help.

If you do not join the committee, they will have more work <LoO: but will still be able to plan the event / HiO: and may have to scale back or cancel the event. You have an upcoming deadline for your own work, and you estimate that it will take <LoS: only take an hour / HiS: at least eight hours> to help them plan the event.

APPENDIX B

Task Instructions and Example for Effort Distribution Task – Study 3

EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS
(Read carefully. You will be quizzed on these instructions on the next page.)

Task
You will be randomly paired with another participant, who will be matched with you for this experiment (i.e., another MTurk Worker). Your group will be assigned a task with 18 number grids. 9 grids are EASY, and 9 are HARD.

One of the participants will be randomly selected by the survey to be the "DECIDER" who will split the 18 parts between the two participants. (Each participants will do 9 parts.) The DECIDER will choose how many EASY versus HARD parts each of the participants will do.

Once the selection (number of EASY vs. HARD grids) is made, participants will separately work on their assigned grids for 1 hour to work for as long (or as short) as they want.

Score and Earnings
You will be paid $1.00 for participating, and, in addition, you will also earn money based on your own score on the task (up to $0.90). Each participant will be paid based on his or her individual score. Only the experimenters will know how much money each participant has earned.

Interacting with Your Partner via Message
You and your partner will not meet face-to-face. You will not hear each others' voice nor will you learn each others identity—that information will be kept confidential. However, one or both participants may be given access to a survey in which you can enter a message to sent to your partner.

To ensure your comprehension, you will be quizzed on these instructions on the next page.

TASK INSTRUCTIONS: (Page 1 of 3)
Number Grids: You will complete a series of "number grids" like the one below. You will have a total of 9 possible grids that you can complete. The EASY grids will be small like the 2x2 grid below, but the HARD grids will be 4x4.

To complete each grid correctly, do the following:

1. Find the two numbers that sum exactly to 10.0000. There are only two correct numbers that sum to 10 in each grid.
2. Enter the two numbers in the boxes below each grid. Order does NOT matter. You must type the full number, including all decimal places, to get credit.

EXAMPLE:
Your score will determine your earnings, which will be paid as an Mturk bonus. Each point of the score is worth $0.10. See chart below for examples. There are a total of 9 grids, so the maximum score is 9 points.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If your Score is:</th>
<th>Then your Earnings will be:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 point</td>
<td>$0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 points</td>
<td>$0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 points</td>
<td>$0.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To continue with the instructions, click the button below.

TASK INSTRUCTIONS: (Page 3 of 3)
(Read carefully. You will be quizzed on these instructions.)

Time:
You have up to 1 hour to do as many of these grids as you would like. However, you can end the task at any time by clicking the button at the bottom of the page.

After you end the task, you will be asked to answer a few more questions. Then the survey will end.
APPENDIX C

Communications (Psychological Closeness) Task – Study 4

This part of the study is about interpersonal closeness, and your task, which we think will be quite enjoyable, is simply to get close to your partner. We believe that the best way for you to get close to your partner is for you to share with them and for them to share with you. Of course, when we advise you about getting close to your partner, we are giving advice regarding your behavior in this study session only, we are not advising you about your behavior outside of this study session.

In order to help you get close, we have arranged for the two of you to engage in a kind of sharing game. **Your sharing time will be about 20 minutes.**

You have been given a set of questions. As soon as you both finish reading these instructions, you should begin with the first question. One of you should read aloud the first question and then **BOTH** do what it asks, starting with the person who read the question aloud. When you are both done, go on to the second question—one of you reading it aloud and both doing what it asks. **Please try to answer the questions in order.**

Alternate who reads the question aloud (and thus goes first).

**It is not important to finish all the questions within the 20 minute time period.** Take plenty of time with each question, doing what it asks thoroughly and thoughtfully.

If you have questions or concerns at any point during this task, please raise your hand to speak to the experimenter.

You may begin!

1. Given the choice of anyone in the world, whom would you want as a dinner guest?
2. What is your most treasured memory?
3. If you knew that in one year you would die suddenly, would you change anything about the way you are now living? Why?
4. What does friendship mean to you?
5. What roles do love and affection play in your life?
6. Alternate sharing something you consider a positive characteristic of your partner (for this experiment). Share a total of 5 items.
7. How close and warm is your family? Do you feel your childhood was happier than most other people’s?
8. How do you feel about your relationship with your mother?
9. Make three true “we” statements each. For instance, “We are both in this room feeling…”
10. Complete this sentence: “we wish we had someone with whom we could share…”
11. If you were going to become close with your partner, please share what would be important for him or her to know.
12. Tell your partner what you like about them; be very honest this time saying things that you might not say to someone you’ve just met.
13. Share with your partner an embarrassing moment in your life.
14. When did you last cry in front of another person? By yourself?
15. Tell your partner something that you like about them already.
16. What, if anything, is too serious to be joked about?
17. If you were to die this evening with no opportunity to communicate with anyone, what would you most regret not having told someone? Why haven’t you told them yet?
18. Your house, containing everything you own, catches fire. After saving your loved ones and pets, you have time to safely make a final dash to save any one item. What would it be? Why?
19. Of all the people in your family, whose death would you find most disturbing? Why?
20. Share a personal problem and ask your partner’s advice on how he or she might handle it. Also, ask your partner to reflect back to you how you seem to be feeling about the problem you have chosen.
APPENDIX D

Task Instructions and Example for Math (Effort Distribution) Task – Study 4

Partner Matching and Participant Selection
For the Math task, you will be paired with the same participant you spoke with during the Communication Task.

Within each pair, one participant (“Person A”) will be randomly selected to work on the Math Task, and the other participant (“Person B”) will be randomly selected to skip the Math Task. Person A will work on the Math Task for up to 10 minutes and then answer a final survey. Person B will only answer the final survey.

Before we randomly select which participant will be Person A, both participants will have the opportunity to learn how to work on the Math Task (solve the grids).

Task
The Math Task involves solving a series of "number grids" like the one below. There are a total of 12 possible grids to complete.

To complete each grid correctly, please do the following:

1. Find the two numbers that sum exactly to 10.00000. There are only two correct numbers that sum to 10 in each grid.
2. Enter the two numbers in the boxes below each grid. Order does NOT matter. You must type the full number, including all decimal places, to get credit.

EXAMPLE:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.82447</td>
<td>6.56824</td>
<td>4.34932</td>
<td>6.69683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.64355</td>
<td>2.09326</td>
<td>2.12901</td>
<td>9.32537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.44596</td>
<td>9.32992</td>
<td>7.31513</td>
<td>3.27716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.27417</td>
<td>6.17553</td>
<td>7.45166</td>
<td>1.62422</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

You will see your score after the task.

Bonus Earnings
For each correctly solved grid, you will earn a bonus of $0.25 per grid. The total bonus payment for 12 correct grids is $3.00.

Time
You will have up to 10 minutes to do as many grids as you would like. You may end the task at any time by clicking the button at the bottom of the page.

Interacting with Your Partner via Message
For the remainder of the experiment, you and your partner are not be allowed to talk aloud to each other. However, one of both of you may be given an opportunity to send an electronic message to your partner.