# Ambiguity Shifts and the 2007–2008 Financial Crisis*

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**Abstract**

I analyze the effects of model misspecification on default swap spreads and equity prices for firms that are informationally opaque to the investors. The agents in the economy are misspecification-averse and thus assign higher probabilities to lower utility states. This leads to higher CDS rates, lower equity prices and lower expected times to default. Estimating the model using data on financial institutions, I find that the sudden increase in credit spreads in the summer of 2007 can be partially explained by agents' mistrust of the signals observed in the market. The bailout of Bear Stearns in March 2008 and the liquidation of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 further exacerbated the agents' doubts about signal quality and introduced mistrust about the agents' pricing models, accounting for the further increases in credit spreads after these events.

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# 1 Introduction

When making consumption decisions, an investor faces uncertainty about both the relevant underlying state and the data-generating process governing the evolution of the state. While uncertainty about the state is risk that the investor understands and can model, uncertainty about the data-generating process represents agents' pessimism about their ability to identify the correct model. This paper argues that prices of credit securities are sensitive to the investors' preferences toward model uncertainty and that the implied time-variation in the level of model uncertainty is a source of variation in credit spreads that explains the asymmetric response of credit spreads to upturns and downturns in the economy.

I analyze the effects of model misspecification on default swap spreads in secondary markets for the corporate debt of firms that are not perfectly transparent to the investors. The agents in the economy are misspecification-averse and thus mistrust the statistical model of the fundamental value of assets of firms and of the firms' observed earnings process. This mistrust reflects the fact that, when it is difficult for investors to observe firms' assets directly, they are forced to rely on imprecise accounting information. In this situation, investors must draw inference from accounting data and other publicly available information. Investors realize that, although they may be able to pick a model of the fundamental asset value and the accounting signals to best fit the historical data, this may not be the true data-generating model. Under the assumption that investors are misspecification-averse, I derive the asset prices in the economy, explicitly accounting for the implications of imperfect information and model misspecification.

I show several significant implications of model misspecification for the level and variation in the term structure of secondary market default swap spreads. Compared to a model with perfect information, model uncertainty increases the level of the yield curve

and the default swap spread curve. Intuitively, in the presence of model misspecification, investors must be compensated for the risk associated with choosing the "wrong" model to describe the evolution of the underlying state. Notice that, as shown in Duffie and Lando (2001), introducing imperfect information to a standard Black and Cox (1976) model has the additional benefit of being able to explain high credit spreads at short maturities.

Next, I show that model uncertainty exacerbates the imperfect information problem faced by the representative investors in the secondary asset markets. In filtering information about the underlying state from the imperfect signals, agents must take into account uncertainty about both the model governing the evolution of the underlying state and the signals about the underlying state. The misspecification-averse agent assigns higher probabilities to lower utility states. Further, how much these probabilities are higher than under the reference model depends on the current conditional probability vector under the reference model.

Model misspecification also impacts the joint probability distribution of the next period's signals and states. In particular, while in states of the economy when no firm defaults, the misspecification averse agent perceives the probability of transitioning to a default state to be higher than under the reference model. Thus, the expected time to default of each firm decreases, increasing default swap spreads. Further, the misspecification averse agent also perceives the transition probability matrix associated with the underlying state to be time varying. The time-variation in the transition probability matrix induces additional time-variation in the expected time to default of each firm and, thus, in default swap spreads.

In this paper, I argue that the increases in CDS spreads observed during the 2007–2008 crisis were due to increases in investors' doubts about the validity of their pricing models and the quality of the signals available to market participants. On August 9, 2007,

France's largest bank BNP Paribas announced that it was having difficulties because two of its off-balance-sheet funds had loaded up on securities based on American subprime mortgages. But Paribas was not alone in its troubles: A month before, the German bank IKB announced similar difficulties, and the Paribas announcement was followed the next day by Northern Rock's revelation that it had only had enough reserve cash to last until the end of the month. These and other similar announcements lead to a freeze of the credit markets as banks lost faith in each other's balance sheets. The situation was particularly surprising considering the market conditions shortly before the crisis began. At the beginning of 2007, financial markets were liquidity-unconstrained and credit spreads were at historical lows. Even as late as May 2007, it would have been hard to predict the magnitude of the response that the losses on subprime mortgages had generated. Compared to the total value of financial instruments traded worldwide, the subprime losses were relatively small: even the worst-case estimates put them at around USD 250 billion. [1] Further, for investors familiar with the instruments, the losses were not unexpected. By definition, the subprime mortgages were part of the riskiest segment of the mortgage market, so it was hardly surprising some borrowers would default on the loans. Yet, despite their predictability, the defaults had precipitated the current liquidity crisis that spread between the credit markets.

(Figure 1 about here.)

Using observations of the CDS spreads on financial institutions, I estimate the degrees of investors' aversion to ambiguity about signal quality and to ambiguity about the fundamental asset value dynamics. To evaluate the changes in investors' aversion to misspecification during the crisis, I estimate the misspecification aversion coefficients using three sub-periods– before the start of the crisis in July 2007, from the start of the crisis

[1] Source: Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008b)

to the bailout of Bear Stearns in March 2008, and from the bailout of Bear Stearns to the liquidation of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 – and find that the three estimates are not statistically significantly different, implying that investors' misspecification preferences did not change during the crisis. In terms of the model, this implies that the observed changes in credit spreads during the financial crisis were due not to changing misspecification attitudes on the part of the investors but rather due to an increase in the amount of misspecification in the economy.

Since the investors' aversion to misspecification did not change significantly during the crisis, I use the pre-crisis estimate of the misspecification aversion coefficients to compute the model-implied time series of CDS spreads, equity prices and the quantity of misspecification. Measuring the amount of misspecification using the expected log likelihood ratio (or relative entropy) between the reference and the worst-case models, I find that the amount of misspecification did in fact increase during the financial crisis. Further, the way that total entropy is decomposed into the contribution from misspecification of the distribution of the future signals and state and the contribution from misspecification of the conditional distribution over the current state changed during the crisis. More specifically, the initial BNP Paribas announcement in August 2007 lead to an increase in the relative entropy due to current period conditional probability misspecification. Intuitively, the BNP Paribas announcement and the subsequent Northern Rock revelations lead to an increase in ambiguity about the quality of the signals available to market participants. The bailout of Bear Stearns and the bailout of Lehman Brothers, on the other hand, lead to an increase in entropy due to misspecification of the distribution of future signals and states. That is, the effective default of these two institutions increased investors' doubts about the quality of the surviving financial institutions. Entropy stabilizes toward the end of the crisis but at a higher level than before the start of the crisis.

To evaluate the quality of the fit of the model, I compare the model-implied CDS spreads and equity prices to the corresponding quantities observed in the data. The model-implied CDS spreads match both the levels and the changes in CDS spreads observed during the crisis, although the performance of the model deteriorates after the liquidation of Lehman Brothers. Further, although the model does not match the overall levels of equity prices and, in fact, is not geared to do so, it does match the changes in equity prices observed during the crisis.

Next, I examine the impact of each source of ambiguity on CDS spreads in greater detail. By alternatively setting the degree of aversion to ambiguity about signal quality or about the fundamental asset value dynamics to zero, I can evaluate separately the contributions to the behavior of CDS rates from the two sources of ambiguity. I find that, while both sources of ambiguity are important for matching the time series evolution of CDS rates, the relative importance of the contributions from different sources evolves over time. At the start of the crisis, aversion to ambiguity about signal quality plays a greater role while in the later part of the crisis the behavior of CDS rates is influenced more strongly by aversion to ambiguity about the underlying dynamics.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. I review the related literature in Section 2. In Section 3, I solve a three period example to illustrate the impact of ambiguity aversion on investors' beliefs. I describe the model considered in the paper in Section 4. The results of the estimation of the model are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. Technical details are relegated to the appendix.

# 2 Literature Review

A rapidly growing literature studies the behavior of asset prices in the presence of ambiguity in dynamic economies. A substantial part of this literature considers investor ambiguity about the data-generating model. Anderson et al. (2003) derive the pricing semigroups associated with robust perturbations of the true state probability law. Trojani and Vanini (2002) use their framework to address the equity premium and the interest rate puzzles, while Leippold et al. (2008) consider also the excess volatility puzzle. Gagliardini et al. (2009) study the term structure implications of adding ambiguity to a production economy. This setting has also been used to study the portfolio behavior of ambiguity-averse investors and the implications for the options markets (see e.g. Trojani and Vanini (2004) and Liu et al. (2005)).

The second strand in the literature, however, assumes that, although the agents in the economy know the "true" data-generating model, they face uncertainty about the quality of the observed signal about an unobservable underlying. Chen and Epstein (2002) study the equity premium and the interest rate puzzles in this set-up, and Epstein and Schneider (2008) consider the implications for the excess volatility puzzle. The portfolio allocation implications of this setting have also been studied extensively in e.g. Uppal and Wang (2003) and Epstein and Miao (2003).

However, none of these papers study the relationship between ambiguity aversion and the term structure of credit spreads. Following Hansen and Sargent (2005, 2007), I introduce model misspecification by considering martingale distortions to the reference model probability law. As Hansen and Sargent (2007) show, the martingale distortion can be factored into distortions of the conditional distribution of the underlying state (signal quality) and the evolution law of the hidden state (asset value dynamics). I assume that the representative investor in the secondary debt market has max-min preferences over

consumption paths under possible models.

This paper is also related to the literature on preference-based explanations for credit spreads. Chen (2010) studies two puzzles about corporate debt: the credit spread puzzle – why yield spreads between corporate bonds and treasuries are high and volatile – and the under-leverage puzzle – why firms use debt conservatively despite seemingly large tax benefits and low costs of financial distress. The paper argues that both of these puzzles can be explained by two observations: defaults are more highly concentrated during bad times, when marginal utility is high, and the losses associated with default are higher during such times. Thus, investors demand high risk premia for holding defaultable claims, including corporate bonds and levered firms.

Using similar intuition, Chen et al. (2009) argue that the credit spread puzzle can be explained by the covariation between default rates and market Sharpe ratios. That is, investors must be compensated more for holding credit risk securities because default rates (and, hence, expected losses from default) increase at the same time as market returns are more uncertain. More specifically, the authors investigate the credit spread implications of the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) pricing kernel calibrated to equity returns and aggregate consumption data. Identifying the historical surplus–consumption ratio from aggregate consumption data, the paper finds that the implied level and time-variation of spreads match historical levels well.

# 3 Three Period Example

In this section, I consider a three period economy consisting of just one firm. In this setting, I can examine analytically the effect of ambiguity aversion on the investors' perceived beliefs. The setting in this section is an extremely simplified version of the model

in Section 4 and provides the main intuition for the more general results.

More specifically, consider a firm whose payoffs $V$ each period are given as in the event tree in Fig. 2. At date 0, the firm pays $V_0$ to the investors for sure. Between dates 0 and 1, the payoff from the firm increases to $V_h$ with probability $p_h$ or decreases to $V_l$ with probability $p_l = 1 - p_h$. Similarly, the probability of the firm payoff increasing between dates 1 and 2 is $p_h$ and the probability of the firm payoff decreasing between dates 1 and 2 is $p_l = 1 - p_h$. Finally, notice that, by assumption, the tree is recombining so that the firm payoff at date 2 if the firm payoff first decreases between dates 0 and 1 and then increases between dates 1 and 2 is the same as the payoff of a firm which first increases and then decreases in value. This simplifying assumption reduces notational complexity without detracting from the main intuition of the model.

(Figure 2 about here.)

In this example, I focus on the investors' problem at date 1. In particular, I assume that, at the intermediate date 1, the investors in the firm do not observe the realized payoff $V_1$ (which is paid into an interest-free account on their behalf). Instead, the representative investor in the firm observes an imperfect but unbiased signal about the true realization: $y = V_1 + u$. Given a signal $y$ at date 1, the representative investor forms a posterior probability $\pi_h$ of the firm payoff being in the high state at date 1:

$$\pi_h = \frac{p_h f(y - V_h)}{p_h f(y - V_h) + p_l f(y - V_l)},$$

where $f(\cdot)$ is the probability distribution function of the signal error, $u$. The corresponding posterior probability of being in the low state at date 1 is then given by:

$$\pi_l = \frac{p_l f(y - V_h)}{p_h f(y - V_h) + p_l f(y - V_l)}.$$

The investors in this firm are risk-neutral but ambiguity-averse. That is, in making investment decisions at date 1, the investors in the firm consider two questions:

1. Given a realization of the firm payoff at date 1, what is the worst-case probability of the firm payoff increasing between dates 1 and 2?

2. Given a signal about the firm payoff at date 1,what is the worst-case probability of the firm payoff being in the high state (i.e. $V_1 = V_h$) at date 1?

The first question captures investors' doubts about the validity of the statistical model they have for the evolution of firm payoffs in the future. Notice that, although I consider the imperfect information setting in this example, this concern remains valid even in perfect information settings as, in making investment and consumption decisions, agents make predictions about the future evolution of their cash flows. The second question captures investors doubts about the validity of filter that they use to construct the posterior probabilities at date 1.

More formally, denote by $\tilde{p}_{hh}$ the perceived probability of the firm payoff increasing from $V_h$ at date 1 to $V_{hh}$ at date 2, $\tilde{p}_{lh}$ the perceived probability of the firm payoff increasing from $V_l$ at date 1 to $V_{hl}$ at date 2 and by $\tilde{\pi}_h$ the perceived probability of $V_h$ being the realized firm payoff at date 1. The corresponding probability tree with distorted probabilities is presented in Fig. 3. The ambiguity-averse investor solves:

$$\begin{aligned}
\min_{\tilde{\pi},\tilde{p}} \quad & \tilde{\pi}_h \left(V_h + \tilde{p}_{hh} V_{hh} + \tilde{p}_{hl} V_{hl}\right) + \tilde{\pi}_l \left(V_l + \tilde{p}_{lh} V_{lh} + \tilde{p}_{ll} V_{ll}\right) \\
+ \quad & \theta_d \left[\tilde{\pi}_h \left(\tilde{p}_{hh} \log \frac{\tilde{p}_{hh}}{p_h} + \tilde{p}_{hl} \log \frac{\tilde{p}_{hl}}{p_l}\right) + \tilde{\pi}_l \left(\tilde{p}_{lh} \log \frac{\tilde{p}_{lh}}{p_h} + \tilde{p}_{ll} \log \frac{\tilde{p}_{ll}}{p_l}\right)\right] \\
+ \quad & \theta_s \left(\tilde{\pi}_h \log \frac{\tilde{\pi}_h}{\pi_h} + \tilde{\pi}_l \log \frac{\tilde{\pi}_l}{\pi_l}\right)
\end{aligned} \tag{3.1}$$

where the minimization is subject to:

$$\begin{aligned} 1 &= \tilde{\pi}_h + \tilde{\pi}_l \\ 1 &= \tilde{p}_{hh} + \tilde{p}_{hl} \\ 1 &= \tilde{p}_{lh} + \tilde{p}_{ll}. \end{aligned}$$

The minimization problem (3.1) has three components. The first,

$$\tilde{E}[V_1 + V_2|y] = \tilde{\pi}_h \left(V_h + \tilde{p}_{hh}V_{hh} + \tilde{p}_{hl}V_{hl}\right) + \tilde{\pi}_l \left(V_l + \tilde{p}_{lh}V_{lh} + \tilde{p}_{ll}V_{ll}\right),$$

is the usual expected utility component but calculated using the distorted probabilities. The remaining two components measure the entropy between the reference and the misspecified probability laws and discipline the choice of the worst-case likelihood. The entropy due to a misspecification of the underlying dynamics (that is, the entropy associated with a different choice of $\tilde{p}_{hh}$ and $\tilde{p}_{lh}$) is:

$$\epsilon^1(\tilde{p}_{hh}, \tilde{p}_{lh}, \tilde{\pi}_h) = \tilde{\pi}_h \left(\tilde{p}_{hh} \log \frac{\tilde{p}_{hh}}{p_h} + \tilde{p}_{hl} \log \frac{\tilde{p}_{hl}}{p_l}\right) + \tilde{\pi}_l \left(\tilde{p}_{lh} \log \frac{\tilde{p}_{lh}}{p_h} + \tilde{p}_{ll} \log \frac{\tilde{p}_{ll}}{p_l}\right),$$

and the entropy due to a misspecification of the signal quality (that is, the entropy associated with a different choice of $\tilde{\pi}_h$) is:

$$\epsilon^2(\tilde{\pi}_h) = \tilde{\pi}_h \log \frac{\tilde{\pi}_h}{\pi_h} + \tilde{\pi}_l \log \frac{\tilde{\pi}_l}{\pi_l}.$$

$\theta_d^{-1}$ and $\theta_s^{-1}$ measure the degree of investors' ambiguity aversion toward ambiguity about the underlying dynamics and ambiguity about the signal quality, respectively. As noted in Jacobson (1973), the relative entropy $\epsilon^1 + \epsilon^2$ is the expected log-likelihood ratio between the

reference and the misspecified models. Thus, the parameters $\theta_d$ and $\theta_s$ can be interpreted as penalization parameters for large deviations away from the reference models. The problem (3.1) can thus be interpreted as a robust way of alternating probability measures. For $\theta_d^{-1} = 0$ and $\theta_s^{-1} = 0$, the investors' problem reduces to that of the ambiguity-neutral investor. As either $\theta_d^{-1}$ or $\theta_s^{-1}$ increases, the degree of ambiguity aversion of the representative agent increases and the agent considers a large set of possible models when making investment decisions.

(Figure 3 about here.)

Taking the first order conditions, we obtain:

$$\frac{\tilde{p}_{hh}}{p_h} = \frac{\exp\left(-\theta_d^{-1} V_{hh}\right)}{\mathbb{E}\left[\exp(-\theta_d^{-1} V_2) \middle| V_1 = V_h\right]} \tag{3.2}$$

$$\frac{\tilde{p}_{lh}}{p_h} = \frac{\exp\left(-\theta_d^{-1} V_{lh}\right)}{\mathbb{E}\left[\exp(-\theta_d^{-1} V_2) \middle| V_1 = V_l\right]} \tag{3.3}$$

$$\frac{\tilde{\pi}_h}{\pi_h} = \frac{\exp\left(-\theta_s^{-1} V_h + \frac{\theta_d}{\theta_s} \log \mathbb{E}\left[\exp\left(-\theta_d^{-1} V_2\right)) \middle| V_1 = V_h\right]\right)}{\mathbb{E}\left[\exp\left(-\theta_s^{-1} V_1 + \frac{\theta_d}{\theta_s} \log \mathbb{E}\left[\exp\left(-\theta_d^{-1} V_2\right) \middle| V_1\right]\right) \middle| y\right]} \tag{3.4}$$

Notice first that, in general, $\tilde{p}_{hh} \neq \tilde{p}_{lh}$ so that, under the misspecified model, the probability of the firm payoff increasing between date 1 and date 2 is state-contingent. Next, we see that the ambiguity-averse agent tilts the probability distribution toward the lower utility states using an exponential tilt. Thus, the distorted probability of the firm payoff increasing between dates 1 and 2 is lower than the reference model probability and decreases as the agent becomes more averse to ambiguity about the underlying dynamics. Similarly, the distorted posterior probability of the firm payoff being high at date 1 is lower than the reference model probability and decreases as the agent becomes more averse to ambiguity about the signal quality. Notice also that the tilt in the posterior

probabilities incorporates the investors' distorted beliefs about the probability of the firm payoff increasing between dates 1 and 2. Finally, (3.2)-(3.4) imply that the minimized objective of the ambiguity-averse investor is given by:

$$J = -\theta_s \log \mathbb{E}\left[\exp\left(-\theta_s^{-1} V_1 + \frac{\theta_d}{\theta_s} \log \mathbb{E}\left[\exp(-\theta_d^{-1} V_2) \middle| V_1\right]\right) \middle| y\right]. \tag{3.5}$$

Thus, in calculating expected utility, the ambiguity-averse investor applies an exponential tilt away from the higher utility states.

There is no independent study of the magnitude of ambiguity aversion in the literature. One way of interpreting the degree of ambiguity aversion is through a thought experiment related to the Ellsberg Paradox (Ellsberg (1961)). Suppose that there are two urns. The participants in the experiment know that there are 50 black and 50 white balls in urn 1. Urn 2 also contains 100 balls but, unlike urn 1, either contains 100 white balls or 100 black balls. The participants are asked to pick a ball from an urn and are given a prize if they pick a black ball. Experimental evidence suggests that participants prefer to bet on urn 1 (see e.g. Camerer (1999) and Halevy (2007)). The Ellsberg Paradox is that, if the participants are asked to pick a white ball, they still prefer to bet on urn 1. This effect cannot be explained by the standard expected utility model with any beliefs or any risk aversion level. This behavior is, however, consistent with ambiguity aversion as, for an ambiguity-averse agent picking a black ball, the worst case beliefs imply that urn 2 contains only white balls while, for the agent picking a white ball, the corresponding worst case belief is that urn 2 contains only black balls. Thus, ambiguity aversion and risk aversion have distinct behavioral meanings.

Return now to the three period tree in Fig. 2. Fig. 4 plots the distorted probability of the firm payoff increasing between date 1 and date 2 as a function of the reference

probability of the same event for two different levels of investors' ambiguity aversion to misspecification of the underlying dynamics, $\theta_d^{-1}$. As the degree of ambiguity aversion increases, the probability becomes more distorted. Furthermore, the distortion is non-linear in the reference model probability, $p_h$, and is larger for intermediate values of $p_h$. Intuitively, if the agent knows that the firm payoff increases between dates 1 and 2 for sure, then he has no misspecification doubts and, thus, the implied misspecified probability coincides with the reference model probability. Similarly, Fig. 5 plots the distorted posterior probability of the high state at date 1 as a function of the reference probability of the same event for two different levels of investors' ambiguity aversion to misspecification of the signal quality, $\theta_s^{-1}$. Similarly to the probability of an increase, as the degree of ambiguity aversion increases, the distortion increases and is larger for intermediate levels of the reference model probability, $\pi_h$.

(Figure 4 about here.)

(Figure 5 about here.)

The interaction between the two sources of ambiguity is illustrated in Fig. 6, which plots the distorted probability of default as a function of the reference model probability for different combinations of $\theta_d^{-1}$ and $\theta_2^{-1}$. Notice first that, even for low levels of the reference model probability of default, the distorted probability of default can be quite high: for the case $\theta_d^{-1} = \theta_s^{-1} = 0.5$, a reference model default probability of 25 bps translates into a perceived 65% probability for the ambiguity-averse agent. Notice further that, although the distortion increases when the degree of ambiguity aversion to either source of ambiguity increases, the relation between the reference and the distorted probability is different depending on whether the agent is more averse to ambiguity about the underlying dynamics or the signal quality. More specifically, for the case when the agent

is more averse to ambiguity about the underlying dynamics ($\theta_d^{-1} = 0.5$, $\theta_s^{-1} = 0.1$), the distorted probability of default increases over the whole range of the reference probability. On the other hand, for the case when the agent is more averse to ambiguity about the signal quality ($\theta_d^{-1} = 0.1$, $\theta_s^{-1} = 0.5$), the distorted probability of default levels off. That is, while the distorted probability of default for the agent more averse to ambiguity about underlying dynamics increases faster than the reference model probability, the distorted probability of default for the agent more averse to ambiguity about the signal quality increases slower than the reference probability.

(Figure 6 about here.)

Consider finally the two contributions, $\epsilon^1$ and $\epsilon^2$, plotted in Fig. 7. The left panel plots the entropy due to misspecification of the underlying dynamics, $\epsilon^1$, as a function of the probability of the firm payoff increasing between dates 1 and 2 for two different levels of the ambiguity aversion to misspecification of the underlying dynamics, while the right panel plots the entropy due to misspecification of the signal quality as a function of the reference model posterior probability of the high state at date 1 for two different levels of the ambiguity aversion to misspecification of the signal quality. As the degree of ambiguity aversion increases to the corresponding source of ambiguity, the entropy increases. Furthermore, entropy is non-linear in the corresponding probability, larger for intermediate levels of the probability and is zero at the extremes of the distribution. Thus, for example, the entropy due to misspecification of the underlying dynamics is larger when the probability of the firm payoff increasing between dates 1 and 2 is close to 1/2. Intuitively, if the agent knows that the firm payoff increases between dates 1 and 2 for sure, then he has no misspecification doubts and, thus, the entropy between the misspecified and the reference models is zero.

(Figure 7 about here.)

# 4 Model

In this section, I present the economy considered in this paper. I begin by describing the reference model used for pricing credit securities and then proceed to the misspecification problem faced by the representative agent in the economy.

## 4.1 Reference model

As the reference model, I consider a modified version of the Black and Cox (1976) economy. Consider a (sector of the) economy consisting of $I$ firms, indexed by $i = 1, \ldots, I$ and denote by $A_{it} = e^{a_{it}}$ the fundamental value of the assets of firm $i$ at date $t = 1, 2, \ldots$. To fix ideas, assume that there are $n_y = 12$ data periods in a year, so that each period corresponds to a month. I assume that the log-asset value of each firm can be decomposed into the sum of two components:

$$a_{it} = z_{it} + \rho_i z_{ct}, \tag{4.1}$$

where $z_{it}$ is an idiosyncratic shock to the asset value of firm $i$, $z_{ct}$ is an aggregate shock to the asset values of all the firms in the sector and $\rho_i$ is the loading of firm $i$ on the aggregate component. Denote by $z_t = [z_{1t}, \ldots, z_{It}, z_{ct}]'$ the vector of the components of asset values at date $t$. I assume that the vector $z_t$ evolves according to an $N$-state Markov chain, with possible values $\xi_1, \ldots, \xi_N$ and the transition probability matrix $\Lambda$ defined as:

$$\{\Lambda\}_{jk} \equiv \lambda_{jk} = \mathbb{P}\left( z_{t+1} = \xi_k \middle| z_t = \xi_j \right). \tag{4.2}$$

There are two types of agents in the economy: managers and investors. All the day-

to-day operations of the firm are delegated to the respective manager. I assume that there are no agency problems between a firm's managers and the equity holders of the firm, so that the managers act in the best interest of the equity holders. Further, similarly to Duffie and Lando (2001), I assume that the managers are better informed about the firm they manage than the participants in the public markets and, in particular, that the managers of the firm observe perfectly the evolution of the fundamental value of the firm's assets. To prevent information spill-over, I assume that managers are precluded from trading in the public assets markets.

In this paper, I abstract from modeling the operational decisions of the firm managers and, in particular, from modeling the optimal capital structure, dividend payment and default decisions faced by the managers. As in Leland (1994) and Duffie and Lando (2001), I assume that each firm $i$ issues perpetual debt with face value $D_i$. This debt is serviced by a constant coupon rate $C_i$. While firm $i$ is in operation, it generates a constant fraction $\delta_i$ of assets as cash-flows which accrue, minus the coupon payments, as equity in the firm.

The managers decide on behalf of the equity holders when to default. As in Black and Cox (1976), I abstract from modeling the liquidation decision faced by the managers and assume instead that a firm defaults automatically whenever the fundamental value of the firm's assets reaches the lowest possible value implied by the Markov chain $\{z_t\}_{t=1}^{+\infty}$. In particular, denote by $\xi_{ji}$ the $i^{th}$ element of the asset values vector in state $j$, $\xi_j$. Let $i^* = argmin_{j=1,\ldots,N}\xi_{ji} + \rho_i\xi_{jc}$ be the state index at which firm $i$ achieves its lowest possible value and by $a_{B_i} = \xi_{i^*}$ the corresponding state. Then the (stochastic) default date $\tau_i$ of firm $i$ is the first hitting time of the state $a_{B_i}$: $\tau_i = \inf\{t : z_t = a_{B_i}\}$. In economic terms, the exogenous default rule can be interpreted as a debt covenant. The firm is liquidated at the present value of the discontinued cash flows, with the proceeds distributed among the

firm's primary debt holders and the equity holders receiving 0. For simplicity, I assume that each firm has a single default state and that firms do not default simultaneously. Notice that, since managers observe perfectly the asset value evolution of the firm under their management, there is no uncertainty about the firm being liquidated upon hitting its default boundary. Finally, denote by $a_B = \bigcup_{i=1}^{I} a_{B_i}$ the union of the default states of all the firms and by $a_B^c$ its complement, which is the set of states where none of the firms default.

Consider now the participants in the public markets. Similarly to Duffie and Lando (2001), I assume that the representative investor does not observe the true evolution of asset values in the sector and receives instead imperfect, unbiased signals about the fundamental value of the assets of each firm, $\hat{A}_{it} = e^{y_{it}}$, and the aggregate component of asset values in the sector, $\hat{A}_{ct} = e^{y_{ct}}$. More specifically, assume that $y_{it} = a_{it} + u_{it}$ and $y_{ct} = z_{ct} + u_{ct}$ where the signal errors $u_t = [u_{1t}, \ldots, u_{It}, u_{ct}]'$ are serially uncorrelated and normally distributed, independent of the true realization of $z_t$: $u_t \sim N(\overline{u}, \Sigma_u)$. Here, $\overline{u}$ is the mean signal error and $\Sigma_u^{-1}$ the signal quality. At each date $t$, the representative agent also observes whether any of the default states have been reached and any of the firms have been liquidated. Thus, the information set of the representative agent at date $t$ is:

$$\mathcal{G}_t = \sigma\left\{y_s,\ \mathbf{1}_{z_s \in a_B^c} :\ s = 1, \ldots, t\right\},$$

where $y_t = [y_{1t}, \ldots, y_{It}, y_{ct}]'$ is the full signal vector at date $t$.

Denote by $p_{jt}$ the probability, conditional on the date $t$ information set of the representative investor, of the vector $z$ being in state $j$ at date $t$:

$$p_{jt} = \mathbb{P}\left(z_t = \xi_j \middle| \mathcal{G}_t\right).$$

For mathematical reasons, it is easier to formulate the updating rule in terms of unnormalized probabilities $\vec{\pi}_t$, which are related to the proper probabilities by:

$$p_{jt} = \frac{\pi_{jt}}{\sum_{j=1}^{N} \pi_{jt}}, \qquad j = 1, \ldots, N.$$

Let $\pi_{j0} = \mathbb{P}(z_1 = \xi_j)$ be the prior probability. Then the following result holds.

**Lemma 4.1.** *(Wonham Filter)*

*Assume that the transition probability matrix, $\Lambda$, and the prior distribution $\pi_{j0}$ are known. Then the date 1 update to the unnormalized probability vector is given by:*

$$\pi_{j1} = \mathbf{1}_{\xi_j \notin a_B} \pi_{j0} f(y_1 - \xi_j), \qquad j = 1, \ldots, N, \tag{4.3}$$

*where $f(\cdot)$ is the density function of the observation errors, $u$. For $t > 1$, the "predict" step of the update to the unnormalized probability vector is given by:*

$$\tilde{\pi}_{t+1} = diag(\mathbf{f}(y_{t+1}))\Lambda' \vec{\pi}_t, \tag{4.4}$$

*where $\mathbf{f}(y) = [f(y - \xi_1), \ldots, f(y - \xi_N)]'$ and $diag(\cdot)$ creates a diagonal matrix from the vector $\cdot$. Then, conditional on no firm defaulting in period $t+1$, the updated unnormalized probability vector is given by:*

$$\vec{\pi}_{t+1} = diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) \tilde{\pi}_{t+1},$$

*where $\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c} = \left[\mathbf{1}_{\xi_1 \in a_B^c}, \ldots, \mathbf{1}_{\xi_N \in a_B^c}\right]'$.*

*Proof.* See e.g. Frey and Schmidt (2009). □

Finally, consider the utility of the representative agent. I assume the representative

agent is risk-neutral and, thus, holds all the claims to the firm's asset value. Thus, the date $t$ expected present value of the utility of the representative agent is given by:

$$J_t = \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{s=0}^{+\infty} \beta^s \sum_{i=1}^{I} \delta_i A_{i,t+s} \middle| \mathcal{G}_t\right], \tag{4.5}$$

where $\beta$ is the subjective discount factor. For the discussion below, it is useful to represent the expected present value of utility in recursive form:

$$J_t = \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{i=1}^{I} \delta_i A_{it} + \beta \mathbf{1}_{z_{t+1} \in a_B^c} J_{t+1} + \beta \sum_{i=1}^{I} \mathbf{1}_{z_{t+1} = a_{B_i}} J^{\tau_i} \middle| \mathcal{G}_t\right], \tag{4.6}$$

where $J^{\tau_i}$ is the value function of the representative agent in case firm $i$ defaults.

## 4.2 Asset prices

In this paper, I consider two types of claims to the assets of the firm: a claim to the firm's equity and a credit default swap (CDS) written on the bond. Recall that equity in firm $i$ accrues as a constant fraction $\delta_i$ of the fundamental asset value and that the equity holders receive 0 in case of the firm being liquidated. Thus, the date $t$ price of a claim to equity of firm $i$, $V_{it}$, is given by:

$$V_{it} = \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{s=0}^{\tau_i} \beta^s (\delta_i A_{i,t+s} - C_i) \middle| \mathcal{G}_t\right],$$

where $\tau_i$ is the (stochastic) default date of the firm $i$. Notice that the equity price satisfies the Euler equation:

$$V_{it} = \mathbb{E}\left[\delta_i A_{it} - C_i + \beta \mathbf{1}_{\tau_i > t+1} V_{i,t+1} \middle| \mathcal{G}_t\right]. \tag{4.7}$$

Consider now the default swaps written on the primary debt of firm $i$. With a given

maturity $T$, a default swap is an exchange of an annuity stream at a constant coupon rate until maturity or default, whichever is first, in return for a payment of $X$ at default, if default is before $T$, where $X$ is the difference between the face value and the recovery value on the stipulated underlying bond. A default swap can thus be thought of as a default insurance contract for bond holders that expires at a given date $T$, and makes up the difference between face and recovery values on the bond in the event of default.

I assume, as typical in practice, that the default swap annuity payments are made semiannually, and that the default swap's maturity date $T$ is a coupon date. As in Duffie and Lando (2001), I take the underlying bond for the default swap on firm $i$ to be the consol bond issued by firm $i$. Recall that, in case of default, the debt holders receive the present value of the discontinued cash flows. Thus, the payment $X_i$ per unit of primary debt if firm $i$ defaults before the swap maturity date $T$ is given by:

$$X_i = 1 - \frac{\delta_i (I - \beta\Lambda)^{-1}_{i^*} e^{\xi}}{(1-\beta) D_i}.$$

The at-market default swap spread is the annualized coupon rate $c_i(t,T)$ that makes the default swap sell at date $t$ for a market value of 0. Thus, with $T = t + 6n$ for a given positive integer $n$,[2] the CDS spread is given by:

$$c_i(t,T) = \frac{2X_i \mathbb{E}\left[\beta^{\tau_i - t} \mathbf{1}_{\tau_i < T} \middle| \mathcal{G}_t\right]}{\sum_{s=1}^{n} \beta^{6s} \mathbb{E}\left[\mathbf{1}_{\tau_i \geq t+6s} \middle| \mathcal{G}_t\right]}. \tag{4.8}$$

Default swap spreads are a standard for price quotation and credit information in bond markets. In this setting, they have the additional virtue of providing implicitly the term structure of credit spreads for par floating-rate bonds of the same credit quality as the underlying consol bond, in terms of default time and recovery at default. Denote by

[2]Recall that there are 12 data periods in a year

$B_i(t,T)$ the date $t$ price of a zero-coupon bond with maturity date $T$ on the debt of firm $i$. The implicit discount curve is then given by:

$$\begin{aligned} B_i\left(t,t+6\right) &= \frac{1}{1+c_i\left(t,t+6\right)} \\ B_i\left(t,t+6s\right) &= \frac{1-\frac{c_i(t,t+6s)}{2}\sum_{j=1}^{s-1}B_i\left(t,t+6j\right)}{1+c_i\left(t,t+6s\right)/2}. \end{aligned}$$

## 4.3 Model misspecification

This paper studies asset prices in a setting where the representative agent makes decision rules robust to possible misspecifications of asset value and accounting signals models. In reality, the correct specification assumption of the reference model is overly restrictive. It implies that, even though the participants in the public markets only observe imperfect signals about the evolution of the fundamental asset value, they can still correctly identify the parametric model that governs the relevant dynamics. More realistically, I assume that the representative investor in the firm fears misspecification of the probability law generated by the model above and believes instead that the signals are related to the true asset value realizations by a family of likelihoods.

As in Hansen and Sargent (1995), Hansen et al. (1999), Tallarini Jr. (2000) and Anderson et al. (2003), I model preferences of the representative agent in the presence of model misspecification using the recursion:

$$J_t = -\theta_s \log \mathbb{E}\left[\exp\left[-\frac{U(z_t)+\mathcal{R}_t(\beta J_{t+1};\theta_d)}{\theta_s}\right]\middle|\,\mathcal{G}_t\right], \tag{4.9}$$

where:

$$\mathcal{R}_t(\beta J_{t+1};\theta_d) \equiv -\theta_d \log \mathbb{E}\left[\exp\left(-\frac{\beta J_{t+1}}{\theta_d}\right)\middle|\,\mathcal{F}_t\right]$$

and

$$\mathcal{F}_t = \sigma\left\{z_s,\ y_s,\ \mathbf{1}_{z_s \in a_B^c}:\ s = 1, \ldots, t\right\}$$

is the full information set. The tilted recursion (4.9) is the dynamic analog of the recursion (3.5) we derived for the three period example and replaces the standard utility recursion (4.6), incorporating the representative agent's misspecification doubts in two steps. First, the tilted continuation function $\mathcal{R}_t$ makes an additional risk adjustment to the continuation value function of the representative agent, accounting for misspecification fears about the fundamental asset value evolution dynamics. Second, the tilted expectations over the current period utility adjusts for misspecification fears about the filtered probability distribution over the current state. As emphasized by Hansen and Sargent (1995), the log-exp specification of the recursion links risk-sensitive control theory and a more general recursive utility specification of Epstein and Zin (1989). The degree of the representative agent's aversion to misspecification of the underlying dynamics is quantified by $\theta_d^{-1}$ (where $d$ stands for dynamics) and the degree of the representative agent's aversion to misspecification of the filter distribution is quantified by $\theta_s^{-1}$ (where $s$ stands for signals). When $\theta_s^{-1} = \theta_d^{-1} = 0$, the risk-sensitive recursion (4.9) reverts to the usual utility recursion under Von Neumann-Morgenstern form of state additivity. For values of $\theta_d^{-1}$ greater than zero, the recursion (4.9) implies an increased aversion to risk associated with the time evolution of the hidden state *vis a vis* the Von Neumann-Morgenstern specification. Similarly, for values of $\theta_s^{-1}$ greater than zero, the recursion implies an increased aversion to risk associated with the unobservability of the true state *vis a vis* the Von Neumann-Morgenstern specification. Maenhout (2004) links the degree of misspecification to the value function itself, so that the agent becomes more misspecification-averse as the present value of her utility increases. Finally, notice that, since the distorted continuation value function $\mathcal{R}_t$ conditions on the full information set $\mathcal{F}_t$ (and, hence, on the true

realization of the hidden state), the investors in this economy have the option of focusing their attention on misspecification of the joint probability distribution of future signals and state.

Hansen and Sargent (2007) show that, corresponding to the tilted continuation function $\mathcal{R}_t$ is the worst-case likelihood ratio:

$$\phi_t(z_{t+1}, y_{t+1}) = \frac{\exp\left(-\frac{\beta J_{t+1}}{\theta_d}\right)}{\mathbb{E}\left[\exp\left(-\frac{\beta J_{t+1}}{\theta_d}\right)\middle|\, \mathcal{F}_t\right]}. \tag{4.10}$$

$\phi_t$ captures the difference between the evolution of future signals and states under the misspecified model and under the reference model. In particular, $\phi_t$ is the date $t$ probability distortion to the joint distribution of next period's signals and state. Relative to the reference model distribution, $\phi_t$ tilts the joint distribution toward lower continuation value states, decreasing the expected future value of the continuation utility. Similarly, corresponding to the recursion (4.9), is the worst-case likelihood ratio:

$$\psi_t(z) = \frac{\exp\left(-\frac{U(z)+\mathcal{R}_t(\beta J_{t+1};\theta_d)}{\theta_s}\right)}{\mathbb{E}\left[\exp\left(-\frac{U(z)+\mathcal{R}_t(\beta J_{t+1};\theta_d)}{\theta_s}\right)\middle|\, \mathcal{G}_t\right]} \tag{4.11}$$

between the conditional distribution over the state at date $t$ under the misspecfied and reference models. $\psi_t$ tilts the conditional distribution toward lower utility states, decreasing the expected value of utility at the current date.

An alternative interpretation of the recursion (4.9) is in terms of the smooth robustness preferences of Klibanoff et al. (2005, 2009) and recursive preferences of Epstein and Zin (1989). In the smooth ambiguity preference setting, the representative agent does not choose the "worst-case model" and instead assigns a preference ordering to the alternative models. In particular, let $u$ be the agent's utility over realizations of consumption, $\mu$ index

different models, $f$ the agent's utility function over different models and $\pi$ the belief vector over the different models. Then, an agent with the smooth robustness preferences evaluates consumption according to:

$$f^{-1}\left(\mathbb{E}_{\pi}\left[f\left(\mathbb{E}\left[u|\,\mu\right]\right)\right]\right).$$

Compare this to the recursion (4.9). Notice first that the tilted continuation utility, $\mathcal{R}(\beta J_{t+1};\theta_d)$, corresponds to the continuation utility for an agent with Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences, so corresponding to the inner expectation conditional on a "model" in smooth utility preferences, the worst-case utility model evaluates future consumption using Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences conditional on the current state. The recursion (4.9) then uses an exponential utility function to rank continuation values and current period utilities for different realizations of the state.

To quantify the amount of distortion in the economy, Hansen and Sargent (2007) introduce measures of the conditional relative entropy between the reference and the distorted models. In particular, under the full information setting, the conditional relative entropy between the reference and the worst case model of the future state and signals evolution is defined as:

$$\epsilon_t^1(\phi_{t+1},\xi_j)=\sum_{k=1}^{N}\int\tau(\xi_k,y_{t+1}|\xi_j)\phi(\xi_k,y_{t+1}|\xi_j)\log\phi(\xi_k,y_{t+1}|\xi_j)dy_{t+1}$$

and the conditional relative entropy between the reference and the worst case model of the current state by:

$$\epsilon_t^2(\psi_t)=\sum_{j=1}^{N}p_j\psi_j\log\psi_j.$$

The total conditional relative entropy between the reference model and the worst case

model at date $t$ is then given by:

$$\epsilon_t = \epsilon_t^2(\psi_t) + \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\left[\epsilon_t^1(\phi_{t+1}, z_t)\middle|\, \mathcal{G}_t\right] \equiv \epsilon_t^2(\psi_t) + \hat{\epsilon}_t^1(\phi_{t+1}). \tag{4.12}$$

In general, the recursion (4.9) does not have a closed-form solution. Instead, I look for a first order approximation to the representative agent's value function around the point $\theta_d^{-1} = \theta_s^{-1} = 0$, which corresponds to the solution under the reference model. Notice that the approximation I construct here is different in its nature from the small noise approximations constructed in Campi and James (1996) and Anderson et al. (2010) as, instead of approximating the reference model value function around the deterministic steady state, I approximate around the value function corresponding to the zero signal precision case.[3] The following result holds:

**Lemma 4.2.** *The first order approximation to the value function around the point* $\theta_d^{-1} = \theta_s^{-1} = 0$ *is given by;*

$$J(\pi; \theta_d^{-1}, \theta_s^{-1}) \approx J_0(\pi) + \theta_d^{-1} J_{\theta_d^{-1}}(\pi) + \epsilon J_\epsilon(\pi), \tag{4.13}$$

*where* $\epsilon = \theta_s^{-1}/\theta_d^{-1} - 1$. *Here,* $J_0$ *is the value function of the ambiguity-neutral agent,* $J_{\theta_d^{-1}}$ *measures the change in the value function as the overall level of ambiguity increases and* $J_\epsilon$ *measures the change in the value function as the agent becomes more averse to ambiguity about the signal quality than ambiguity about the underlying dynamics. In the non-default states of the economy, the first order approximations to* $J_0$, $J_{\theta_d^{-1}}$, *and* $J_\epsilon$ *in terms of log-deviations,* $\hat{\pi}$, *from the stationary distribution of the underlying Markov chain*

[3] When the signal precision approaches 0, the agent does not update the conditional probability distribution and, hence, the stationary distribution can be used as the prior distribution.

*are given, respectively, by:*

$$J_0(\pi) \approx \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}' diag(\bar{\pi})\hat{\pi} \tag{4.14}$$

$$J_{\theta_d^{-1}}(\pi) \approx \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}' diag(\bar{\pi})\hat{\pi} \tag{4.15}$$

$$J_\epsilon(\pi) \approx \gamma_{\epsilon 0} + \gamma_{\epsilon 1}' diag(\bar{\pi})\hat{\pi}, \tag{4.16}$$

*where the coefficients $\gamma_{00}$, $\gamma_{01}$, $\gamma_{10}$, $\gamma_{11}$, $\gamma_{\epsilon 0}$ and $\gamma_{\epsilon 1}$ solve the system (A.2)-(A.10). The first order approximation to the implied distortion to the conditional joint distribution of next period's signals and state is then given by:*

$$\begin{aligned}\phi_t\left(z_{t+1}, y_{t+1}\right) \approx 1 &- \theta_d^{-1}\beta\left(J_0(\pi_{t+1}) - \mathbb{E}\left[J_0(\pi_{t+1})\middle|\mathcal{F}_t\right]\right) \\ &- \left(\theta_s^{-1} - \theta_d^{-1}\right)\beta\left(J_\epsilon(\pi_{t+1}) - \mathbb{E}\left[J_\epsilon(\pi_{t+1})\middle|\mathcal{F}_t\right]\right),\end{aligned} \tag{4.17}$$

*and the first order approximation to the implied distortion to the conditional distribution of the current state by:*

$$\begin{aligned}\psi_t(z_t) \approx 1 &- \left(\theta_d^{-1} - \theta_s^{-1}\right)\beta\left(\mathbb{E}\left[J_\epsilon(\pi_{t+1})\middle|\mathcal{F}_t\right] - \mathbb{E}\left[J_\epsilon(\pi_{t+1})\middle|\mathcal{G}_t\right]\right) \\ &- \theta_s^{-1}\left(U(z_t) + \beta\mathbb{E}\left[J_0(\pi_{t+1})\middle|\mathcal{F}_t\right] - \mathbb{E}\left[U(z_t) + \beta J_0(\pi_{t+1})\middle|\mathcal{G}_t\right]\right).\end{aligned} \tag{4.18}$$

*Proof.* See Appendix A.1. □

Notice that $J_0$ is the value function of the representative agent under the reference model. The vector $\gamma_{01}$ captures the first-order dependence of the reference model value function on the conditional distribution of the hidden state. From (A.3) we can see that the right hand side of the equation determining $\gamma_{01,j}$ is positive when the agent's utility in state $j$ is higher than the stationary probability distribution weighted average of utility in

different states. Thus, $\gamma_{01,j}$ is positive for states that have higher utility and negative for lower utility states. Intuitively, the expected present value of the representative agent's utility should be higher when the probability of the economy being in a good state is higher and lower when the probability of being in a bad state is higher. $J_{\theta_d^{-1}}$ measures the change in the value function as the overall level of ambiguity increases. Since the ambiguity-averse agent is solving a minimization problem in determining optimal consumption and portfolio choices, $J_{\theta_d^{-1}}$ is negative. Thus, as the agent becomes more ambiguity averse overall, his value function decreases. $J_\epsilon$, on the other hand, measures the change to the value function of the ambiguity-averse agent as the agent becomes more averse to ambiguity about signal quality than ambiguity about the underlying dynamics. Thus, keeping the level of aversion to ambiguity about the underlying dynamics constant, $J_\epsilon$ is also negative as the agent imposes a larger entropy cost on choosing more distorted (toward lower utility states) posterior distributions. Notice that, since both $J_{\theta_d^{-1}}$ and $J_\epsilon$ are time-varying, the agent's perceived risk attitudes change depending on the conditional distribution of the hidden state, with the vectors $\gamma_{11}$ and $\gamma_{\epsilon 1}$ describing the loadings on the individual components of the probability vector.

Consider now the implied amount of ambiguity, as measured by the relative entropy between the reference and the worst-case models. Substituting (4.17) into the definition of $\epsilon_t^1$, the relative entropy between the reference and the worst-case models for the fundamental asset dynamics, we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned}
\epsilon_t^1 &= \mathbb{E}\left[\phi_t(z_{t+1}, y_{t+1}) \log \phi_t(z_{t+1}, y_{t+1}) \middle| \mathcal{F}_t\right] \\
&\approx \theta_d^{-2}\beta^2 var\left(J_0\left(\pi_{t+1}\right) \middle| \mathcal{F}_t\right) + \left(\theta_s^{-1} - \theta_d^{-1}\right)^2 \beta^2 var\left(J_\epsilon\left(\pi_{t+1}\right) \middle| \mathcal{F}_t\right) \\
&+ 2\left(\theta_s^{-1} - \theta_d^{-1}\right)\theta_d^{-1}\beta^2 cov\left(J_0\left(\pi_{t+1}\right), J_\epsilon\left(\pi_{t+1}\right) \middle| \mathcal{F}_t\right).
\end{aligned}$$

Notice first that, when the representative agent is equally averse to both sources of ambiguity, so that $\theta_d = \theta_s$, the amount of ambiguity due to misspecification of the fundamental asset value dynamics depends only on the variance of the next period's value function. For the case $\theta_d \neq \theta_s$, two more quantities are instrumental in determining the amount of ambiguity: the variance of next period's correction to the value function in the direction of greater aversion to ambiguity about signal quality and the covariance between the reference model value function and the correction term. Since $J_0$ and $J_\epsilon$ are negatively correlated, there is a trade-off between aversion to ambiguity about signal quality and aversion to ambiguity about the underlying dynamics. In particular, if the representative agent is more averse to ambiguity about signal quality than to ambiguity about the fundamental asset value dynamics (so that $\theta_d^{-1} < \theta_s^{-1}$), aversion to ambiguity about signal quality reduces the amount of ambiguity about the underlying dynamics. If, on the other hand, the agent is more averse to ambiguity about the underlying dynamics (so that $\theta_d^{-1} > \theta_s^{-1}$), the aversion to ambiguity about signal quality increases the amount of ambiguity about the fundamental asset value. Intuitively, if the agent is more averse to ambiguity about signal quality, then he will not apply as a large of a distortion to the transition probabilities since misspecification of the underlying dynamics is a smaller concern in his mind. If, however, the agent is more averse to ambiguity about the underlying dynamics, then misspecification of the transition probabilities is a primary concern which only worsens due to misspecification concerns about the posterior distribution over the possible realizations of the current state.

Similarly, we can represent the relative entropy between the reference and the worst-

case models for the posterior distribution of the current state as:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\epsilon_t^2 &= \mathbb{E}\left[\psi_t(z_t)\log\psi_t(z_t)\middle|\,\mathcal{G}_t\right] \\
&\approx \theta_s^{-2} var\left(U(z_t)+\beta J_0(\pi_{t+1})\middle|\,\mathcal{G}_t\right) + \left(\theta_d^{-1}-\theta_s^{-1}\right)^2 \beta^2 var\left(J_\epsilon\left(\pi_{t+1}\right)\middle|\,\mathcal{G}_t\right) \\
&+ 2\left(\theta_d^{-1}-\theta_s^{-1}\right)\theta_s^{-1}\beta cov\left(J_\epsilon\left(\pi_{t+1}\right), U(z_t)+\beta J_0(\pi_{t+1})\middle|\,\mathcal{G}_t\right).
\end{aligned}
$$

Thus, when the agent is equally averse to both sources of ambiguity, the amount of ambiguity about signal quality depends only on the variance of the current period reference model value function. For the case $\theta_s \neq \theta_d$, however, the trade-off between aversion to ambiguity about signal quality and aversion to ambiguity about the fundamental asset value dynamics reemerges. If the agent is more averse to ambiguity about the signal quality than about the underlying dynamics (so that $\theta_d^{-1} < \theta_s^{-1}$), the aversion to ambiguity about the underlying dynamics increases the amount of ambiguity about signal quality. If, on the other hand, the agent is more averse to ambiguity about the underlying dynamics (so that $\theta_d^{-1} > \theta_s^{-1}$), the aversion to ambiguity about the underlying dynamics mitigates the impact of the ambiguity about the signal quality. Intuitively, if the representative agent is more averse to ambiguity about the underlying dynamics, he will not apply as large a distortion to the current period posterior probabilities since misspecification of the filter dynamics is a smaller concern in his mind. If, however, the agent is more averse to ambiguity about the signal quality, then misspecification of the current period posterior probabilities is a primary concern which only worsens due to misspecification concerns about the transition probabilities.

Substituting for $J_0$ and $J_\epsilon$ in (4.17)-(4.18), we can express:

$$\begin{aligned}\phi_t(z^* = \xi_k, y^* | z = \xi_j) &= 1 + \theta_d^{-1}\left(\varphi_{01,jk} + \varphi'_{\pi 1,jk} diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi} + \varphi'_{y1,jk}\log f(y^* - \xi_k)\right) \\ &\quad + \left(\theta_s^{-1} - \theta_d^{-1}\right)\left(\varphi_{0\epsilon,jk} + \varphi'_{\pi\epsilon,jk} diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi} + \varphi'_{y\epsilon,jk}\log f(y^* - \xi_k)\right) \\ \psi_t(\xi_j) &= 1 + \theta_s^{-1}\left(\zeta_{01,j} + \zeta'_{11,j} diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi}\right) + \left(\theta_d^{-1} - \theta_s^{-1}\right)\left(\zeta_{0\epsilon,j} + \zeta'_{1\epsilon,j} diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi}\right)\end{aligned}$$

where the expansion coefficients are given by (A.11)-(A.20). Integrating over the future state, the implied transition probability matrix is:

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{\lambda}_{jk} &\equiv \tilde{\mathbb{P}}\left(z_{t+1} = \xi_k | \, z_t = \xi_j\right) \\ &\approx \lambda_{jk}\left[1 + \theta_d^{-1}\left(\varphi_{01,jk} + \varphi'_{\pi 1,jk} diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi} + \varphi'_{y1,jk}\Delta_k^1\right)\right] \\ &\quad + \lambda_{jk}\left(\theta_s^{-1} - \theta_d^{-1}\right)\left(\varphi_{0\epsilon,jk} + \varphi'_{\pi\epsilon,jk} diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi} + \varphi'_{y\epsilon,jk}\Delta_k^1\right).\end{aligned} \tag{4.19}$$

Notice this implies that, unlike the reference model, the transition probability matrix under the misspecified model is time-dependent. This effect introduces additional time variation into asset prices above that implied by the time evolution of fundamental asset values under the reference model.

## 4.4 Asset prices under the misspecified model

Since the representative agent evaluates expectations under the worst-case measure when making consumption decisions, the Euler equation holds under the worst-case likelihood and assets can be priced using the worst-case Euler equation. In particular, under the misspecified model, the date $t$ price of a claim to the equity of firm $i$ satisfies:

$$V_{it} = \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\left[\delta_i A_{it} - C_i + \beta \mathbf{1}_{\tau_i > t+1} V_{i,t+1} | \, \mathcal{G}_t\right]. \tag{4.20}$$

As with the value function, consider a first order expansion of the equity price around the reference model equity price. That is, I look for a first order approximation to the solution of the worst-case Euler equation (4.20) in the form:

$$V_i(\pi_t; \theta_d^{-1}, \theta_s^{-1}) \approx V_{i0}(\pi_t) + \theta_d^{-1} V_{i\theta_d^{-1}}(\pi_t) + \epsilon V_{i\epsilon}(\pi_t). \tag{4.21}$$

The following result holds:

**Lemma 4.3.** *The first order approximations to $V_{i0}$, $V_{i\theta_d^{-1}}$, and $V_{i\epsilon}$ in terms of log-deviations, $\hat{\pi}$, from the stationary distribution of the underlying Markov chain, are given, respectively, by:*

$$V_{i0}(\pi_t) = \nu_{i,00} + \nu'_{i,01} diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi} + O_2(\hat{\pi}) \tag{4.22}$$

$$V_{i\theta_d^{-1}}(\pi_t) = \nu_{i,10} + \nu'_{i,11} diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi} + O_2(\hat{\pi}) \tag{4.23}$$

$$V_{i\epsilon}(\pi_t) = \nu_{i,\epsilon 0} + \nu'_{i,\epsilon 1} diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi} + O_2(\hat{\pi}), \tag{4.24}$$

*where the coefficients $\nu_{i,00}$, $\nu_{i,01}$, $\nu_{i,10}$, $\nu_{i,11}$, $\nu_{i,\epsilon 0}$ and $\nu_{i,\epsilon 1}$ solve the system of linear equations in Appendix A.2.*

*Proof.* See Appendix A.2. □

Consider now the CDS spreads under the misspecified model. Recall that the spread on a default swap with maturity $T = t + 6n$ on the primary debt of firm $i$ is given by:

$$c_i(t, T) = \frac{2X\tilde{\mathbb{E}}\left[\beta^{\tau_i - t}\mathbf{1}_{\tau_i < T} \middle| \mathcal{G}_t\right]}{\sum_{k=1}^{n} \beta^{6s}\tilde{\mathbb{E}}\left[\mathbf{1}_{\tau_i \geq t+6s} \middle| \mathcal{G}_t\right]}. \tag{4.25}$$

The misspecification concerns of the representative agent influence the CDS calculations in two ways. First, the conditional probability of the current state is distorted using

$\psi(\xi_j)$, with the lower utility states receiving a higher probability. Second, the transition probability matrix $\Lambda$ is replaced with the time-dependent distorted probability matrix $\tilde{\Lambda}$.

# 5 The 2007–2008 Financial Crisis

In this section, I estimate the model in Section 4 using data on financial institutions. Although the returns on the equity of financial institutions accounts for a small portion of the overall level of consumption in the economy, these institutions were at the forefront of the 2007 financial crisis and, thus, to understand the asset price movements during the crisis, it is important to understand the movements in the prices of claims on these institutions. I begin by estimating the parameters of the reference model using the observations of book equity of financial institutions as firm-specific signals and the Case-Shiller 10 Cities Housing (CS10) Index as the signal about the common component of the asset values. Although book equity of financial institutions make for imperfect signals, both because by it's nature the series is backward-looking and because of the infrequency of observation, using observations of market equity is also fraught with difficulty. The problem of inverting market prices to obtain time series observations of risk-neutral probabilities is a complex problem in general. For the model considered in this paper, the matter is complicated by the fact that all market prices reflect the worst-case distortions imposed by the preferences of the representative agent. Thus, if market prices were to be used as firm-specific signals, then estimation could no longer be decomposed into two parts – estimating independently the parameters of the reference model and then using these parameters as inputs to estimate the ambiguity preference parameters, further complicating the estimation procedure. While I believe that observations of market equity for the institutions concerned provide interesting insights into the nature of risk and uncertainty

in the market, in the current paper I prefer to use these time series to provide an outside test for the validity of the estimated parameters. I choose observations of the CS10 Index as the aggregate signal to capture the exposure of the financial institutions to risks associated with the national housing market. Notice from Table I that the financial institutions considered have higher correlations with the CS10 Index than with stock market indices, such as the S&P 500 index.

(Table I about here.)

Next, I use historical observations of CDS spreads for the financial institutions prior to the start of the crisis to obtain an estimate of $\theta_s$ and $\theta_d$ – the parameters governing the investors' aversion to misspecification of the filter distribution and underlying dynamics, respectively. Using these estimates, I compute the implied relative entropy between the reference and the worst-case models and decompose the entropy calculation into the contributions from misspecification of the signal model and misspecification of the fundamental value of assets model for the whole time series. Next, I compare the model-implied CDS rates and equity prices to the observed time series. Finally, I examine the differential effect of the two sources of misspecification in the model on asset prices.

## 5.1 Estimating the reference model

To estimate the reference model, I use historical observations of the firm-specific signals and the aggregate signal. Below, I provide the outline of the estimation procedure. The details of the estimation are provided in Supplemental Appendix.

As observations of firm-specific signals, I use balance sheet data from COMPUSTAT. In particular, I use observations of book equity as the accounting signals. As observations of the aggregate signals, I take the time series of the Case-Shiller 10 Cities index. Notice

that, while balance sheet data are observed at a quarterly frequency only, observations of the CS10 Index are available at a monthly frequency. The procedure described in Supplemental Appendix accounts explicitly for this dual frequency of observations. Notice that, to estimate the reference model, I only use observations up to Q2 2007 to avoid introducing measurement error by including observations of the accounting signal which reflect mark-downs taken since the start of the crisis, as well as the increased ambiguity discount in credit derivatives held on the balance sheets of these institutions.

Recall that the reference model is described by the parameters:

- $\Lambda$, $\{\xi_j\}_{j=1}^N$: transition probability matrix and states of the fundamental asset values
- $\{\rho_i\}_{i=1}^I$: firm-specific loadings on the common component
- $\Sigma_u$: signal error covariance matrix
- $\{D_i, C_i\}_{i=1}^I$: level of perpetual debt and coupon payments
- $\{\delta_i\}_{i=1}^I$: fraction of assets generated as cash-flows.

I begin the estimation by identifying the face value of the perpetual bond issued by firm $i$, $D_i$, with the last pre-crisis (Q2 2007) observation of the firm's value of long-term debt; notice that, since the model-implied debt has infinite maturity, long-term debt is a better measure than total debt as it excludes short-term liabilities. The coupon payment, $C_i$, is then chosen to make the level of debt $D_i$ optimal. Following the model assumption that each firm generates a constant fraction $\delta_i$ of assets as cash-flows, I identify $\delta_i$ as the time-series average of the total earnings as a fraction of total assets. The rest of the parameters are estimated using the Gibbs sampling procedure of Appendix **??**.

The estimated reference model parameters are presented in Tables II – III and the filtered time series of the expected fundamental value of each firm's assets under the

reference model is plotted in Fig. 8. Notice first that, while changes in the filtered fundamental asset values mimic the observed changes in the corresponding book values, the level of the fundamental asset values are lower than that of the book values. Notice also that the states of the economy are highly persistent. The probability of the firm-specific component of asset values staying in the same state next period is around 54% and the probability of the aggregate component of asset values staying in the same state next period is around 99%. Notice also that, although book values have a high correlation with the Case Shiller 10 Index, the estimated firm-specific loadings on the aggregate component of asset values is lower, ranging from 27% for JP Morgan and less than 1% for Bear Stearns. Finally, notice that the signal errors have low cross-correlations of at most 7% and a higher variance, ranging from 73% for the Case Shiller 10 Index to 15% for Goldman Sachs.

(Table II about here.)

(Table III about here.)

(Figure 8 about here.)

## 5.2 Estimating the misspecification preference parameter

Consider now estimating the degree of aversion toward misspecification of the underlying dynamics, $\theta_d^{-1}$, and misspecification of the filter distribution, $\theta_s^{-1}$. Rewrite the CDS equation (4.25) as:

$$0 = 2X_i\tilde{\mathbb{E}}\left[\beta^{\tau_i - t}\mathbf{1}_{\tau_i < T}\middle|\,\mathcal{G}_t\right] - c_i(t,T)\sum_{k=1}^{n}\beta^{6s}\tilde{\mathbb{E}}\left[\mathbf{1}_{\tau_i \geq t+6s}\middle|\,\mathcal{G}_t\right].$$

Recall that the expectation functions $\tilde{\mathbb{E}}\left[\beta^{\tau_i - t}\mathbf{1}_{\tau_i<T}\middle|\,\mathcal{G}_t\right]$ and $\tilde{\mathbb{E}}\left[\mathbf{1}_{\tau_i\geq t+6s}\middle|\,\mathcal{G}_t\right]$ are calculated using the worst-case likelihood and, thus, depend on investors' preferences toward ambiguity. Thus, to estimate $\theta_d^{-1}$ and $\theta_s^{-1}$, I assume that the CDS rates are observed with a measurement error. In particular, assume that the observation equation is given by:

$$0 = 2X_i\tilde{\mathbb{E}}\left[\beta^{\tau_i - t}\mathbf{1}_{\tau_i<T}\middle|\,\mathcal{G}_t\right] - \hat{c}_i(t,T)\sum_{k=1}^{n}\beta^{6s}\tilde{\mathbb{E}}\left[\mathbf{1}_{\tau_i\geq t+6s}\middle|\,\mathcal{G}_t\right] + \eta_{iT,t},$$

where $\hat{c}_i(t,T)$ are the observed CDS rates and the vector of maturity-specific measurement errors $\eta_{it} = [\eta_{i1,t},\ldots,\eta_{iT,t}]$ is normally distributed and i.i.d. across time and firms: $\eta_i \sim N(0,\Sigma_\eta)$. Taking the point estimates from the Gibbs sampling procedure as estimates of the reference model parameters, I make draws of the vector $\theta^{-1} = \left[\theta_d^{-1}\ \theta_s^{-1}\right]'$ using a Random Walk Metropolis algorithm with a flat prior. The accept/reject probability for the draws of $\theta^{-1}$ is the ratio of the likelihood of the CDS rates for all firm, at all available data points and for all available maturities.

To evaluate whether the investors' attitudes toward ambiguity change during the crisis, I conduct three different estimations of the parameters $\theta_d^{-1}$ and $\theta_s^{-1}$ using different data sub-periods: the pre-crisis period, the period from the start of the crisis to the bailout of Bear Stearns and the period from the bailout of Bear Stearns to the liquidation of Lehman Brothers. The results of these estimations are presented in Table IV. Notice that the estimation suggests that the investors in this market exhibit a higher degree of aversion to ambiguity about the filter distribution than to ambiguity about the underlying dynamics. Notice further that the three different periods do not yield significantly different estimates of $\theta_d^{-1}$ and $\theta_s^{-1}$, suggesting that the investors attitudes toward model misspecification do not change significantly during the crisis period. Instead, the observed changes in CDS rates are due to the amount of ambiguity faced by agents in the markets and to shifts in

what kind of misspecification the agents are more concerned about.

(Table IV about here.)

Consider now the model-implied time series evolution of credit spreads. Since the estimate of $\theta^{-1}$ does not change during the crisis, I use the pre-crisis estimates of $\theta_d^{-1}$ and $\theta_s^{-1}$ to compute the model-implied CDS spreads. Table V presents the observed 5 year CDS spreads for the financial institutions at five dates of interest – before the start of the crisis, July 2007, at the start of the crisis in August 2007, after the bailout of Bear Stearns in March 2008, after the liquidation of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and after the introduction of TARP in October 2008 – together with the model-implied CDS rates at these dates. Notice first that the model-implied CDS rates follow the observed pattern of increasing during the financial crisis. Further, for most institutions, the implied CDS rates match the levels of CDS spreads over time, although the performance of the estimated model worsens after the liquidation of Lehman Brothers.

(Table V about here.)

Recall that the estimates of the ambiguity aversion parameters $\theta_d^{-1}$ and $\theta_s^{-1}$ do not change significantly over the crisis. What then generates the time series behavior of CDS rates that we observed during the crisis? In this paper, I argue that the observed rapid increases in CDS spreads are driven by changes in the amount of total ambiguity faced by investors in the market, as well as changes in how this total amount of ambiguity is decomposed into the amount of ambiguity about the underlying dynamics and the amount of ambiguity about the filter distribution. In Fig. 9, I plot the time series evolution of ambiguity, as measured by the conditional relative entropy between the reference and the worst-case likelihoods[4], during the crisis. Notice that at the beginning of the crisis (after

[4]See the definition of conditional relative entropy in eq. (4.12)

the BNP Paribas announcement in August 2007), only ambiguity about the filter distribution increased. Intuitively, at the beginning of the crisis, although investors observed the negative reports released by financial institutions, since no defaults of major institutions occurred, they could interpret these new signals as informing about the quality of information and not about the quality of the assets on the balance sheets of these institutions. Contrast this with the changes to the amount of ambiguity after the bailout of Bear Stearns in March 2008 and after the liquidation of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. In these cases, it is the amount of ambiguity about the underlying dynamics that increases. Unlike the start of the crisis, investors now observed default by major financial institutions, which increased their uncertainty about the quality of assets held by financial institutions. Notice also that, although the amount of total entropy decreased a little after the introduction of TARP in October 2008, it was still higher than before the start of the crisis, which is consistent with the Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008a) intuition that ambiguity increased during the crisis.

(Figure 9 about here.)

To further understand the time series evolution of asset prices during the crisis, consider the time series evolution of expected time to default of the financial institutions. Table VI presents the expected time to default for the financial institutions at five dates of interest – before the start of the crisis, July 2007, at the start of the crisis in August 2007, after the bailout of Bear Stearns in March 2008, after the liquidation of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and after the introduction of TARP in October 2008 – together with the percentage change in the time to default relative to the previous month. The initial BNP Paribas announcement in August 2007 only lead to a decrease in the expected time to default for only Bank of America, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. This coincides with the intuition that investors interpreted the announcements by

financial institutions at the beginning of the crisis as increasing the amount of ambiguity about the filter distribution, and not necessarily indicative of the quality of assets held by the financial institutions. More interesting is the fact that the bailout of Bear Stearns in March 2008 lead to a decrease in the expected time to default for only some firms. In contrast, the liquidation of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 decreased the expected time to default for all institutions except Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. Thus, while the bailout of Bear Stearns induced contagion effects for some of the financial institutions, the effect was not as widespread as that induced by the liquidation of Lehman Brothers. Intuitively, while the bailout of Bear Stearns increased the ambiguity about the underlying dynamics, the fact that the institution was bailed out and not liquidated implied a guarantee for the other institutions and thus mitigated the contagion effects. The liquidation of Lehman Brothers, on the other hand, removed this guarantee and thus the liquidation had more systematic effects.

(Table VI about here.)

Compare this to the evolution of expected times to default under the reference model, presented in Panel B of Table VI. Notice first that, under the reference model, the expected time to default is longer at all dates than under the misspecified model. Intuitively, the misspecification-averse agent perceives the probability of default next period to be greater than under the reference model, decreasing the expected time to default. Next, consider the time evolution of the expected times to default. The initial BNP Paribas announcement leads to a slight ( 0.03%) decrease in the expected time to default for each of the institutions. As under the misspecified model, the decrease in the expected time to default is much greater after the bailout of Bear Stearns. Notice, however, that the decrease under the reference model is greater than under the misspecified model. Intuitively, since the misspecification-averse agent already has more pessimistic views of

the future, observing the bailout of Bear Stearns did not have as a large of an impact on her beliefs as it did on the beliefs under the reference model. Similarly, the decrease under the reference model after the liquidations of Lehman Brothers is larger than under the misspecified model. After introduction of TARP in October 2008, however, the increase in the expected time to default under the reference model is much smaller than under the misspecified model.

Finally, consider the implied time series evolution of equity prices during the crisis. Fig. 10 plots the observed evolution of equity prices together with the model-implied evolution. Although we cannot hope to match the level of equity prices since the firm earnings model in the paper is extremely simplistic, the model should be able to match the observed movements in equity prices. Comparing the model-implied evolution to the true evolution of equity prices, we see that the model-implied equity prices lag the observed equity prices. This is not surprising since the signals used to construct the time series evolution of conditional probabilities are backward-looking; for example, the Case-Shiller 10 Index is constructed using observations over the previous three months. The model is able to capture the overall downward trend of equity prices during the crisis and especially well the sharp drop in equity prices after the bailout of Bear Stearns and after the liquidation of Lehman Brothers.

(Figure 10 about here.)

## 5.3 Sources of ambiguity and CDS rates

I will now investigate the impact of ambiguity aversion on CDS rates and the expected times to default of the financial institutions examined in Section 5 in greater detail. In order to evaluate the disparate effect of the two sources of ambiguity on market quantities, I will examine two cases:

1. Investors are averse to ambiguity about the underlying dynamics but not to ambiguity about the signal quality ($\theta_s^{-1} = 0$).

2. Investors are averse to ambiguity about the signal quality but not to ambiguity about the underlying dynamics ($\theta_d^{-1} = 0$).

In this exercise, I assume that the value of the non-zero degree of ambiguity aversion is the value estimated in Section 5 using the pre-crisis data (see Table IV). This allows me to examine the counterfactual implication of having only one source of ambiguity for market prices. While it is possible to estimate the full model with different degrees of aversion to different sources of ambiguity using a version of the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm described in the previous section, it would be less illuminating about the differential impact of the two sources of ambiguity and I leave that exercise for future research.

Consider now the CDS rates implied for different sources of ambiguity. Table VII presents the percent deviation between the model-implied and the observed five year CDS rates for different financial institutions at five dates of interest – before the start of the crisis in July 2007, at the start of the crisis in August 2007, after the bailout of Bear Stearns in March 2008, after the liquidation of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and after the introduction of TARP in October 2008 – for three different specifications of ambiguity preference. In particular, the column "Main" refers to the case in the main body of the paper, with the representative agent averse to ambiguity about both the underlying dynamics and the filter distribution; the column $\theta_s^{-1}$ refers to the case when the representative agent is averse to ambiguity about the underlying dynamics only; the column $\theta_d^{-1} = 0$ refers to the case when the representative agent is averse to ambiguity about the filter distribution only. Notice first that, the model with aversion to both sources of ambiguity fits the data better overall than either the model with aversion to only the underlying dynamics or the model with aversion to only the filter distribution.

Thus, both sources of ambiguity are important in explaining the behavior of CDS rates during the crisis. Notice also that neither the model with aversion to only ambiguity about the underlying dynamics outperforms consistently the model with aversion to only ambiguity about filter distribution nor *vice versa*. This is consistent with the intuition provided by the time series of the different contributions to entropy in Fig. 9. More specifically, at the start of the crisis (July – August, 2007), the model with aversion to only ambiguity about the filter distribution outperforms the model with aversion to only ambiguity about the underlying dynamics, implying that, during this period, ambiguity about the filter distribution had a stronger impact on CDS rates. This relationship reversed as the crisis progressed, with the model with aversion to only ambiguity about the underlying dynamics outperforming the model with aversion to only ambiguity about the filter distribution. Thus, during the later part of the crisis, ambiguity about the underlying dynamics had a stronger impact on CDS spreads.

(Table VII about here.)

# 6 Conclusion

In this paper, I consider the implications of model misspecification for default swap spreads. Using an incomplete information version of the Black and Cox (1976) model of credit spreads as the reference model, I find that introducing misspecification concerns exacerbates the imperfect information problem faced by the representative agent. This leads to an increased level of default swap spreads overall and greater sensitivity of CDS spreads to bad news. The misspecification-averse agent perceives the probability of default next period to be higher than under the reference model, increasing CDS spreads and decreasing expected time to default. Observing a bad signal not only increases the con-

ditional probability of being in a low-payoff state in the current period but also increased the perceived probability of default in the next period.

To investigate whether the model can produce reasonable magnitudes of CDS spreads, I estimated the parameters of the reference model using observations of the book value of equity of several financial institutions as firm-specific signals and of Case Shiller 10 Index as observations of aggregate signals. The misspecification preference parameters $\theta_d^{-1}$ and $\theta_s^{-1}$ were then estimated using observations of CDS spreads for the financial institutions over time. The results of the estimation procedure suggest that, while agents' preference toward model misspecification did not change during the crisis, the amount of entropy in the economy and how that entropy is decomposed into the contributions from misspecification of the joint distribution of next period's signals and state and misspecification of the conditional probability distribution of the current state did change. In particular, the initial BNP Paribas announcement in August 2007 lead to an increase in ambiguity about the filter distribution. The bailout of Bear Stearns in March 2008 and the liquidation of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 on the other hand lead to an increase in the amount of ambiguity about the underlying dynamics.

Examining the implied time-series evolution of equity prices, I find that, while the model is able to match the overall movements of the equity prices, the model-implied equity prices lag the observed equity prices. A possible avenue of future research is to estimate the model under the assumption that the representative agent in the economy observes more information than the econometrician estimating the model. While allowing for equity prices to adjust quicker to news in the market, this would also allow us to estimate the model at a higher frequency and, thus, extract more information from the observed CDS spreads.

I turn next to examining the disparate effect of the two sources of ambiguity aversion

on market prices. I find that, while both sources of ambiguity play an important role in determining CDS spreads, aversion to different sources of ambiguity plays an important role during different times. In particular, the model with aversion to only ambiguity about the filter distribution is better able to explain the evolution of CDS spreads at the start of the crisis, while aversion to only ambiguity about the underlying dynamics performs better during the later part of the crisis. Notice that this corresponds to the intuition delivered by looking at the time series evolution of the two contributions to entropy.

Notice that, while the model described in this paper is geared toward explaining the observed increases in CDS spreads, similar intuition could be used to explain observed changes to prices of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and other complex securities. In fact, since arguably CDOs have a more complicated underlying structure than default swaps, model misspecification concerns would be even more relevant in pricing these securities. A formal treatment of this problem, however, is left for future research.

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# A Proofs

## A.1 Proof of Lemma 4.2

To obtain a first order approximation to the value function around the point $\theta_d^{-1} = \theta_s^{-1} = 0$, we need to take a second order expansion of the risk-sensitive recursion. In particular, introduce $\theta_s^{-1}/\theta_d^{-1} = 1 + \epsilon$ and rewrite the recursion (4.9) as:

$$\exp\left(-\theta_d^{-1}(1+\epsilon)J_t\right) = \mathbb{E}\left[\exp\left\{-\theta_d^{-1}(1+\epsilon)U(z_t) + (1+\epsilon)\log\mathbb{E}\left[\exp\left(-\beta\theta_d^{-1}J_{t+1}\right)\middle|\right]\right\}\middle|\,\mathcal{G}_t\right].$$

Then, taking a second order expansion of the above recursion, we have:

$$\begin{aligned}
&\exp\left(-\theta_d^{-1}(1+\epsilon)J_t\right) \approx 1 - J(p;0,0)\theta_d^{-1} + \frac{\theta_d^{-2}}{2}\left(J(p;0,0)^2 - 2\frac{\partial J(p;0,0)}{\partial\theta_d^{-1}}\right)\\
&-\epsilon\left(J(p;0,0) + \frac{\partial J(p;0,0)}{\partial\epsilon}\right)\\
&\exp\left\{-\theta_d^{-1}(1+\epsilon)U(z_t) + (1+\epsilon)\log\mathbb{E}\left[\exp\left(-\beta\theta_d^{-1}J_{t+1}\right)\middle|\right]\right\} \approx 1 - \theta_d^{-1}\left(U(z_t) + \beta\mathbb{E}\left[J(p;0,0)\middle|\,\mathcal{F}_t\right]\right)\\
&+\frac{\theta_d^{-2}}{2}\left\{\left(U(z_t) + \beta\mathbb{E}\left[J(p;0,0)\middle|\,\mathcal{F}_t\right]\right)^2 - 2\beta\mathbb{E}\left[\frac{\partial J(p;0,0)}{\partial\theta_d^{-1}}\middle|\,\mathcal{F}_t\right] - \beta^2\mathbb{E}\left[J(p;0,0)\middle|\,\mathcal{F}_t\right]^2\right\}\\
&-\theta_d^{-1}\epsilon\left\{U(z_t) + \beta\mathbb{E}\left[J(p;0,0) + \frac{\partial J(p;0,0)}{\partial\epsilon}\middle|\,\mathcal{F}_t\right]\right\}.
\end{aligned}$$

Denote:

$$J_0 = J(p;0,0) \qquad J_{\theta_d^{-1}} = \frac{\partial J(p;0,0)}{\partial\theta_d^{-1}} \qquad J_\epsilon = \frac{\partial J(p;0,0)}{\partial\epsilon},$$

so that:

$$\begin{aligned}
&\exp\left(-\theta_d^{-1}(1+\epsilon)J_t\right) \approx 1 - J_0\theta_d^{-1} + \frac{\theta_d^{-2}}{2}\left(J_0^2 - 2J_{\theta_d^{-1}}\right) - \epsilon\left(J_0 + J_\epsilon\right)\\
&\exp\left\{-\theta_d^{-1}(1+\epsilon)U(z_t) + (1+\epsilon)\log\mathbb{E}\left[\exp\left(-\beta\theta_d^{-1}J_{t+1}\right)\middle|\right]\right\} \approx 1 - \theta_d^{-1}\left(U(z_t) + \beta\mathbb{E}\left[J_0(t+1)\middle|\,\mathcal{F}_t\right]\right)\\
&+\frac{\theta_d^{-2}}{2}\left\{\left(U(z_t) + \beta\mathbb{E}\left[J_0(t+1)\middle|\,\mathcal{F}_t\right]\right)^2 - 2\beta\mathbb{E}\left[J_{\theta_d^{-1}}(t+1)\middle|\,\mathcal{F}_t\right] - \beta^2\mathbb{E}\left[J_0(t+1)\middle|\,\mathcal{F}_t\right]^2\right\}\\
&-\theta_d^{-1}\epsilon\left\{U(z_t) + \beta\mathbb{E}\left[J_0(t+1) + J_\epsilon(t+1)\middle|\,\mathcal{F}_t\right]\right\}
\end{aligned}$$

Substituting into the risk-sensitive recursion and equating coefficients on powers of $\theta_d^{-1}$ and $\epsilon$, we obtain the following system of equations for $J_0$, $J_{\theta_d^{-1}}$ and $J_\epsilon$:

$$\begin{aligned}
J_0(t) &= \mathbb{E}\left[U(z_t) + \beta J_0(t+1)\middle|\,\mathcal{G}_t\right]\\
2J_{\theta_d^{-1}}(t) &= J_0(t)^2 + \mathbb{E}\left[2\beta J_{\theta_d^{-1}}(t+1) + \beta^2\mathbb{E}\left[J_0(t+1)\middle|\,\mathcal{F}_t\right]^2 - \left(U(z_t) + \beta\mathbb{E}\left[J_0(t+1)\middle|\,\mathcal{F}_t\right]\right)^2\middle|\,\mathcal{G}_t\right]\\
J_\epsilon(t) &= -J_0(t) + \mathbb{E}\left[U(z_t) + \beta\left(J_0(t+1) + J_\epsilon(t+1)\right)\middle|\,\mathcal{G}_t\right].
\end{aligned}$$

To solve the above system, notice that, since the unnormalized probability vector $\pi$ is proportional to the conditional probability vector $p$, we can use $\pi$ as the state variable as long as we recognize that $J_0$ and $J_1$ are homogeneous of degree 0 in $\pi$, so that $J_0(\alpha\pi) = J_0(\pi)$, $J_{\theta_d^{-1}}(\alpha\pi) = J_{\theta_d^{-1}}(\pi)$ and $J_\epsilon(\alpha\pi) = J_\epsilon(\pi)$ $\forall \alpha \in \mathbb{R}$. I look for a first order approximation to the solution in terms of log deviations from the steady state conditional distribution. In particular, denote by $\overline{\pi}$ the stationary distribution of the Markov chain $\{z_t\}_{t\geq 0}$: $\overline{\pi} = \Lambda'\overline{\pi}$. Notice that $\overline{\pi}$ is the steady state conditional distribution in the limiting case of arbitrarily uninformative signals where $\Sigma_u^{-1} = 0$. Introduce $\hat{\pi}$ to be the vector of log deviations from the stationary distribution:

$$\hat{\pi}_{jt} = \begin{cases} \log \tilde{\pi}_{jt} - \log \overline{\pi}_j; & j \in a_B^c \\ 0 & j \in a_B \end{cases}, \tag{A.1}$$

where $\tilde{\pi}_{jt} = f(y_t - \xi_j) \sum_{k=1}^N \lambda_{kj}\pi_{k,t-1}$ is the unnormalized probability vector before conditioning on observations of default at date $t$, and approximate:

$$\begin{aligned}
J_0(\pi) &\approx J_0(\overline{\pi}) + \frac{\partial J_0(\overline{\pi})'}{\partial \pi} diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi} \\
J_0(\pi)^2 &\approx J_0(\overline{\pi})^2 + 2J_0(\overline{\pi})\frac{\partial J_0(\overline{\pi})'}{\partial \pi} diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi} \\
J_{\theta_d^{-1}}(\pi) &\approx J_{\theta_d^{-1}}(\overline{\pi}) + \frac{\partial J_{\theta_d^{-1}}(\overline{\pi})'}{\partial \pi} diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi} \\
J_\epsilon(\pi) &\approx J_\epsilon(\overline{\pi}) + \frac{\partial J_\epsilon(\overline{\pi})'}{\partial \pi} diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi} \\
(U(z) + \beta\mathbb{E}\left[J_0(\pi_{t+1})|\,\mathcal{F}_t\right]) &\approx (U(z) + \beta J_0(\overline{\pi}))^2 + 2\left(U(z) + \beta J_0(\overline{\pi})\right)\beta\frac{\partial J_0(\overline{\pi})'}{\partial \pi} diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi} \\
\mathbb{E}\left[J_0(\pi_{t+1})|\,\mathcal{F}_t\right]^2 &\approx J_0(\overline{\pi})^2 + 2J_0(\overline{\pi})\frac{J_0(\overline{\pi})'}{\partial \pi} diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi}.
\end{aligned}$$

For simplicity, denote: $\gamma_{00} = J_0(\overline{\pi})$, $\gamma_{01} = \frac{\partial J_0(\overline{\pi})}{\partial \pi}$, $\gamma_{10} = J_{\theta_d^{-1}}(\overline{\pi})$, $\gamma_{11} = \frac{\partial J_{\theta_d^{-1}}(\overline{\pi})}{\partial \pi}$, $\gamma_{\epsilon 0} = J_\epsilon(\overline{\pi})$, and $\gamma_{\epsilon 1} = \frac{\partial J_\epsilon(\overline{\pi})}{\partial \pi}$, so that:

$$\begin{aligned}
J_0(\pi) &\approx \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}' diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi} \\
J_0(\pi)^2 &\approx \gamma_{00}^2 + 2\gamma_{00}\gamma_{01}' diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi} \\
J_{\theta_d^{-1}}(\pi) &\approx \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}' diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi} \\
J_\epsilon &\approx \gamma_{\epsilon 0} + \gamma_{\epsilon 1}' diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi} \\
(U(z) + \beta\mathbb{E}\left[J_0(\pi_{t+1})|\,\mathcal{F}_t\right]) &\approx (U(z) + \beta\gamma_{00})^2 + 2\left(U(z) + \beta\gamma_{00}\right)\beta\gamma_{01}' diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi} \\
\mathbb{E}\left[J_0(\pi_{t+1})|\,\mathcal{F}_t\right]^2 &\approx \gamma_{00}^2 + 2\gamma_{00}\gamma_{01}' diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi}.
\end{aligned}$$

Notice that the restrictions $J_0(\alpha\pi) = J_0(\pi)$, $J_{\theta_d^{-1}}(\alpha\pi) = J_{\theta_d^{-1}}(\pi)$ and $J_\epsilon(\alpha\pi) = J_\epsilon(\pi)$

imply that:

$$\begin{aligned}\sum_{j\in a_B^c}\gamma_{01,j}\overline{\pi}_j &= 0\\ \sum_{j\in a_B^c}\gamma_{11,j}\overline{\pi}_j &= 0\\ \sum_{j\in a_B^c}\gamma_{\epsilon 1,j}\overline{\pi}_j &= 0.\end{aligned}$$

Consider now the updating rule for log deviations from the steady state. Recall that unnormalized probabilities are updated according to:

$$\pi_i^* = f(y^* - \xi_j)\sum_{k=1}^{N}\lambda_{kj}\pi_k,$$

or, equivalently,

$$\frac{\pi_j^*}{\overline{\pi}_j} = f(y^* - \xi_j)\sum_{k\in a_B^c}\lambda_{kj}\frac{\overline{\pi}_k}{\overline{\pi}_j}\frac{\pi_k}{\overline{\pi}_k}.$$

Taking logs of both sides, we obtain the following updating rule for log deviations from the stationary distribution:

$$\hat{\pi}_j^* = \log f(y^* - \xi_j) + \log\left(\sum_{k\in a_B^c}\lambda_{kj}\frac{\overline{\pi}_k}{\overline{\pi}_j}\exp(\hat{\pi}_k)\right).$$

Approximating once again around $\hat{\pi} = \overrightarrow{0}$, we obtain:

$$\hat{\pi}_j^* \approx \log f(y^* - \xi_j) + \log\left(\sum_{k\in a_B^c}\lambda_{kj}\frac{\overline{\pi}_k}{\overline{\pi}_j}\right) + \left(\sum_{k\in a_B^c}\lambda_{kj}\overline{\pi}_k\right)^{-1}\sum_{k\in a_B^c}\lambda_{kj}\overline{\pi}_k\hat{\pi}_k.$$

Denote: $\mathcal{L}_{0j} = \log\left(\sum_{k\in a_B^c}\lambda_{kj}\frac{\overline{\pi}_k}{\overline{\pi}_j}\right)$, $\mathcal{L}_{1,jk} = \left(\sum_{k\in a_B^c}\lambda_{kj}\overline{\pi}_k\right)^{-1}\lambda_{kj}$, so that the first order approximation to the evolution equation is given by:

$$\hat{\pi}_j^* \approx \log f(y^* - \xi_k) + \mathcal{L}_{0j} + \mathcal{L}_{1j}' diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi}.$$

Notice also that, after observing the default state of firm $i$, $i^*$, the predicted vector of conditional distribution is given by:

$$\hat{\pi}_j^* = \log f(y^* - \xi_j) + \log\lambda_{i^*j} - \log\overline{\pi}_j, \qquad \forall j \in a_B^c.$$

Similarly, approximate:

$$p_j = \frac{\pi_j}{\mathbf{1}_N'\pi} \approx \overline{\pi}_j(1 + \hat{\pi}_j - \overline{\pi}'\hat{\pi}).$$

Substituting into the above system and equating coefficients, we obtain the following system:

$$\begin{aligned}
\gamma_{00} &= \sum_{j\in a_B^c} \overline{\pi}_j \left\{ U(\xi_j) + \beta \sum_{k\in a_B^c} \lambda_{jk} \left(\gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}' diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})[\Delta_k^1 + \mathcal{L}_0]\right) \right\} && \text{(A.2)} \\
&\quad + \beta \sum_{j\in a_B^c} \overline{\pi}_j \sum_{i=1}^{I} \lambda_{ji^*} J_0^{\tau_i} \\
\gamma_{01,j} &= U(\xi_j) + \beta \sum_{k\in a_B^c} \lambda_{jk} \left(\gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}' diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})[\Delta_k^1 + \mathcal{L}_0]\right) && \text{(A.3)} \\
&\quad + \beta \sum_{i=1}^{I} \lambda_{ji^*} J_0^{\tau_i} - \gamma_{00} + \beta\gamma_{01}' diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) \mathcal{L}_{1j}' \left( \sum_{l,k\in a_B^c} \overline{\pi}_l \lambda_{lk} \right) \\
J_0^{\tau_i} &= \sum_{k\in a_B^c} \lambda_{i^*k} \left(U(\xi_{i^*}) + \beta \left[\gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}' diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) \left(\Delta_k^1 + \mathcal{L}_{0i^*}^d\right)\right]\right) && \text{(A.4)} \\
&\quad + \sum_{j=1}^{I} \lambda_{i^*j^*} \left[U(\xi_{i^*}) + \beta J_0^{\tau_j}\right]
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
2\gamma_{10} &= \gamma_{00}^2 + 2 \sum_{j,k\in a_B^c} \overline{\pi}_j \lambda_{jk} \beta \left[\gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}' diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) \left(\Delta_k^1 + \mathcal{L}_0\right)\right] && \text{(A.5)} \\
&+ \sum_{j,k\in a_B^c} \overline{\pi}_j \lambda_{jk} \beta^2 \left[\gamma_{00}^2 + 2\gamma_{00}\gamma_{01}' diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) \left(\Delta_k^1 + \mathcal{L}_0\right)\right] \\
&- \sum_{j,k\in a_B^c} \overline{\pi}_j \lambda_{jk} \left(U(\xi_j) + \beta\gamma_{00}\right)^2 \\
&- 2\beta \sum_{j,k\in a_B^c} \overline{\pi}_j \lambda_{jk} \left[U(\xi_j) + \beta\gamma_{00}\right] \gamma_{01}' diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) \left(\Delta_k^1 + \mathcal{L}_0\right) \\
&\quad + \sum_{j\in a_B^C} \sum_{i=1}^{I} \overline{\pi}_j \lambda_{ji^*} \left[2\beta J_{\theta_d^{-1}}^{\tau_i} + \beta^2 \left(J_0^{\tau_i}\right)^2 - \left(U(\xi_j) + \beta J_0^{\tau_i}\right)^2\right].
\end{aligned}$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
2\gamma_{11,j} &= 2\gamma_{00}\gamma_{01,j} + \gamma_{00}^2 - 2\gamma_{10} + \sum_{i=1}^{I} \lambda_{ji^*} \left[ 2\beta J_{\theta_d^{-1}}^{\tau_i} + \beta^2 \left(J_0^{\tau_i}\right)^2 - \left(U(\xi_j) + \beta J_0^{\tau_i}\right)^2 \right] \qquad \text{(A.6)} \\
&+ 2 \sum_{k \in a_B^c} \lambda_{jk} \beta \left[ \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}' diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) \left( \Delta_k^1 + \mathcal{L}_0 \right) \right] \\
&+ \sum_{k \in a_B^c} \lambda_{jk} \beta^2 \left[ \gamma_{00}^2 + 2\gamma_{00}\gamma_{01}' diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) \left( \Delta_k^1 + \mathcal{L}_0 \right) \right] \\
&- \sum_{k \in a_B^c} \lambda_{jk} \left( U(\xi_j) + \beta\gamma_{00} \right)^2 \\
&- 2\beta \sum_{k \in a_B^c} \lambda_{jk} \left[ U(\xi_j) + \beta\gamma_{00} \right] \gamma_{01}' diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) \left( \Delta_k^1 + \mathcal{L}_0 \right) \\
&+ 2\beta\gamma_{11}' diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) \mathcal{L}_{1j}' \sum_{l,k \in a_B^c} \overline{\pi}_l \lambda_{lk} \\
&- 2\beta\gamma_{01}' diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) \mathcal{L}_{1j}' \sum_{l,k \in a_B^c} U(\xi_l) \overline{\pi}_l \lambda_{lk}
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
2J_{\theta_d^{-1}}^{\tau_i} &= \left(J_0^{\tau_i}\right)^2 + 2 \sum_{k \in a_B^c} \lambda_{i^*k} \beta \left[ \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}' diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) \left( \Delta_k^1 + \mathcal{L}_{0i}^d \right) \right] \qquad \text{(A.7)} \\
&+ \sum_{k \in a_B^c} \lambda_{i^*k} \beta^2 \left[ \gamma_{00}^2 + 2\gamma_{00}\gamma_{01}' diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) \left( \Delta_k^1 + \mathcal{L}_{0i}^d \right) \right] \\
&- \sum_{k \in a_B^c} \lambda_{i^*k} \left( U(\xi_{i^*}) + \beta\gamma_{00} \right)^2 \\
&- \beta \sum_{k \in a_B^c} \lambda_{i^*k} \left[ U(\xi_{i^*}) + \beta\gamma_{00} \right] \gamma_{01}' diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) \left( \Delta_k^1 + \mathcal{L}_{0i}^d \right) \\
&+ \sum_{j=1}^{I} \lambda_{i^*j^*} \left[ 2\beta J_{\theta_d^{-1}}^{\tau_j} + \beta^2 \left(J_0^{\tau_j}\right)^2 - \left(U(\xi_{i^*}) + \beta J_0^{\tau_j}\right)^2 \right]
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
\gamma_{\epsilon 0} &= -\gamma_{00} + \sum_{j\in a_B^c}\sum_{i=1}^{I}\overline{\pi}_j\lambda_{ji^*}\left(U(\xi_j)+\beta J_0^{\tau_i}+\beta J_\epsilon^{\tau_i}\right) \qquad \text{(A.8)}\\
&+ \sum_{j,k\in a_B^c}\overline{\pi}_j\lambda_{jk}\left[U(\xi_j)+\beta\left(\gamma_{00}+\gamma_{\epsilon 0}\right)\right]\\
&+ \beta\sum_{j,k\in a_B^c}\overline{\pi}_j\lambda_{jk}\left(\gamma_{01}+\gamma_{\epsilon 1}\right)' diag(\overline{\pi})diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})\left(\Delta_k^1+\mathcal{L}_0\right)\\
\gamma_{\epsilon 1,j} &= -\gamma_{01,j}-\gamma_{00}-\gamma_{\epsilon 0}+\beta\left(\gamma_{01}+\gamma_{\epsilon 1}\right)' diag(\overline{\pi})diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})\mathcal{L}_{1j}'\sum_{l,k\in a_B^c}\overline{\pi}_l\lambda_{lk} \qquad \text{(A.9)}\\
&+ \sum_{k\in a_B^c}\lambda_{jk}\left[U(\xi_j)+\beta\left(\gamma_{00}+\gamma_{\epsilon 0}\right)\right]\\
&+ \beta\sum_{k\in a_B^c}\lambda_{jk}\left(\gamma_{01}+\gamma_{\epsilon 1}\right)' diag(\overline{\pi})diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})\left(\Delta_k^1+\mathcal{L}_0\right)\\
&+ \sum_{i=1}^{I}\lambda_{ji^*}\left(U(\xi_j)+\beta J_0^{\tau_i}+\beta J_\epsilon^{\tau_i}\right)\\
J_\epsilon^{\tau_i} &= J_0^{\tau_i}+\sum_{j=1}^{I}\lambda_{i^*j^*}\left(U(\xi_{j^*})+\beta J_0^{\tau_j}+\beta J_\epsilon^{\tau_j}\right) \qquad \text{(A.10)}\\
&+ \sum_{k\in a_B^c}\lambda_{i^*k}\left[U(\xi_{i^*})+\beta\left(\gamma_{00}+\gamma_{\epsilon 0}\right)\right]\\
&+ \beta\sum_{k\in a_B^c}\lambda_{i^*k}\left(\gamma_{01}+\gamma_{\epsilon 1}\right)' diag(\overline{\pi})diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})\left(\Delta_k^1+\mathcal{L}_{0i}^d\right),
\end{aligned}
$$

where $\Delta_k^1$ is a constant vector given by:

$$\Delta_{kj}^1 = -\frac{1}{2}-\frac{1}{2}(\xi_j-\xi_k)'\Sigma_u^{-1}(\xi_j-\xi_k).$$

Consider now the distortion to the conditional joint distribution of next period's signals and state. Recall that, in terms of the value function, this is given by:

$$\phi_t(z^*,y^*) = \frac{\exp\left(-\frac{\beta J(\pi^*;\theta_d^{-1})}{\theta}\right)}{\mathbb{E}\left[\exp\left(-\frac{\beta J(\pi^*;\theta_d^{-1})}{\theta_d}\right)\middle|\,\mathcal{F}_t\right]}.$$

Taking a first order approximation around the point $\theta_d^{-1}=\theta_s^{-1}=0$, we obtain:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\phi_t\left(z_{t+1},y_{t+1}\right) \approx 1 &- \theta_d^{-1}\beta\left(J_0(\pi_{t+1})-\mathbb{E}\left[J_0(\pi_{t+1})\middle|\,\mathcal{F}_t\right]\right)\\
&- \left(\theta_s^{-1}-\theta_d^{-1}\right)\beta\left(J_\epsilon(\pi_{t+1})-\mathbb{E}\left[J_\epsilon(\pi_{t+1})\middle|\,\mathcal{F}_t\right]\right).
\end{aligned}
$$

Substituting for $J_0$ and $J_\epsilon$, we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned}\phi(z^*, y^*|z=\xi_j) = 1 + \theta_d^{-1}\left(\varphi_{01,j} + \varphi'_{\pi 1,j} diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi} + \varphi'_{y1,j}\log f(y^*)\right) \\ + (\theta_s^{-1} - \theta_d^{-1})\left(\varphi_{0\epsilon,j} + \varphi'_{\pi\epsilon,j} diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi} + \varphi'_{y\epsilon,j}\log f(y^*)\right),\end{aligned}$$

where:

$$\varphi_{01,jk} = \begin{cases} \beta\left(\sum_{i=1}^I \lambda_{ji^*} J_0^{\tau_i} - \gamma_{00} - \gamma'_{01} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})\mathcal{L}_0\right) \\ +\beta\sum_{l\in a_B^c}\lambda_{jl}\left[\gamma_{00} + \gamma'_{01} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})(\Delta_k^1 + \mathcal{L}_0)\right] & j,k\in a_B^c \\ \beta\left(\sum_{i=1}^I \lambda_{ji^*} J_0^{\tau_i} - J_0^{\tau_k}\right) + \\ +\beta\sum_{l\in a_B^c}\lambda_{jl}\left[\gamma_{00} + \gamma'_{01} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})(\Delta_k^1 + \mathcal{L}_0)\right] & j\in a_B^c, k\in a_B \\ \beta\left(\sum_{i=1}^I \lambda_{j^*i^*} J_0^{\tau_i} - \gamma_{00} - \gamma'_{01} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})\mathcal{L}_{0j}^d\right) \\ +\beta\sum_{l\in a_B^c}\lambda_{j^*l}\left[\gamma_{00} + \gamma'_{01} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})\mathcal{L}_{0j}^d\right] & j\in a_B, k\in a_B^c \\ \beta\left(\sum_{i=1}^I \lambda_{j^*i^*} J_0^{\tau_i} - \gamma_{00} - \gamma'_{01} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})\mathcal{L}_{0j}^d\right) \\ +\beta\sum_{l\in a_B^c}\lambda_{j^*l}\left[\gamma_{00} + \gamma'_{01} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})\mathcal{L}_{0j}^d\right] & j,k\in a_B \end{cases} \tag{A.11}$$

$$\varphi_{\pi 1,jk} = \begin{cases} \beta\gamma'_{01} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})\mathcal{L}_1\left(\sum_{l\in a_B^c}\lambda_{jl} - 1\right) & j,k\in a_B^c \\ \beta\mathcal{L}'_1 diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})\gamma_{01}\sum_{k\in a_B^c}\lambda_{jk} & j\in a_B^c, k\in a_B \\ 0 & j\in a_B \end{cases} \tag{A.12}$$

$$\varphi_{y1,jk} = \begin{cases} -\beta\gamma'_{01} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) & j,k\in a_B^c \\ -\beta diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})\gamma_{01} & j\in a_B, k\in a_B^c \\ 0 & k\in a_B \end{cases} \tag{A.13}$$

$$\varphi_{0\epsilon,jk} = \begin{cases} \beta\left(\sum_{i=1}^I \lambda_{ji^*} J_\epsilon^{\tau_i} - \gamma_{\epsilon 0} - \gamma'_{\epsilon 1} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})\mathcal{L}_0\right) \\ +\beta\sum_{l\in a_B^c}\lambda_{jl}\left[\gamma_{\epsilon 0} + \gamma'_{\epsilon 1} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})(\Delta_k^1 + \mathcal{L}_0)\right] & j,k\in a_B^c \\ \beta\left(\sum_{i=1}^I \lambda_{ji^*} J_\epsilon^{\tau_i} - J_\epsilon^{\tau_k}\right) + \\ +\beta\sum_{l\in a_B^c}\lambda_{jl}\left[\gamma_{\epsilon 0} + \gamma'_{\epsilon 1} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})(\Delta_k^1 + \mathcal{L}_0)\right] & j\in a_B^c, k\in a_B \\ \beta\left(\sum_{i=1}^I \lambda_{j^*i^*} J_\epsilon^{\tau_i} - \gamma_{\epsilon 0} - \gamma'_{\epsilon 1} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})\mathcal{L}_{0j}^d\right) \\ +\beta\sum_{l\in a_B^c}\lambda_{j^*l}\left[\gamma_{\epsilon 0} + \gamma'_{\epsilon 1} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})\mathcal{L}_{0j}^d\right] & j\in a_B, k\in a_B^c \\ \beta\left(\sum_{i=1}^I \lambda_{j^*i^*} J_\epsilon^{\tau_i} - \gamma_{\epsilon 0} - \gamma'_{\epsilon 1} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})\mathcal{L}_{0j}^d\right) \\ +\beta\sum_{l\in a_B^c}\lambda_{j^*l}\left[\gamma_{\epsilon 0} + \gamma'_{\epsilon 1} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})\mathcal{L}_{0j}^d\right] & j,k\in a_B \end{cases} \tag{A.14}$$

$$\varphi_{\pi\epsilon,jk} = \begin{cases} \beta\gamma'_{\epsilon 1} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})\mathcal{L}_1 \left(\sum_{l\in a_B^c}\lambda_{jl} - 1\right) & j,k \in a_B^c \\ \beta\mathcal{L}'_1 diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})\gamma_{\epsilon 1}\sum_{k\in a_B^c}\lambda_{jk} & j\in a_B^c, k\in a_B \\ 0 & j\in a_B \end{cases} \tag{A.15}$$

$$\varphi_{y\epsilon,jk} = \begin{cases} -\beta\gamma'_{\epsilon 1} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) & j,k\in a_B^c \\ -\beta diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})\gamma_{\epsilon 1} & j\in a_B, k\in a_B^c \\ 0 & k\in a_B \end{cases} \tag{A.16}$$

Turn now to the distortion to the current period's conditional probability vector. Recall that this is given by:

$$\psi_t(z) = \frac{\exp\left(-\frac{U(z)+\mathcal{R}_t(\beta J(p^*);\theta_d)}{\theta_s}\right)}{\mathbb{E}\left[\exp\left(-\frac{U(z)+\mathcal{R}_t(\beta J(p^*);\theta_d)}{\theta_s}\right)\middle|\,\mathcal{G}_t\right]}.$$

Approximating once again around the point $\theta_d^{-1} = \theta_s^{-1} = 0$, we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned}\psi_t(z_t) \approx 1 &- \left(\theta_d^{-1} - \theta_s^{-1}\right)\beta\left(\mathbb{E}\left[J_\epsilon(\pi_{t+1})\middle|\,\mathcal{F}_t\right] - \mathbb{E}\left[J_\epsilon(\pi_{t+1})\middle|\,\mathcal{G}_t\right]\right) \\ &- \theta_s^{-1}\left(U(z_t) + \beta\mathbb{E}\left[J_0(\pi_{t+1})\middle|\,\mathcal{F}_t\right] - \mathbb{E}\left[U(z_t) + \beta J_0(\pi_{t+1})\middle|\,\mathcal{G}_t\right]\right).\end{aligned}$$

Recall that, in terms of log-deviations from the steady state, $p_l \approx \overline{\pi}_l\left(1 + \hat{\pi}_l - \overline{\pi}'\hat{\pi}\right)$. We can represent:

$$\psi(\xi_j) = 1 + \theta_s^{-1}\left(\zeta_{j,01} + \zeta'_{j,11} diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi}\right) + \left(\theta_d^{-1} - \theta_s^{-1}\right)\left(\zeta_{j,0\epsilon} + \zeta'_{j,1\epsilon} diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi}\right),$$

where:

$$\begin{aligned}\zeta_{j,01} = &\sum_{l\in a_B^c}\overline{\pi}_l\left\{U(\xi_l) + \beta\sum_{k\in a_B^c}\lambda_{lk}\left[\gamma_{00} + \gamma'_{01} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})(\Delta_k^1 + \mathcal{L}_0)\right]\right\} \\ &+ \beta\sum_{l\in a_B^c}\overline{\pi}_l\sum_{i=1}^{I}\lambda_{li^*}J_0^{\tau_k} - U(\xi_l) \\ &- \beta\sum_{k\in a_B^c}\lambda_{lk}\left[\gamma_{00} + \gamma'_{01} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})(\Delta_k^1 + \mathcal{L}_0)\right] - \beta\sum_{i=1}^{I}\lambda_{li^*}J_0^{\tau_k}\end{aligned} \tag{A.17}$$

$$\zeta_{j,11,k} = -\zeta_{k,00} + \beta\gamma'_{01} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})\mathcal{L}'_{1k}\left(\sum_{l,m\in a_B^c}\overline{\pi}_l\lambda_{lm} - \sum_{l\in a_B^c}\lambda_{kl}\right) \tag{A.18}$$

$$\zeta_{j,0\epsilon} = \beta \sum_{l,k\in a_B^c} \overline{\pi}_l \lambda_{lk} \left[\gamma_{\epsilon 0} + \gamma'_{\epsilon 1} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})(\Delta_k^1 + \mathcal{L}_0)\right] + \beta \sum_{l\in a_B^c} \overline{\pi}_l \sum_{i=1}^{I} \lambda_{li^*} J_\epsilon^{\tau_k} \quad \text{(A.19)}$$

$$- \beta \sum_{k\in a_B^c} \lambda_{lk} \left[\gamma_{\epsilon 0} + \gamma'_{\epsilon 1} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})(\Delta_k^1 + \mathcal{L}_0)\right] - \beta \sum_{i=1}^{I} \lambda_{li^*} J_\epsilon^{\tau_k}$$

$$\zeta_{j,1\epsilon,k} = -\zeta_{k,0\epsilon} + \beta \gamma'_{\epsilon 1} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) \mathcal{L}'_{1k} \left( \sum_{l,m\in a_B^c} \overline{\pi}_l \lambda_{lm} - \sum_{l\in a_B^c} \lambda_{kl} \right). \quad \text{(A.20)}$$

## A.2 Proof of Lemma 4.3

Notice first that, substituting the first order expansion to the value of equity of firm $i$ into the worst-case Euler equation and equating coefficients on the powers of $\theta^{-1}$, we obtain the following system for $V_{i0}$ and $V_{i1}$:

$$V_{i0}(\pi) = -C_i + \sum_{j\in a_B^c} p_j \left[ \delta_i A_{ij} + \beta \sum_{k\in a_B^c} \lambda_{jk} \left|2\pi\Sigma_u\right|^{-\frac{1}{2}} \int V_{i0}(\pi^*) df(y^* - \xi_k) + \beta \sum_{k\neq i} \lambda_{jk^*} V_{i0}^{\tau_k} \right]$$

$$V_{i0}^{\tau_j} = -C_i + \delta_i A_{ij^*} + \beta \left[ \sum_{k\in a_B^c} \lambda_{j^*k} \left|2\pi\Sigma_u\right|^{-\frac{1}{2}} \int V_{i0}(\pi^*) df(y^* - \xi_k) + \sum_{k\neq i} \lambda_{j^*k^*} V_{i0}^{\tau_k} \right]$$

$$\begin{aligned}
V_{i\theta_d^{-1}} = & \sum_{j\in a_B^c} p_j \left[\zeta_{01,j} + \zeta'_{11,j} diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi}\right] \left[\delta_i A_{ij} + \beta \sum_{k\neq i} \lambda_{jk^*} V_{i0}^{\tau_k}\right] \\
& + \beta \sum_{j,k\in a_B^c} p_j \left[\zeta_{01,j} + \zeta'_{11,j} diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi}\right] \lambda_{jk} \left|2\pi\Sigma_u\right|^{-\frac{1}{2}} \int V_{i0}(\pi^*) df(y^* - \xi_k) \\
& + \beta \sum_{j,k\in a_B^c} p_j \lambda_{jk} \left|2\pi\Sigma_u\right|^{-\frac{1}{2}} \int V_{i\theta_d^{-1}}(\pi^*) df(y^* - \xi_k) \\
& + \beta \sum_{j,k\in a_B^c} p_j \lambda_{jk} \left|2\pi\Sigma_u\right|^{-\frac{1}{2}} \int V_{i0}(\pi^*) \left(\varphi_{01,jk} + \varphi'_{\pi 1,jk} diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi} + \varphi_{y1,jk} \log f(y^* - \xi_k)\right) df(y^* - \xi_k) \\
& + \beta \sum_{j\in a_B^c} p_j \sum_{k\neq i} \lambda_{jk^*} \left[V_{i\theta_d^{-1}}^{\tau_k} + V_{i0}^{\tau_k} \left(\varphi_{01,jk^*} + \varphi'_{\pi 1,jk} diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi}\right)\right]
\end{aligned}$$

$$V_{i\theta_d^{-1}}^{\tau_j} = \beta \sum_{k \in a_B^c} \lambda_{j^*k} \left|2\pi\Sigma_u\right|^{-\frac{1}{2}} \int \left[V_{i\theta_d^{-1}}(\pi^*) + V_{i0}(\pi^*)\left(\varphi_{01,j^*k} + \varphi_{y1,j^*k}\log f(y^* - \xi_k)\right)\right] df(y^* - \xi_k)$$
$$+ \beta \sum_{k \neq i} \lambda_{j^*k^*} \left[V_{i\theta_d^{-1}}^{\tau_k} + V_{i0}^{\tau_k}\varphi_{01,j^*k^*}\right]$$

$$V_{i\epsilon} = \beta \sum_{j \in a_B^c} p_j \left[\sum_{k \in a_B^c} \lambda_{jk} \left|2\pi\Sigma_u\right|^{-\frac{1}{2}} \int V_{i\epsilon}(\pi^*) df(y^* - \xi_k) + \sum_{k \neq i} \lambda_{jk^*} V_{i\epsilon}^{\tau_k}\right]$$
$$V_{i\epsilon}^{\tau_j} = \beta \sum_{k \in a_B^c} \lambda_{j^*k} \left|2\pi\Sigma_u\right|^{-\frac{1}{2}} \int V_{i\epsilon}(\pi^*) df(y^* - \xi_k) + \beta \sum_{k \neq i} \lambda_{j^*k^*} V_{i\epsilon}^{\tau_k},$$

where $A_{ij}$ is the fundamental value of asset of firm $i$ in state $j$. Substituting the approximations (4.22)-(4.24) and equating coefficients, we obtain:

$$\nu_{i,00} = -C_i + \sum_{j \in a_B^c} \overline{\pi}_j \left(\delta_i A_{ij} + \beta \sum_{k \in a_B^c} \lambda_{jk} \left[\nu_{i,00} + \nu'_{i,01} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})(\mathcal{L}_0 + \Delta_k^1)\right] + \beta \sum_{k \neq i} \lambda_{jk^*} V_{i0}^{\tau_k}\right)$$

$$\nu_{i,01,j} = \delta_i A_{ij} + \beta \sum_{k \in a_B^c} \lambda_{jk} \left[\nu_{i,00} + \nu'_{i,01} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})(\mathcal{L}_0 + \Delta_k^1)\right] + \beta \sum_{k \neq i} \lambda_{jk^*} V_{i0}^{\tau_k}$$
$$- \nu_{i,00} + \beta \sum_{k \neq i} \lambda_{jk^*} V_{i0}^{\tau_k} + \beta \nu'_{i,01} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) \mathcal{L}'_{1j} \sum_{l,k \in a_B^c} \overline{\pi}_l \lambda_{lk}$$

$$V_{i0}^{\tau_j} = -C_i + \delta_i A_{ij^*} + \beta \sum_{k \neq i} \lambda_{j^*k^*} V_{i0}^{\tau_k} + \beta \sum_{k \in a_B^c} \lambda_{j^*k} \left[\nu_{i,00} + \nu'_{i,01} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) \left(\Delta_k^1 + \mathcal{L}_{0j}^d\right)\right]$$

$$\nu_{i,\epsilon 0} = \beta \sum_{j \in a_B^c} \overline{\pi}_j \left(\sum_{k \in a_B^c} \lambda_{jk} \left[\nu_{i,\epsilon 0} + \nu'_{i,\epsilon 1} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})(\mathcal{L}_0 + \Delta_k^1)\right] + \sum_{k \neq i} \lambda_{jk^*} V_{i\epsilon}^{\tau_k}\right)$$

$$\nu_{i,01,j} = \beta \sum_{k \in a_B^c} \lambda_{jk} \left[\nu_{i,\epsilon 0} + \nu'_{i,\epsilon 1} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})(\mathcal{L}_0 + \Delta_k^1)\right] + \beta \sum_{k \neq i} \lambda_{jk^*} V_{i\epsilon}^{\tau_k}$$
$$- \nu_{i,\epsilon 0} + \beta \sum_{k \neq i} \lambda_{jk^*} V_{i\epsilon}^{\tau_k} + \beta \nu'_{i,\epsilon 1} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) \mathcal{L}'_{1j} \sum_{l,k \in a_B^c} \overline{\pi}_l \lambda_{lk}$$

$$V_{i\epsilon}^{\tau_j} = \beta \sum_{k \neq i} \lambda_{j^* k^*} V_{i\epsilon}^{\tau_k} + \beta \sum_{k \in a_B^c} \lambda_{j^* k} \left[ \nu_{i,\epsilon 0} + \nu'_{i,\epsilon 1} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) \left( \Delta_k^1 + \mathcal{L}_{0j}^d \right) \right]$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\nu_{i,10} = & \sum_{j \in a_B^c} \overline{\pi}_j \zeta_{j0} \left\{ \delta_i A_{ij} + \beta \sum_{k \neq i} \lambda_{jk^*} V_{i0}^{\tau_k} + \beta \sum_{k \in a_B^c} \lambda_{jk} \left[ \nu_{i,00} + \nu'_{i,01} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) (\mathcal{L}_0 + \Delta_k^1) \right] \right\} \\
& + \beta \sum_{j,k \in a_B^c} \overline{\pi}_j \lambda_{jk} \left[ \nu_{i,10} + \nu'_{i,11} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) (\mathcal{L}_0 + \Delta_k^1) \right] \\
& + \beta \sum_{j,k \in a_B^c} \overline{\pi}_j \lambda_{jk} \left[ \nu_{i,00} + \nu'_{i,01} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) (\mathcal{L}_0 + \Delta_k^1) \right] \varphi_{01,jk} \\
& + \beta \sum_{j,k \in a_B^c} \overline{\pi}_j \lambda_{jk} \left[ \nu_{i,00} \varphi'_{y1,jk} \Delta_k^1 + \nu'_{i,01} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) \Delta_k^2 \varphi_{y1,jk} \right] \\
& + \beta \sum_{j \in a_B^c} \overline{\pi}_j \sum_{k \neq i} \lambda_{jk^*} \left[ V_{i0}^{\tau_k} \varphi_{01,jk^*} + V_{i\theta_d^{-1}}^{\tau_k} \right]
\end{aligned}$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
\nu_{i,11,j} = \zeta_{j0} & \left\{ \delta_i A_{ij} + \beta \sum_{k \neq i} \lambda_{jk^*} V_{i0}^{\tau_k} + \beta \sum_{k \in a_B^c} \lambda_{jk} \left[ \nu_{i,00} + \nu'_{i,01} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})(\mathcal{L}_0 + \Delta_k^1) \right] \right\} \\
& + \beta \sum_{k \in a_B^c} \lambda_{jk} \left[ \nu_{i,10} + \nu'_{i,11} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})(\mathcal{L}_0 + \Delta_k^1) \right] \\
& + \beta \sum_{k \in a_B^c} \lambda_{jk} \left[ \nu_{i,00} + \nu'_{i,01} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})(\mathcal{L}_0 + \Delta_k^1) \right] \varphi_{01,jk} - \nu_{i,10} \\
& + \beta \sum_{k \in a_B^c} \lambda_{jk} \left[ \nu_{i,00} \varphi'_{y1,jk} \Delta_k^1 + \nu'_{i,01} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) \Delta_k^2 \varphi_{y1,jk} \right] + \beta \sum_{k \neq i} \lambda_{jk^*} \left[ V_{i0}^{\tau_k} \varphi_{01,jk^*} + V_{i\theta_d^{-1}}^{\tau_k} \right] \\
& + \sum_{l \in a_B^c} \zeta_{l1,j} \left[ \delta_i A_{il} + \beta \sum_{k \neq i} \lambda_{lk^*} V_{i0}^{\tau_k} + \beta \sum_{k \in a_B^c} \lambda_{lk} \left( \nu_{i,00} + \nu'_{i,01} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})(\mathcal{L}_0 + \Delta_k^1) \right) \right] \\
& + \beta \nu'_{i,01} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) \mathcal{L}'_{1j} \sum_{l,k \in a_B^c} \overline{\pi}_l \zeta_{l0} \lambda_{lk} + \beta \nu'_{i,11} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) \mathcal{L}'_{1j} \sum_{l,k \in a_B^c} \overline{\pi}_l \zeta_{l0} \lambda_{lk} \\
& + \beta \nu'_{i,01} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) \mathcal{L}'_{1j} \sum_{l,k \in a_B^c} \overline{\pi}_l \lambda_{lk} \left[ \varphi_{01,lk} + \varphi'_{y1,lk} \Delta_k^1 \right] + \beta \sum_{l \in a_B^c} \sum_{k \neq i} \overline{\pi}_l \lambda_{lk^*} V_{i0}^{\tau_k} \varphi_{\pi 1,lk^*,j} \\
& + \beta \sum_{l,k \in a_B^c} \overline{\pi}_l \lambda_{lk} \left[ \nu_{i,00} + \nu'_{i,01} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})(\mathcal{L}_0 + \Delta_k^1) \right] \varphi_{\pi 1,lk,j} \\
V_{i\theta_d^{-1}}^{\tau_j} = \beta & \sum_{k \in a_B^c} \lambda_{j^*k} \left[ \nu_{i,00} + \nu'_{i,01} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})(\mathcal{L}_{0j}^d + \Delta_k^1) \right] \varphi_{01,j^*k} \\
& + \beta \sum_{k \in a_B^c} \lambda_{j^*k} \left[ \nu_{i,00} \varphi'_{y1,j^*k} \Delta_k^1 + \nu'_{i,01} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) \Delta_k^2 \varphi_{y1,j^*k} \right] \\
& + \beta \sum_{k \in a_B^c} \lambda_{j^*k} \left[ \nu_{i,10} + \nu'_{i,11} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c})(\mathcal{L}_{0j}^d + \Delta_k^1) \right] + \beta \sum_{k \neq i} \lambda_{j^*k^*} \left( V_{i0}^{\tau_k} \phi_1(\xi_{k^*} | \xi_{j^*}) + V_{i\theta_d^{-1}}^{\tau_k} \right)
\end{aligned}
$$

where $\Delta_k^2$ is a constant matrix given by:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\Delta_{k,jl}^2 \equiv & |2\pi \Sigma_u|^{-\frac{1}{2}} \int \left( \frac{1}{2}(y^* - \xi_j - \overline{u})' \Sigma_u^{-1} (y^* - \xi_j - \overline{u}) \right) \left( \frac{1}{2}(y^* - \xi_j - \overline{u})' \Sigma_u^{-1} (y^* - \xi_j - \overline{u}) \right) df(y^* - \xi_k) \\
= & \frac{1}{4} \left[ (\xi_k - \xi_j)' \Sigma_u^{-1} (\xi_k - \xi_j) \right] \left[ (\xi_k - \xi_l)' \Sigma_u^{-1} (\xi_k - \xi_l) \right] + \frac{1}{4} (\xi_k - \xi_j)' \Sigma_u^{-1} (\xi_k - \xi_j) \\
& + \frac{1}{4} (\xi_k - \xi_l)' \Sigma_u^{-1} (\xi_k - \xi_l) + (\xi_k - \xi_l)' \Sigma_u^{-1} (\xi_k - \xi_j) + \frac{5}{4}.
\end{aligned}
$$

# B Risk aversion benchmark

In this section, I investigate the performance of a power utility model in explaining the time series evolution of credit spreads and equity prices. Instead of solving the portfolio

allocation problem of the representative risk-averse agent, I take the stochastic discount factor as given. In particular, let $S_{t,t+s}$ be the stochastic discount factor between dates $t$ and $t+s$. In an economy where the representative agent evaluates consumption paths using a power utility function:

$$u(\mathcal{K}_t) = \frac{\mathcal{K}_t^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma},$$

where $\mathcal{K}_t \equiv \mathcal{K}(z_t) = \sum_{i=1}^{I} \delta_i A_i(z_t)$ is the level of consumption at date $t$ and $\gamma > 0$ is the degree of risk aversion, the stochastic discount factor is given by:

$$S_{t,t+s} = \beta^s \frac{\mathcal{K}_{t+s}^{-\gamma}}{\mathcal{K}_t^{-\gamma}}. \tag{B.1}$$

Consider first the CDS spread on a swap with maturity $T = t+6n$ on the consol bond of firm $i$. In the economy with the risk-averse representative agent, this is given by:

$$c_i(t,T) = \frac{2X_i \mathbb{E}\left[\beta^{\tau_i - t}\mathcal{K}_{\tau_i}^{-\gamma}\mathbf{1}_{\tau_i<T}\middle|\,\mathcal{G}_t\right]}{\sum_{s=1}^{n}\beta^{6s}\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{K}_{t+6s}^{-\gamma}\mathbf{1}_{\tau_i\geq t+6s}\middle|\,\mathcal{G}_t\right]}.$$

Notice that:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}\left[\beta^{\tau_i - t}\mathcal{K}_{\tau_i}^{-\gamma}\mathbf{1}_{\tau_i<T}\middle|\,\mathcal{G}_t\right] &= \sum_{s=1}^{T-t}\beta^s\mathbb{E}\left[\mathbf{1}_{\tau_i=t+s}\mathcal{K}_{t+s}^{-\gamma}\middle|\,\mathcal{G}_t\right] \\
\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{K}_{t+6s}^{-\gamma}\mathbf{1}_{\tau_i\geq t+6s}\middle|\,\mathcal{G}_t\right] &= \mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{K}_{t+6s}^{-\gamma}\middle|\,\mathcal{G}_t\right] - \sum_{k=1}^{6s}\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{K}_{t+6s}^{-\gamma}\mathbf{1}_{\tau_i=t+k}\middle|\,\mathcal{G}_t\right].
\end{aligned}$$

Let $q_{ij}^{(n)} = \mathbb{P}\left(z_{t+n} = \xi_j,\ z_{t+n-1} \neq \xi_j, \ldots,\ z_{t+1} \neq \xi_j \middle|\, z_t = \xi_i\right)$ be the probability that $t+n$ is the first hitting time of $\xi_j$ conditional on being in state $i$ at date $t$. Then:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{K}_{t+s}^{-\gamma}\mathbf{1}_{\tau_i=t+s}\middle|\,\mathcal{G}_t\right] &= \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{jt} q_{ji^*}^{(s)} \mathcal{K}(a_{B_i})^{-\gamma} \\
\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{K}_{t+s}^{-\gamma}\middle|\,\mathcal{G}_t\right] &= \sum_{j\in a_B^c} p_{jt} \sum_{k=1}^{N} \left\{\Lambda^s\right\}_{jk} \mathcal{K}(\xi_k)^{-\gamma} \\
\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{K}_{t+s_1}^{-\gamma}\mathbf{1}_{\tau_i=t+s_2}\middle|\,\mathcal{G}_t\right] &= \sum_{j\in a_B^c} p_{jt} q_{ji^*} \sum_{k=1}^{N} \left\{\Lambda^{s_1-s_2}\right\}_{jk} \mathcal{K}(\xi_k)^{-\gamma}.
\end{aligned}$$

Table VIII presents the 5 year CDS spreads on the financial institutions for different levels of risk aversion at four of interest – before the start of the crisis, July 2007, at the start of the crisis in August 2007, after the bailout of Bear Stearns in March 2008 and after

the liquidation of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 – together with the observations of the 5 year CDS spreads at these dates. Notice first that while the model-implied credit spreads do increase during the crisis, the magnitude of the model-implied spreads remains much smaller than that of the observed CDS spreads. The only exception is JP Morgan, the model-implied spreads for which exceed the observed ones during the crisis. Notice also, that the dependence on the degree of risk aversion is not monotone. In particular, although the spreads increase initially as the degree of risk aversion increases, further increases in risk aversion decrease the model-implied CDS spreads.

(Table VIII about here.)

Consider now the date $t$ price of a claim to the equity of firm $i$. Using the stochastic discount factor of the risk-averse agent, the equity price satisfies the Euler equation:

$$V_{it} = \mathbb{E}\left[\delta_i A_{it} - C_i + S_{t,t+1}\mathbf{1}_{\tau_i > t+1} V_{i,t+1} \middle| \mathcal{G}_t\right]. \tag{B.2}$$

Similarly to the case with model misspecification, I look for a first order approximation to the equity price in terms of log deviations from the steady state:

$$V_{ir}(\pi_t) = \nu_{ir,0} + \nu'_{ir,1} diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi}_t + O_2(\hat{\pi}_t).$$

Substituting into the Euler equation and equation coefficients, we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned}
\nu_{ir,0} &= \sum_{j\in a_B^c} \overline{\pi}_j \left\{ \delta_i A_{ij} - C_i + \beta \sum_{k\in a_B^c} \frac{\mathcal{K}(\xi_k)^{-\gamma}}{\mathcal{K}(\xi_j)^{-\gamma}} \lambda_{jk} \left[\nu_{ir,0} + \nu'_{ir,1} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}\left(\mathcal{L}_0 + \Delta_k^1\right)\right] \right\} \\
&\quad + \beta \sum_{j\in a_B^c} \overline{\pi}_j \sum_{k\neq i} \lambda_{jk^*} \frac{\mathcal{K}(\xi_{k^*})^{-\gamma}}{\mathcal{K}(\xi_j)^{-\gamma}} \\
\nu_{ir,1j} &= \delta_i A_{ij} - C_i + \beta \sum_{k\in a_B^c} \frac{\mathcal{K}(\xi_k)^{-\gamma}}{\mathcal{K}(\xi_j)^{-\gamma}} \lambda_{jk} \left[\nu_{ir,0} + \nu'_{ir,1} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}\left(\mathcal{L}_0 + \Delta_k^1\right)\right] \\
&\quad + \beta \sum_{k\neq i} \lambda_{jk^*} \frac{\mathcal{K}(\xi_{k^*})^{-\gamma}}{\mathcal{K}(\xi_j)^{-\gamma}} - \nu_{ir,0} + \beta \nu'_{ir,1} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) \mathcal{L}'_{1j} \sum_{l,k\in a_B^c} \overline{\pi}_l \lambda_{lk} \frac{\mathcal{K}(\xi_k)^{-\gamma}}{\mathcal{K}(\xi_l)^{-\gamma}}.
\end{aligned}$$

Similarly, at the time of default of firm $j$, the equity price of firm $i$ solves:

$$\begin{aligned}
V_{ir}^{\tau_j} &= \delta_i A_{ij^*} - C_i + \beta \sum_{k\in a_B^c} \frac{\mathcal{K}(\xi_k)^{-\gamma}}{\mathcal{K}(\xi_{j^*})^{-\gamma}} \lambda_{j^*k} \left[\nu_{ir,0} + \nu'_{ir,1} diag(\overline{\pi}) diag(\mathbf{1}_{a_B^c}) \left(\mathcal{L}_0 + \mathcal{L}_1 diag(\overline{\pi})\hat{\pi} + \Delta_k^1\right)\right] \\
&\quad + \beta \sum_{k\neq i} \lambda_{j^*k^*} \frac{\mathcal{K}(\xi_{k^*})^{-\gamma}}{\mathcal{K}(\xi_{j^*})^{-\gamma}} V_{ir}^{\tau_k}.
\end{aligned}$$

| | Mean | St. Dev. | Correlations | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | BAC | BSC | Citi | GS | JPM | MER | MS | WB | WFC | CS10 | SP500 |
| BAC | 56038.09 | 65351.99 | 100.00 | | | | | | | | | 76.99 | 61.27 |
| BSC | 4508.48 | 3687.57 | 98.08 | 100.00 | | | | | | | | 95.85 | 83.32 |
| Citi | 53210.59 | 51820.79 | 91.39 | 56.58 | 100.00 | | | | | | | 91.01 | 75.66 |
| GS | 32395.77 | 18845.19 | 96.01 | -20.99 | 93.12 | 100.00 | | | | | | 48.25 | -10.57 |
| JPM | 51611.38 | 57647.31 | 79.25 | 33.03 | 74.92 | 78.50 | 100.00 | | | | | 67.35 | 48.97 |
| MER | 15995.35 | 13145.67 | 88.73 | 73.51 | 97.45 | 92.10 | 71.71 | 100.00 | | | | 95.81 | 76.41 |
| MS | 16683.24 | 14747.40 | 95.92 | 43.47 | 97.14 | 96.66 | 76.59 | 78.11 | 100.00 | | | 83.31 | 73.77 |
| WB | 21541.91 | 22530.87 | 96.66 | 92.99 | 93.97 | 96.84 | 71.40 | 95.30 | 93.99 | 100.00 | | 93.78 | 75.48 |
| WFC | 23943.94 | 28543.76 | 96.35 | 19.57 | 88.91 | 94.29 | 73.87 | 63.31 | 94.59 | 31.24 | 100.00 | 68.15 | 55.87 |

Table I: Sample moments of and empirical correlations between the book equity of financial institutions and aggregate market indicators. CS10 is the Case-Shiller 10 index; SP500 is the Standard and Poor's 500 index. Data Source: Compustat, CRSP

| | BAC | BSC | Citi | GS | JPM | MER | MS | WB | WFC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| $\delta$ | 3.67 | 3.41 | 3.97 | 4.46 | 9.67 | 3.39 | 4.69 | 3.13 | 3.13 |
| $D$ | 1398608 | 381237.992 | 2093112 | 891128 | 1338831 | 1034133 | 1160482 | 647525 | 492564 |
| $X$ | 47.61 | 70.20 | 67.91 | 98.77 | 75.05 | 66.96 | 65.11 | 45.07 | 46.35 |
| $C$ | 530.96 | 120.85 | 767.83 | 669.21 | 496.40 | 305.24 | 404.80 | 225.59 | 202.27 |

Table II: Parameters estimated outside the MCMC procedure of Appendix **??**. $\delta$, the fraction of assets generated as payoffs, and $X$, the payment in case of default, are reported in percentage terms; $D$ is the face value of the consol bond, taken to be the last available observation of long-term debt; $C$ is the monthly coupon payment on the consol bond.

$\zeta_f$

| BAC | BSC | Citi | GS | JPM | MER | MS | WB | WFC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7.40 | 7.98 | 9.66 | 5.54 | 10.00 | 9.21 | 9.11 | 9.37 | 9.13 |
| 9.83 | 6.92 | 9.58 | 5.29 | 9.99 | 9.10 | 9.00 | 9.28 | 9.02 |
| 9.75 | 7.93 | 6.91 | 5.19 | 9.92 | 9.08 | 8.98 | 9.27 | 8.99 |
| 9.74 | 7.91 | 9.55 | 0.13 | 9.91 | 9.04 | 8.97 | 9.25 | 8.95 |
| 9.86 | 7.99 | 9.71 | 5.57 | 8.00 | 9.01 | 8.91 | 9.17 | 8.86 |
| 9.98 | 8.07 | 9.90 | 5.99 | 10.11 | 8.02 | 8.87 | 9.16 | 8.85 |
| 9.89 | 7.99 | 9.73 | 5.66 | 10.03 | 9.12 | 6.82 | 9.14 | 8.85 |
| 9.73 | 7.91 | 9.54 | 5.19 | 9.91 | 8.98 | 8.88 | 7.49 | 8.84 |
| 9.75 | 7.92 | 9.59 | 5.21 | 9.95 | 9.01 | 8.90 | 9.19 | 7.05 |
| 9.73 | 7.88 | 9.52 | 5.05 | 9.90 | 8.99 | 8.87 | 9.14 | 8.84 |
| 9.74 | 7.94 | 9.58 | 5.28 | 9.91 | 9.04 | 8.91 | 9.16 | 8.88 |
| 9.86 | 8.01 | 9.73 | 5.66 | 10.02 | 9.12 | 8.99 | 9.27 | 8.98 |
| 9.69 | 7.89 | 9.49 | 5.10 | 9.90 | 8.98 | 8.85 | 9.10 | 8.80 |
| 9.71 | 7.89 | 9.54 | 5.16 | 9.88 | 9.02 | 8.87 | 9.13 | 8.85 |
| 9.71 | 7.91 | 9.55 | 5.14 | 9.90 | 9.01 | 8.87 | 9.13 | 8.83 |
| 9.78 | 7.94 | 9.60 | 5.37 | 9.95 | 9.03 | 8.93 | 9.18 | 8.89 |
| 9.75 | 7.92 | 9.57 | 5.30 | 9.93 | 9.03 | 8.92 | 9.18 | 8.87 |
| 9.83 | 7.97 | 9.67 | 5.47 | 10.00 | 9.09 | 8.98 | 9.23 | 8.96 |

$\zeta_c$

| | |
|---|---|
| 4.06 | 4.82 |

$\rho$

| BAC | BSC | Citi | GS | JPM | MER | MS | WB | WFC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.20 | 0.00 | 0.09 | 0.01 | 0.27 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.06 | 0.01 |

$\Omega_c$

| | |
|---|---|
| 99.32 | 0.68 |
| 0.54 | 99.46 |

$\Omega_f$

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 54.90 | 2.74 | 2.63 | 2.56 | 2.71 | 2.68 | 2.60 | 2.58 | 2.66 | 2.70 | 2.53 | 2.63 | 2.73 | 2.64 | 2.63 | 2.63 | 2.70 | 2.75 |
| 2.58 | 55.04 | 2.61 | 2.68 | 2.69 | 2.73 | 2.66 | 2.66 | 2.65 | 2.66 | 2.59 | 2.57 | 2.62 | 2.64 | 2.69 | 2.59 | 2.74 | 2.61 |
| 2.63 | 2.65 | 55.12 | 2.65 | 2.60 | 2.59 | 2.72 | 2.66 | 2.71 | 2.68 | 2.67 | 2.65 | 2.59 | 2.69 | 2.57 | 2.57 | 2.63 | 2.62 |
| 2.63 | 2.65 | 2.61 | 55.08 | 2.63 | 2.75 | 2.53 | 2.63 | 2.68 | 2.62 | 2.65 | 2.65 | 2.63 | 2.69 | 2.67 | 2.62 | 2.69 | 2.62 |
| 2.62 | 2.64 | 2.57 | 2.73 | 54.93 | 2.60 | 2.73 | 2.63 | 2.70 | 2.62 | 2.66 | 2.59 | 2.59 | 2.73 | 2.66 | 2.62 | 2.70 | 2.68 |
| 2.68 | 2.64 | 2.67 | 2.62 | 2.63 | 54.99 | 2.80 | 2.59 | 2.59 | 2.64 | 2.59 | 2.65 | 2.55 | 2.77 | 2.68 | 2.57 | 2.70 | 2.62 |
| 2.79 | 2.66 | 2.64 | 2.67 | 2.67 | 2.61 | 54.87 | 2.68 | 2.70 | 2.58 | 2.67 | 2.67 | 2.63 | 2.69 | 2.66 | 2.59 | 2.63 | 2.60 |
| 2.65 | 2.54 | 2.76 | 2.65 | 2.75 | 2.76 | 2.47 | 54.97 | 2.69 | 2.63 | 2.72 | 2.65 | 2.54 | 2.61 | 2.72 | 2.61 | 2.65 | 2.62 |
| 2.70 | 2.67 | 2.60 | 2.64 | 2.84 | 2.67 | 2.65 | 2.66 | 54.98 | 2.59 | 2.52 | 2.58 | 2.73 | 2.64 | 2.67 | 2.73 | 2.56 | 2.57 |
| 2.73 | 2.58 | 2.65 | 2.70 | 2.64 | 2.63 | 2.74 | 2.62 | 2.67 | 54.76 | 2.69 | 2.56 | 2.69 | 2.62 | 2.74 | 2.67 | 2.58 | 2.73 |
| 2.70 | 2.58 | 2.71 | 2.64 | 2.58 | 2.65 | 2.68 | 2.62 | 2.51 | 2.78 | 55.04 | 2.71 | 2.61 | 2.57 | 2.62 | 2.68 | 2.66 | 2.65 |
| 2.63 | 2.65 | 2.58 | 2.68 | 2.62 | 2.57 | 2.61 | 2.62 | 2.57 | 2.66 | 2.75 | 55.23 | 2.62 | 2.56 | 2.66 | 2.69 | 2.74 | 2.57 |
| 2.64 | 2.66 | 2.64 | 2.57 | 2.57 | 2.75 | 2.69 | 2.66 | 2.64 | 2.67 | 2.60 | 2.57 | 55.08 | 2.53 | 2.64 | 2.76 | 2.64 | 2.69 |
| 2.58 | 2.59 | 2.63 | 2.60 | 2.64 | 2.69 | 2.65 | 2.61 | 2.65 | 2.63 | 2.61 | 2.58 | 2.68 | 54.96 | 2.60 | 2.73 | 2.79 | 2.81 |
| 2.61 | 2.66 | 2.67 | 2.66 | 2.60 | 2.59 | 2.67 | 2.65 | 2.75 | 2.67 | 2.75 | 2.66 | 2.60 | 2.60 | 54.82 | 2.71 | 2.68 | 2.63 |
| 2.74 | 2.67 | 2.53 | 2.65 | 2.65 | 2.61 | 2.66 | 2.73 | 2.72 | 2.61 | 2.62 | 2.72 | 2.62 | 2.76 | 2.70 | 54.82 | 2.51 | 2.65 |
| 2.67 | 2.65 | 2.61 | 2.58 | 2.70 | 2.66 | 2.68 | 2.71 | 2.68 | 2.61 | 2.65 | 2.60 | 2.70 | 2.59 | 2.74 | 2.70 | 54.87 | 2.58 |
| 2.59 | 2.64 | 2.66 | 2.63 | 2.52 | 2.64 | 2.67 | 2.69 | 2.65 | 2.64 | 2.66 | 2.76 | 2.62 | 2.72 | 2.61 | 2.70 | 2.71 | 54.88 |

$\Sigma_u$

| | BAC | BSC | Citi | GS | JPM | MER | MS | WB | WFC | CS10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BAC | 31.92 | 3.85 | 8.56 | -0.05 | 7.85 | 3.71 | 5.99 | 6.69 | 5.76 | 0 |
| BSC | 3.85 | 25.47 | 3.85 | 0.01 | 4.02 | 2.34 | 3.14 | 3.63 | 2.81 | 0 |
| Citi | 8.56 | 3.85 | 32.76 | -0.04 | 7.49 | 3.80 | 6.21 | 6.67 | 6.23 | 0 |
| GS | -0.05 | 0.01 | -0.04 | 14.45 | -0.03 | 0.01 | -0.06 | -0.02 | -0.03 | 0 |
| JPM | 7.85 | 4.02 | 7.49 | -0.03 | 35.26 | 4.10 | 5.10 | 7.12 | 5.23 | 0 |
| MER | 3.71 | 2.34 | 3.80 | 0.01 | 4.10 | 25.42 | 2.96 | 3.63 | 3.08 | 0 |
| MS | 5.99 | 3.14 | 6.21 | -0.06 | 5.10 | 2.96 | 27.16 | 4.76 | 4.32 | 0 |
| WB | 6.69 | 3.63 | 6.67 | -0.02 | 7.12 | 3.63 | 4.76 | 29.20 | 4.88 | 0 |
| WFC | 5.76 | 2.81 | 6.23 | -0.03 | 5.23 | 3.08 | 4.32 | 4.88 | 27.54 | 0 |
| CS10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 72.93 |

Table III: Reference model parameters estimated using the MCMC procedure of Appendix **??**. The transition probability matrices $\Omega_f$ and $\Omega_c$ as well as the covariance matrix $\Sigma_u$ are reported in percentage terms. The parameters are estimated using 10000 draws from the Gibbs sampler, with a 1000 draw burn-in period.

| | Pre-crisis | Pre- Bear Stearns | Pre- Lehman Brothers |
|---|---|---|---|
| $\theta_d^{-1}$ | 0.23 | 0.21 | 0.29 |
| | (0.017) | (0.028) | (0.018) |
| $\theta_s^{-1}$ | 0.64 | 0.65 | 0.69 |
| | (0.021) | (0.029) | (0.019) |
| MSE | 2.63 | 4.04 | 8.51 |

Table IV: Estimates of investors' degree of aversion to ambiguity about the underlying dynamics, $\theta_d^{-1}$, and degree of aversion to the filter distribution, $\theta_s^{-1}$. Half-width of the 95% confidence intervals are reported in parentheses. Mean Squared Error (MSE) is the average squared error between the observed CDS rates and the model-implied CDS rates for all institutions, maturities, and observations. Draws are made using the Metropolis-Hastings procedure of Section 5.2.

| | BAC | BSC | Citi | GS | JPM | MER | MS | WB | WFC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jul 31 07 | 36.2 | 161.7 | 37.2 | 81.2 | 55 | 74.7 | 75.2 | 39.5 | 35.9 |
| | 29.6 | 51.3 | 34.9 | 71.2 | 54.7 | 73.8 | 73.2 | 39.3 | 38.7 |
| Aug 31 07 | 39.7 | 135.7 | 45.5 | 68.8 | 45.4 | 71.7 | 68.8 | 39.4 | 35 |
| | 22.1 | 128.7 | 41.4 | 36.5 | 43.2 | 72.2 | 64.7 | 32.3 | 32.2 |
| Mar 31 08 | 86.8 | 122.7 | 138.2 | 115 | 87.5 | 195.8 | 153.9 | 142.8 | 80.8 |
| | 65.1 | 157.0 | 128.62 | 133.9 | 85.3 | 109.7 | 93.4 | 83.2 | 90.9 |
| Sep 30 08 | 170 | 143.3 | 301.7 | 452.5 | 143.8 | 410.8 | 1022 | 385.8 | 170 |
| | 102.7 | 144.5 | 486.4 | 482.8 | 152.6 | 380.03 | 317.3 | 386.5 | 138.1 |
| Oct 31 08 | 133.1 | 120.2 | 197.6 | 313.3 | 119.9 | 216.2 | 413.3 | 121 | 97.2 |
| | 133.3 | 161.3 | 178.8 | 380.7 | 146.6 | 203.5 | 416.26 | 131.3 | 93.1 |

Table V: Observed 5 year CDS rates and model-implied 5 year CDS rates at five different dates. The reference model parameters are estimated using the Gibbs sampling procedure of Appendix **??**; the degree of aversion to ambiguity about the underlying dynamics, $\theta_d^{-1}$, and the degree of aversion to ambiguity about the filter distribution, $\theta_s^{-1}$, are estimated using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm of Section 5.2.

*Panel A: Misspecified Model*

| | BAC | BSC | Citi | GS | JPM | MER | MS | WB | WFC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jul 31 07 | 5.15 | 9.54 | 10.04 | 13.32 | 11.65 | 10.80 | 13.34 | 11.02 | 10.96 |
| | 100.43 | -18.79 | -25.16 | 256.87 | -9.95 | -32.18 | 47.10 | -26.28 | -28.05 |
| Aug 31 07 | 2.61 | 11.74 | 13.42 | 3.77 | 13.01 | 16.03 | 9.11 | 15.03 | 15.32 |
| | -49.44 | 23.04 | 33.73 | -71.71 | 11.64 | 48.39 | -31.73 | 36.44 | 39.81 |
| Mar 31 08 | 4.81 | 0.00 | 16.22 | 5.12 | 11.64 | 13.42 | 9.08 | 12.83 | 13.01 |
| | 5.11 | -100.00 | 19.85 | 37.19 | -9.44 | -15.05 | 0.53 | -13.45 | -13.90 |
| Sep 30 08 | 4.27 | – | 9.55 | 10.31 | 11.50 | 10.47 | 13.77 | 10.74 | 10.66 |
| | 20.39 | | -42.75 | 155.77 | -0.53 | -23.03 | 59.41 | -16.98 | -18.83 |
| Oct 31 08 | 5.00 | – | 13.86 | 4.55 | 10.44 | 11.81 | 8.25 | 11.34 | 11.49 |
| | 17.20 | | 45.09 | -55.83 | -9.24 | 12.77 | -40.09 | 5.61 | 7.72 |

*Panel B: Reference Model*

| | BAC | BSC | Citi | GS | JPM | MER | MS | WB | WFC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jul 31 07 | 16.47 | 16.47 | 16.47 | 16.47 | 16.47 | 16.47 | 16.47 | 16.47 | 16.47 |
| | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.04 |
| Aug 31 07 | 16.46 | 16.46 | 16.46 | 16.46 | 16.46 | 16.46 | 16.46 | 16.46 | 16.46 |
| | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.03 |
| Mar 31 08 | 11.23 | 0.00 | 11.26 | 11.23 | 11.21 | 11.19 | 11.21 | 11.22 | 11.21 |
| | -31.74 | -100.00 | -31.63 | -31.79 | -31.88 | -31.98 | -31.90 | -31.81 | -31.87 |
| Sep 30 08 | 11.23 | – | 11.25 | 11.25 | 11.26 | 11.22 | 11.21 | 11.22 | 11.22 |
| | -28.05 | | -27.97 | -27.99 | -27.92 | -28.12 | -28.18 | -28.13 | -28.15 |
| Oct 31 08 | 11.32 | – | 11.35 | 11.34 | 11.35 | 11.32 | 11.31 | 11.32 | 11.31 |
| | 0.81 | | 0.85 | 0.84 | 0.79 | 0.84 | 0.85 | 0.87 | 0.85 |

Table VI: Expected time to default and the percentage change in the expected time to default relative to previous month for different financial institutions. Panel A: expected time to default perceived by the misspecification-averse agent. Panel B: expected time to default under the reference model. The reference model parameters are estimated using the Gibbs sampling procedure of Appendix **??**; the degree of aversion to ambiguity about the underlying dynamics, $\theta_d^{-1}$, and the degree of aversion to ambiguity about the filter distribution, $\theta_s^{-1}$, are estimated using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm of Section 5.2.

July 31, 2007

| | Main | $\theta_s^{-1} = 0$ | $\theta_d^{-1} = 0$ |
|---|---|---|---|
| BAC | -5.53 | -0.82 | -14.20 |
| BSC | -71.79 | -53.66 | -5.90 |
| Citi | 31.10 | -7.75 | 3.55 |
| GS | 1.19 | 0.59 | 1.88 |
| JPM | -3.42 | 15.32 | 3.09 |
| MER | -6.05 | 4.52 | 0.35 |
| MS | -1.41 | -0.15 | 0.59 |
| WB | -2.12 | 0.98 | -1.18 |
| WFC | 3.01 | -3.67 | 0.95 |

August 31, 2007

| | Main | $\theta_s^{-1} = 0$ | $\theta_d^{-1} = 0$ |
|---|---|---|---|
| BAC | -17.38 | -2.52 | -44.33 |
| BSC | -61.64 | -48.49 | -5.16 |
| Citi | -77.8 | 20.15 | -9.01 |
| GS | -29.22 | -14.97 | -46.95 |
| JPM | 5.51 | -22.82 | -4.85 |
| MER | -12.13 | 9.07 | 0.7 |
| MS | 14.53 | 1.45 | -5.96 |
| WB | -31.98 | 15.23 | -18.02 |
| WFC | -25.14 | 31.14 | -8 |

March 31, 2008

| | Main | $\theta_s^{-1} = 0$ | $\theta_d^{-1} = 0$ |
|---|---|---|---|
| BAC | 1.22 | -22.47 | -25 |
| BSC | 53.14 | 31.05 | 27.95 |
| Citi | -6.98 | -44.97 | -6.93 |
| GS | 18.7 | 6.7 | 16.43 |
| JPM | -28.23 | -53.49 | -2.51 |
| MER | -45.49 | -68.65 | -43.97 |
| MS | -42.18 | -67.52 | -39.31 |
| WB | -45.67 | -70.22 | -41.74 |
| WFC | 6.84 | -40.22 | 12.5 |

September 30, 2008

| | Main | $\theta_s^{-1} = 0$ | $\theta_d^{-1} = 0$ |
|---|---|---|---|
| BAC | 12.59 | 2.24 | -39.59 |
| BSC | -0.28 | 15.35 | 0.84 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Citi | 61.37 | 44.14 | 61.22 |
| GS | -66.27 | -22.98 | 6.7 |
| JPM | 21.32 | -6.95 | 6.12 |
| MER | -7.28 | 15.86 | -7.49 |
| MS | -65.75 | -63.05 | -68.95 |
| WB | 1.56 | 18.53 | 0.18 |
| WFC | -18.53 | -14.18 | -18.76 |

October 31, 2008

| | Main | $\theta_s^{-1} = 0$ | $\theta_d^{-1} = 0$ |
|---|---|---|---|
| BAC | -0.69 | -0.10 | -1.77 |
| BSC | -108.75 | -81.28 | -8.93 |
| Citi | -92.31 | 23.02 | -10.54 |
| GS | 0.37 | 0.18 | 0.59 |
| JPM | -4.69 | 21.02 | 4.25 |
| MER | -11.10 | 8.29 | 0.64 |
| MS | -1.53 | -0.16 | 0.64 |
| WB | -49.26 | 22.82 | -27.47 |
| WFC | -28.55 | 34.80 | -9.03 |

Table VII: Percent deviation between the observed 5 year CDS rates and model-implied 5 year CDS rates for different ambiguity aversion specifications at five different dates. "Main" refers to the setting in the main body of the paper, with the representative agent averse to ambiguity about both the underlying dynamics and the filter distribution; $\theta_s^{-1}$ refers to the case when the representative agent is averse to ambiguity about the underlying dynamics only; $\theta_d^{-1} = 0$ refers to the case when the representative agent is averse to ambiguity about the filter distribution only. The reference model parameters are estimated using the Gibbs sampling procedure of Appendix **??**; the degree of aversion to ambiguity about the underlying dynamics, $\theta_d^{-1}$, and the degree of aversion to ambiguity about the filter distribution, $\theta_s^{-1}$, are estimated using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm of Section 5.2.

July 31 2007

| | Data | $\gamma = 0$ | 0.5 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BAC | 36.2 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.5 | 1.2 |
| BSC | 161.7 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.4 | 1.0 | 0.7 |
| Citi | 37.2 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.2 | 0.9 |
| GS | 81.2 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.5 |
| JPM | 55 | 1.2 | 1.8 | 2.7 | 5.7 | 10.8 | 17.9 | 25.9 |
| MER | 74.7 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.4 | 1.0 |
| MS | 75.2 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.5 | 1.1 |
| WB | 39.5 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.5 | 1.1 |
| WFC | 35.9 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.4 | 1.1 |

August 31 2007

| | Data | $\gamma = 0$ | 0.5 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BAC | 39.7 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 1.7 |
| BSC | 135.7 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 1.7 | 1.3 | 0.9 |
| Citi | 45.5 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 1.2 |
| GS | 68.8 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.5 | 1.1 | 0.7 |
| JPM | 45.4 | 1.8 | 2.6 | 3.9 | 8.2 | 15.6 | 25.9 | 37.5 |
| MER | 71.7 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 1.5 |
| MS | 68.8 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 1.6 |
| WB | 39.4 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.1 | 1.6 |
| WFC | 35 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 1.5 |

March 31 2008

| | Data | $\gamma = 0$ | 0.5 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BAC | 86.8 | 19.0 | 19.4 | 19.6 | 19.2 | 17.3 | 13.9 | 9.9 |
| BSC | 122.7 | 861.4 | 795.8 | 729.6 | 591.7 | 445.4 | 301.7 | 181.3 |
| Citi | 138.2 | 19.5 | 19.3 | 18.9 | 17.4 | 14.7 | 11.1 | 7.4 |
| GS | 115 | 20.2 | 18.8 | 17.4 | 14.2 | 10.7 | 7.2 | 4.2 |
| JPM | 87.5 | 18.6 | 26.2 | 36.5 | 67.9 | 116.0 | 176.8 | 237.7 |
| MER | 195.8 | 20.4 | 20.6 | 20.6 | 19.6 | 17.2 | 13.4 | 9.3 |
| MS | 153.9 | 19.9 | 20.2 | 20.4 | 19.8 | 17.7 | 14.1 | 9.9 |
| WB | 142.8 | 19.8 | 20.1 | 20.2 | 19.5 | 17.3 | 13.7 | 9.5 |
| WFC | 80.8 | 19.7 | 19.9 | 20.0 | 19.1 | 16.8 | 13.2 | 9.2 |

September 30 2008

| | Data | $\gamma = 0$ | 0.5 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BAC | 170 | 19.2 | 19.6 | 19.8 | 19.5 | 17.5 | 14.1 | 10.0 |
| BSC | 143.3 | 19.8 | 18.8 | 17.7 | 14.9 | 11.6 | 8.1 | 4.9 |
| Citi | 301.7 | 19.8 | 19.6 | 19.2 | 17.7 | 15.0 | 11.3 | 7.5 |
| GS | 452.5 | 19.7 | 18.4 | 17.0 | 13.9 | 10.5 | 7.0 | 4.1 |
| JPM | 143.8 | 17.5 | 24.6 | 34.3 | 63.9 | 109.2 | 166.4 | 223.8 |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MER | 410.8 | 19.7 | 19.9 | 19.8 | 18.9 | 16.6 | 13.0 | 9.0 |
| MS | 1022 | 20.0 | 20.3 | 20.5 | 19.9 | 17.8 | 14.2 | 9.9 |
| WB | 385.8 | 20.1 | 20.4 | 20.5 | 19.7 | 17.5 | 13.9 | 9.7 |
| WFC | 170 | 19.7 | 20.0 | 20.0 | 19.2 | 16.9 | 13.3 | 9.2 |

Table VIII: Observed five year CDS and implied CDS for different levels of the risk aversion coefficient, $\gamma$, at four different dates. $\gamma = 0$ corresponds to the case of risk-neutral investors, which is the reference model case in this paper. The reference model parameters are estimated using the Gibbs sampling procedure of Appendix **??**.




Figure 1: Evolution of the five year CDS spreads for financial institutions over the course of the crisis. Data source: Datastream




Figure 2: Event tree for the three period economy in Section 3.




Figure 3: Misspecified probability tree for the three period economy in Section 3.




Figure 4: Distorted probability of an up movement for various levels of ambiguity aversion.




Figure 5: Distorted probability of the high state for various levels of ambiguity aversion.




Figure 6: Distorted probability of default for various levels of ambiguity aversion.




Figure 7: Contribution to entropy for various levels of ambiguity aversion.




Figure 8: Filtered estimates of fundamental asset value evolution (left-hand scale) and the observed book value evolution (right-hand scale) for different financial institutions. Parameters are estimated using the Gibbs Sampling procedure of Appendix **??** with 10000 draws and 1000 draw burn-in. The different states are weighted using the reference model conditional probabilities.




Figure 9: Components of relative entropy between the reference and misspecified models over time. Upper panel: entropy due to misspecification of the joint signals and states dynamics; central panel: entropy due to misspecification of the current period conditional probability; lower panel: total entropy. The right hand scale in each panel is the three month moving average of the corresponding entropy measure. The degree of aversion to ambiguity about the underlying dynamics, $\theta_d^{-1}$, and the degree of aversion to ambiguity about the filter distribution, $\theta_s^{-1}$, are estimated using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm of Section 5.2.




Figure 10: Value of equity under the misspecified model (left-hand scales) and the observed value of equity (right-hand scale) of the different financial institutions over time. The degree of aversion to ambiguity about the underlying dynamics, $\theta_d^{-1}$, and the degree of aversion to ambiguity about the filter distribution, $\theta_s^{-1}$, are estimated using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm of Section 5.2.